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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to construct a comprehensive view of the GAP project from its 
establishment in the 1950s through to 2015 through employing two theoretical 
approaches (‘modernization/development’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ theories) and wide-
ranging fieldwork in south-east Turkey, conducting interviews with local people, 
initiators of the project, local civil organizations and political actors. 
Modernization/development theory is employed to examine the content and 
conceptualization of GAP, cosmopolitan theory to assess obstacles to the GAP ‘social 
development’ project. Fieldwork has been undertaken to collect primary data and 
make the contextualization more comprehensive. In this way the thesis seeks to 
determine whether the GAP project has made positive progress towards enabling the 
sustainable development of the south-east and resolve the problem of the unequal 
socio-economic development of the south-east relative to the rest of Turkey. The 
thesis also seeks to determine whether the project has had a negative impact on the 
environment, archaeological sites, historical towns, settlements and cultural heritage 
in the region. 
The main purpose of the thesis is to examine two factors in relation to the 
GAP ‘social development’ project: (1) understanding the core concept behind the 
materialization of the project, which involves ending the region’s longstanding 
chronic poverty, provide socio-economic stability and creating integration with the 
industrialized west of Turkey; (2) a comparative analysis of empirical and theoretical 
work provides a review of the conceptualization of the project and investigation of the 
extent to which it has succeeded, and an assessment is made of obstructions which 
have led to the project failing to achieve many of its  targets. 
The thesis argues that four problems, three internal and one external, have 
impacted on the ‘social development’ aspect of the GAP project. It also points out the 
historical factors involved in Turkish policy for the region, and demonstrates how the 
success or failure of the project depends on how far the Turkish state understands the 
need for local cultural empowerment and operates in the interests of local people.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
Along with the Nile River, which mankind began to utilize about 7,000 years ago for 
the cultivation of cereals and herding in Egypt and the Sudan (Hassan 2007), the 
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have played a significant role in mankind’s 
socio-economy since ancient times.1 Along with the Nile, dams were constructed on 
the Euphrates and Tigris, and canals were dug to enable the cultivation of crops, 
which played a significant role in cultural identity, the religious beliefs of mankind, 
connecting people through their navigable channels and promoting the concentration 
of human settlements.  
Having said that, in the modern world, from the beginning of the industrial 
revolution which ushered in an era of fast economic development in the advanced 
states with the help of agricultural economic enterprise, the notion of constructing 
dams and utilizing the water has been developed to enable the development of socio-
economic conditions in a more sophisticated way. In particular, from the twentieth 
century onwards, the concept of infrastructure water projects have had an 
extraordinary impact on the social development of many countries, both advanced and 
developing.2  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The biblical references indicate how the lands lying between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers were 
maintained by the ancient civilizations for irrigation and flood control (Mountjoy 2005). The ancient 
civilizations in Mesopotamia, led by Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians and Assyrians, organized 
effectively on the basis of irrigation and hydraulics, which supported millions of inhabitants in the 
region (Kliot 1994); and it was these civilisations, with the help of water, which created sophisticated 
systems which led to the development of the world’s first arches, writing system, new cities, potters’ 
wheels, metalworks, wheeled carts, the science of mathematics and astronomy (Stansfield 2007). 
Moreover, the great ancient cities such as the Assyrian capitals of Asshur, Nimrud and Ninevah, the 
Sumerian cities of Nippur and Ur, the ancient cities of Ashur, Calah, and Nineveh, the Median city of 
Amed, and the Abbasid towns of Baghdad, Samarra and Mosul were built on or near the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers (Kolars and Mitchell 1991). These cities took life from the water of these two rivers, and 
developed as a consequence.  The modern world’s knowledge of how to utilize water for large-scale 
irrigation and hydraulic projects is rooted in ancient times. 
2 Among these water projects are the Hoover Dam, which was completed in 1936 and prompted US 
agricultural and industrial development; the Kariba Dam in southern Africa, built in the 1950s for 
economic development; the Bhakra Dam in India built in the 1960s, which “became the symbol of 
India’s green revolution, and was hailed by the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru as a ‘Temple of 
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States throughout the world have provided water for irrigation, hydroelectric 
purposes, industrial use, flood control and fresh water for domestic use. According to 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD),3 states built 45,000 big dams all over the 
world in the last century (WCD 2000). These large dams have had a mixed impact on 
local populations and the regions’ demography. Negative effects on the regions 
include the flooding of historical sites and settlement areas and the creation of 
environmental problems all over the globe. However, dam projects have also been 
planned for facilitating flood control, planned irrigated agriculture and hydro-electric 
power plants for countries’ energy needs, all of which bring significant benefits for 
the countries in which the dams have been constructed (Oktem 2002).  
In Turkey since the creation of the republic in 1923, over 600 dams4 have been 
planned for domestic and industrial use,5 22 of which were formulated in the south-
east on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers under the name of the South-east Anatolia 
Project (Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)) established in 1989, which comprises: 
13 sub-projects of irrigation and energy schemes, 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants, 
expected to generate 27 million kWh electricity a year, that is “nearly two-thirds more 
than the amount of electricity produced hydroelectrically in the entire country” 
(Kolars & Mitchell 1991: 24). In terms of irrigation, the scope of the project 
represents about 20% of Turkey’s total (18 million ha).  
Although this $32 billion (US) project was originated mainly for the purpose 
of hydroelectric power production and irrigation in the 1950s, led by the Turkish 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su Isleri (DSI)), by the late 
1980s the GAP infrastructure incorporated a ‘social development’ programme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Modern India’ (The Guardian 12 January 2015); the Aswan Dam project in Egypt, which was one of 
the major achievements of the Egyptian government in the 1960s, and provided for Egypt’s water and 
energy demands, and was used as a defence against droughts and for the creation of land irrigation 
(Hassan 2007); and Three Gorges Dam in China, competed in 2008, considered to be the largest 
hydroelectric scheme in the world.  
3 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was formed in 1997 by individual members who are not 
members of an organization or government and its commissioners began work in 1998 reviewing the 
effectiveness of large dams globally in terms of socio-economic, environmental and social 
development, and assessing alternatives for water and energy resources management. As Professor 
Kader Asmal, WCD Chair, stated: “Our task was to conduct a rigorous, independent review of the 
development effectiveness of large dams, to assess alternatives and to propose practical guidelines for 
future decision-making” (WCD 2000).   
4 These 600 dams are large dams that were planned within Turkish borders, making Turkey one of the 
world’s most active dam building states (internationalrivers.org). Small dams are not included. 
5 See www.milliyet.com.tr and www.Hurriyet.com.tr. (accessed 25 June 2015)  
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through the GAP Master Plan, under its Regional Development Administration (GAP-
RDA), which was established in 1989 and became an integrated regional 
modernization and development project.  
According to the official statement of the Turkish state, the project was 
established in order to develop and modernize the most socio-economically 
underdeveloped region, the south-east, dealing with issues that had not been seriously 
considered since the creation of  the Turkish Republic in 1923. According to official 
discourse, GAP6, through the Master Plan, was designed for increasing irrigation, 
power production, urban and rural infrastructure, education and health, housing, 
transportation, communication, agricultural and industrial development, and 
employment (Carkoglu and Eder 2005; Ünver 1997).7 So the Turkish government 
presents GAP as a modernizing ‘social development’ scheme that will create 
economic, social and spatial changes, and end the chronic poverty of the south-
east/Kurdish region by raising local income levels and living standards, providing 
social stability and economic growth by enhancing the employment capacity of the 
regional sector and creating socio-economic integration between the underdeveloped 
south-east/Kurds and the industrialized west/Turks. GAP was initiated and presented 
the most comprehensive and significant projects in the south-east of Turkey.  
Despite a certain amount of research addressing the implementation of GAP 
and the explanation of its role and political conception with regard to water use in the 
Middle East, including protection of historical sites and environmental issues, the 
current literature does not take a sufficiently broad view of the empirical and 
theoretical implications of the incomplete and fragmentary GAP ‘social development’ 
project. 8 There is still a great range of questions which remain to be answered. For 
instance, has GAP really contributed to the development of the region? How did the 
approach of the Turkish state towards this project change in time in accordance with 
the changing political dynamics in the regional as well as the global context? In 
addition, the opinions of the people living in the region, whose life has been 
considerably impacted on by the project, have not received much attention in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See more about GAP in ‘TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx’. (accessed 10 July 2015) 
7 See the official GAP website: www.gap.gov.tr.  (accessed 20 June 2014) 
8 A more detailed overview of the literature on GAP and its ‘social development’ project is provided in 
Chapter Four, which stresses the ‘social development’ programmes, outlines GAP’s political 
implications and the incomplete nature of the GAP ‘social development’ project.  
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scholarly writings so far, which means that the research has failed to reflect the full 
picture of GAP. 
This study, through wide-ranging fieldwork in the region involving interviews 
with local people, initiators of the project, local civil organizations and Kurdish 
political actors, aims to construct a comprehensive picture of GAP from the 
establishment of the project up to the present. It will also attempt to determine 
whether GAP has reached its main target, and examine the reasons behind the 
unfinished and fragmentary nature of the project. 
 
1.2. Research questions and argument  
 
The south-east region is the scene of longstanding historical conflicts and tense 
relationships between the Turkish state and the Kurds.9 For instance, historical 
evidence indicates that Turkey faced 17 minor and three major Kurdish uprisings 
between 1920 and 1938, and the state has been in conflict with the Kurdistan Workers 
Party or Partiya Karkerin Kurdistan (PKK) since 1984 (Heper 2005). All of this has 
pushed the region into deeper poverty, and this has become a major problem for the 
Turkish state in terms of socio-economic backwardness and political instability.  
The policy-makers of the Turkish state have claimed that once the GAP 
project has succeeded in modernizing the south-east, this will resolve the problems 
not only in terms of the region’s socio-economic situation but also in political terms 
with regard to the Kurdish question.10  
Thus, with the aim of diminishing politically volatility and tackling the socio-
economic issues of the south-east, the GAP project, which was considered to be an 
ambitious modernization strategy on the part of the Turkish state, and was supported 
by all the Turkish ruling elites and politicians, was intended to be completed by 2005. 
However, when the project had still not reached its goals by 2005, particularly in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 At the end of the First World War, the Lausanne summit resulted in the land of the Kurds, Kurdistan, 
being divided into five pieces over five countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia (Ignatieff 
1993). Ever since the Treaty of Lausanne, the tense relationship between the Turkish state and Kurds 
has increased, and the Kurds in the region have always been perceived as a threat to the unity of the 
Turkish state.  
10 Regarding Turkish state policy-makers in relation to the concept of the GAP project and policies 
regarding transforming the south-east into a modernized region, see more from the statement of the 
former prime ministers and presidents of the Turkish republic such as Bülent Ecevit, Turgut Özal and 
Suleyman Demirel in Turkish national newspapers’ websites such as www.milliyet.com.tr, 
www.Hurriyet.com.tr, www,sabah.com.tr and www.zaman.com.tr (accessed 2 March 2015).  
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terms of regional socio-economic development, the deadline was extended to 2010, 
and then further extended to 2012, but it has still not materialized. 
Hence, the main aim of this research is to make the ‘social development’ aims 
and objectives of the GAP project more comprehensible, and to establish whether it 
has been beneficial for the most underdeveloped region of Turkey, the south-east, in 
terms of achieving its ultimate modernization/social development goal. The Turkish 
state claimed that GAP was a ‘social development’ project which would bring 
prosperity to the south-east, and this research seeks to understand to what extent such 
an assumption has been realised. In particular, it seeks to establish whether the project 
has created economic, social and spatial changes, and ended the chronic poverty of 
the region.  
If not, what are the main obstacles preventing the project from bringing 
prosperity to the region in the form of developments such as profitable farming and 
vast employment opportunities for the local inhabitants? It is the aim of this thesis to 
reveal any obstacles and challenges.  
The research first examines the nature of the GAP project and investigates the 
results of its ‘social development’ policy, exploring political obstacles that may have 
been preventing the policy from becoming reality. It suggests practical 
recommendations which could enable Turkey to implement a stable political solution 
for the south-east and abandon its traditional policies and mind-set towards the Kurds. 
However, the question arises as to whether Turkey will accept Kurdish cultural 
empowerment and work for the locals’ interests or whether it will stick with its 
traditional policy. This depends on how far Turkey wants to create relationships not 
only with its own Kurds, but also with those in neighbouring countries. 
 In this context, the following questions are posed: what was the strategy of 
the Turkish state in transforming the project into a ‘social development’ project or 
integrated regional-social development project? What was the role of GAP in terms of 
regional political dimensions?  How do we understand the ‘social development’ 
project of GAP in the context of the modernization/development approach and overall 
literature? What is the current condition of the GAP ‘social development’ project and 
how successful has the project been so far? To what extent do the regional political 
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development factors and global political shifts11 play roles in fostering a sceptical 
attitude by the Turkish state towards the completion of the GAP ‘social development 
project? 
 
1.3. Methodological considerations  
 
I have undertaken fieldwork in the GAP region in order to clarify my theoretical 
position and explore the project on the basis of the evidence provided by people on 
the ground. Therefore, two research methods are implemented throughout. While I 
make use of primary data, which has been collected during field research, I also 
analyze the relevant literature, including books, academic articles and government 
publications.  
My fieldwork (after a four weeks’ pilot study period spent in Turkey in 
February 2011, my second five weeks’ visit followed in June 2011 and ended in early 
July 2011) was mainly undertaken in six cities (Diyarbakir, Batman, Mardin, 
Sanliurfa, Istanbul and Ankara), five towns (Hasankeyf, Suruc, Harran, Halfeti and 
Samsat) and two villages (Ilisu and Yeniçagla) in the GAP region/south-east of 
Turkey. In order to gain factual information and experiential insights from varied 
perspectives, my interviewees included top members of staff of the GAP Project, such 
as members of the General Directorate, Sadrettin Karahocagil (the regional director) 
and Mehmet Açikgoz (president of GAP and the coordinator of the GAP social 
projects with locals who had been affected by the dams). In addition, I interviewed 
academics from Istanbul universities, and several NGOs in the GAP region together 
with MPs and local representatives. I have also worked through the governmental 
resources (gap.gov.tr, governmental reports and document/ Can Suyu: GAP 2010) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 At the end of World War II, the world was divided into two predominant orders: capitalism 
(US/western Europe) and communism (Soviet Union/eastern Europe). War and peace focused on these 
two blocs. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, a new era began and 
a new world order was established. To be more specific, while the Hobbesian notion of the world order 
has become meaningless, the Kantian notion of ‘perpetual peace’ (which “required the transformation 
of individual consciousness” (Dunne 2001: 165)) and Benthamite liberalism (which “showed that 
federal states such as the German diet, the American Confederation, and the Swiss League were able to 
transform their identity from one based on conflicting interests to a more peaceful federation” (Dunne 
2001: 166)) have become more constructive for the new world order.  So, traditional international 
relations, which were based on the Realist tradition, have been fragmented by the development of 
transnational relations (Eriksson and Giacomello 2006) and this has led world politics to focus on other 
developments such as non-governmental organisations, which were becoming a new form of global 
actor, in the context of the cosmopolitan regime of democracy (Held 1995), which I will employ for 
this study. 
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independent surveys by various institutions such as the National Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (Ulusal Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi (USİAD)), the 
Sociological Association (Sosyoloji Dernegi) based in Turkey, a comparative survey 
on the social and economic structure in the GAP Region, the State Planning 
Organization (SPO), SEGE’s 2011 research, the web archive of Turkish national news 
channel CNN Turk, the Human Development Index 2000, GAP Action Plan 
Investigation and Assessment Report (Gap Eylem Planı İnceleme ve Değerlendirme 
Raporu) conducted by the Association of Turkish Engineering and Architecture (Türk 
Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği (TMMOB)), the report of the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project (KHRP) now called the Democratic Progress Institute, and the Turkish 
national newspapers archive. 
With the aim of producing a well-researched study, the qualitative research 
method was employed during fieldwork. After a long period of studying and 
examining the GAP ‘social development’ project, I came to the conclusion that 
qualitative methods would be beneficial, because, “qualitative methods draw 
particular attention to contextual issues, placing an interviewee’s attitudes and 
behaviour in the context of their individuals’ biography and the wider social setting” 
(Devine 2002: 199). It has been ascertained that “[q]ualitative methods […] are good 
at capturing meaning, process and context” (Ibid: 199). 
The main source of primary data in this study was a series of in-depth 
interviews. The purpose of in-depth interviewing was neither simply to get answers to 
questions, nor to test hypotheses. At the root of in-depth interviewing was my interest 
in the knowledge and experience of my interviewees, and the meaning they made of 
their experience. As Devine (Ibid: 199) puts it: “the in-depth interview is about 
listening to people talking in order to gain some insight into their world-views and 
how they see things as they do.” So, a basic assumption in in-depth interviewing 
research is that “the meaning people make of their experience affects the way they 
carry out that experience” (Seidman 2006:10).  
So in order to understand the GAP project from its foundation to the present, 
as a means of comprehending its ‘social development’ and its current condition, this 
research was mainly based on one-to-one interviews. The interviews were mainly 
semi-structured and primarily open-ended and semi-formal. In order to gain factual 
information and experiential insights from varied perspectives, I devised largely open 
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interview questions and ended by allowing a free, unstructured discussion, which I 
have recorded. 
Although my interviews, in general, were based on one-to-one in-depth 
research in order to fully grasp interviewees’ experiences, I also carried out some 
group interviews. I realized that a group interview would take the pressure off my 
group interviewees, as Darlington and Scott (2002: 62) indicate, “hearing others talk 
about their experiences, in a supportive environment, may enable participants to feel 
comfortable about sharing their own experiences.” My questions were mainly based 
on gauging my interviewees’ understanding of the project and assessing whether it 
was created in the interests of the locals and the region’s socio-economic 
development. In particular, I devised some critical questions for my interviewees as to 
why the project has not been successful. 
Undertaking fieldwork in the south-east was not an easy task; there were 
obstacles, security being the main one. So I chose the right time for undertaking my 
fieldwork. As is well-known, violent conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK 
has been taking place since 1984 in Turkish Kurdistan, the Turks having responded to 
PKK resistance with heavily armed units, resulting in battles between 100,000 
Turkish troops and the PKK with at least 10,000 guerrillas, which have turned the 
region into a war zone. Consequently undertaking wide-ranging fieldwork and 
detailed observation could have been very difficult.  
However, during my visit (June and July 2011), there was a ceasefire by the 
PKK. As a result, the Turkish state softened its military operation. I knew from 
previous ceasefires that this one could not last long, because of political instability in 
the region, so I wanted to benefit from that semi-peaceful period to complete my 
fieldwork as soon as possible. 
Despite the fact that I began my fieldwork during the ceasefire in the region, I 
realized that without primary networks and help in getting interviews, in particular 
with those villagers who were tired of the war between the Kurdish guerrillas and the 
Turkish state, it would have taken me a long time to complete the research on the 
ground. I contacted my relatives in Diyarbakir and friends in Urfa to assist me in 
visiting rural areas and the places I had never before visited, and most importantly 
used my contacts to find a way to get interviews. The advantages of easily obtaining 
interviews through my network resources and consulting with collaborators during the 
research provided me with a great opportunity to examine unrevealed issues and 
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undertake a substantial area of fieldwork. Also the ceasefire period made my work 
considerably easier in security terms. 
I believe that I have achieved an in-depth understanding of the GAP so-called 
‘social development’ project and its current condition, and gained Turkish policy-
makers’ complex views, through assessing participants’ thoughts on the project.  
 
1.4. Theoretical considerations  
 
1.4.1. Modernization/development and cosmopolitan theories 
 
Throughout this research, two main theories will be employed: 
modernization/development theory and cosmopolitan theory. Before examining the 
linkage between the GAP project and modernization/development theory, it is helpful 
to understand the materialization of the theory. The concept is considered to have 
begun with Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who are known as the ‘Classical 
Development Theorists’. Adam Smith’s book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations “was published in 1776 and was a response to the mercantile 
(trade) focus of economic policy of that time in West Europe” (Willis 2005: 32). 
David Ricardo played a substantial role in economic development in the eighteenth 
century.  
However, there is an argument that modernization theory also owes a debt to the 
work of Max Weber (1902-79) (see Andersen and Taylor 2006) and Emile Durkheim 
(Roberts and Hite 2000). Weber analyzed economic development in his influential 
book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958/1904) (see Andersen 
and Taylor 2006: 252). He believed that development and modernization “occurred in 
Europe during the Industrial Revolution as a result of the values and attitudes of 
Protestantism” (Andersen and Taylor 2006: 252). 
 From the viewpoint of early modernization theorists such as Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim, “modern society was unique because, even though it grew out of 
European history, it required a fundamentally different way of thinking, working, and 
organizing as a society” (Roberts and Hite 2000: 4). However, modernization theory, 
reformulated by Max Weber’s follower, American sociologist Talcott Parsons, who 
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was also influenced by Emile Durkheim’s ‘structural functionalism’, provided some 
core ideas in the 1960s, which were taken up by many ‘modernization theorists’. 
To understand the notion of modernization/development, one needs to take into 
account one of the best-known modernization theorists, Walt W. Rostow (1960), 
“who, as an economic adviser to U.S. president John F. Kennedy, was highly 
instrumental in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in the 1960s” 
(Kendall, 2009: 267). One should also not neglect the British economist John 
Maynard Keynes, who, in 1936, published The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (Willis 2005: 34). The Great Depression (1930s) in the United 
States and the failure of the free market began a new era of understandings of national 
economies, and economists started to develop new theories for world economies. 
Keynes was among these new economists, and he believed that “[r]ather than letting 
the market operate alone […] governments could intervene to promote investment 
either through monetary policies such as changing interest rates, or directly through 
government expenditure” (Willis 2005: 34-5). 
Modernization/development theory, which requires a process and transition from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ society, is employed here to examine the concept and the 
materialization of the GAP ‘social development’ project. To ascertain the theoretical 
and practical answer to the question of ‘modernisation’ or ‘development’, particularly 
in the context of the global political economy, it is necessary to examine it from 
different perspectives. Only by doing this can one grasp how development has 
occurred or what development means in theory as well as in practice.  
I will analyze the notion of modernization/development theory in relation to 
GAP in more detail in Chapter Three. However, in this section it is necessary to 
outline its origins and contextual framework. According to Hegel, the history of world 
‘development’ is one of ‘progression to the better’ (Leys 1994). For Wallerstein, the 
notion of how development occurs is more straightforward. He states (1994: 4) that 
“nations or states or societies somehow (and somewhere) begin; then they grow or 
develop.” Nevertheless, the notion of development is complex, abstract and perceived 
differently among theorists, because it involves both theory and practice, that is, both 
ideas about how development should or might occur, and real-world efforts to put 
various aspects of development practice into practice (Potter 2008: 67). As Willis 
defines it, while some see the definition of ‘development’ as economic growth and 
increase in economic wealth, or as social improvement, as Turkey proposed via GAP 
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for the south-east, others see ‘development’ as encompassing “ideas of greater 
autonomy and choice about how individuals live their lives” (Willis 2005: 200).  
For instance, for rural Africa, Asia and Latin American countries, the notion 
of ‘development’ can be understood as “experience in practice processes that are 
described to them as development, in terms of official discourse inspired by or 
dressed up in an idiom of Western origin” (Dahl and Megerssa 1997: 52). Whatever 
development means, as Willis puts it (2005: 200), “[s]ome form of development may 
lead to increasing inequalities between places, while other development approaches 
may explicitly attempt to reduce spatial inequalities.”  
 For Talcott Parsons, who developed some core ideas in the 1960s which were 
taken up by many ‘modernization theorists’,  
 
modernization came to be seen as the process by which the transition from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms of social organization which had emerged in 
the West would be transferred to the non-Western societies, and this was 
supposed to be achieved using ‘structural functionalist’ approaches. (Nabudere 
1997: 205) 
 
Nevertheless, as Binns (2008: 83) infers, Walt W. Rostow’s (1960) ‘unilinear’ model 
is one of the best-known attempts to indicate how a country’s economy and society 
progressed through a series of stages in the 1960s.  
Works of Parsons and Rostow, which I will scrutinise in more detail in 
Chapter Three, are important in relation to the south-east’s socio-economic 
development via the GAP social programme. The region has been a socially, 
economically, geo-politically and ethnographically problematic issue for the modern 
Turkish state, to which GAP was thought to be the answer.  
There are substantial criticisms (see Chapter Three) about the failure of the 
concept of modernization/development in many underdeveloped countries,12 and I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “These countries are mainly African and Latin American countries, who found themselves in 
positions of ‘underdevelopment’ because of the operation of the capitalist system” (Willis 2005: 69). 
To study these countries’ underdeveloped situation, see the works of Dodds, K. (2002) The Third 
World, Developing Countries, the South, Poor Countries; Dos Santos, T. (1993) The Structure of 
Dependence, Development and Underdevelopment; Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development: 
The making and unmaking of the Third World; Galeano, E. (1997) To Be Like Them; Frank, G. A. 
(1966) The Development of Underdevelopment; Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela (1978) 
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argue that the core concept of modernization/development theory is based on the self-
interest of certain dominant states. However, this is the only theory which fits the 
original concept of the GAP ‘social development’ project, and it provides an excellent 
framework within which to explore the intention of the GAP policy-makers regarding 
‘modernization/development’. 
 Cosmopolitan theory, which developed in the aftermath of the post-Cold War era 
in the form of a new democratic regime, will be employed to analyse the Turkish 
state’s current overall approach to the GAP project, and I will assess whether the 
notion of the cosmopolitan regime of democracy has been an obstacle to GAP 
development in the south-east (see Chapter Seven). 
Cosmopolitan democracy, according to Archibugi, may be a combination of 
words which was used in classical Athens, derived  
 
from the Greek cosmos + polis and demos + kratos. However, while 
cosmopolis (literally, the city of the universe) was used to describe an ideal 
condition, democracy (the power of the many) was employed for very 
practical purposes, i.e. the everyday management of public affairs. (Archibugi 
2012: 12) 
 
However, it is argued that the notion of cosmopolitanism “[i]nspired by the work of 
Immanuel Kant, has received its most sustained analysis in the scholarship of David 
Held (1992; 1995; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2004)” (Frith 2008: 216). In the modern 
period, numerous philosophical supporters of cosmopolitanism “have tended to 
associate cosmopolitanism with a universalistic orientation towards world 
community” (Delanty 2008: 217):  
 
The justification for a new global order based on cosmopolitan moral 
principles is arguably much stronger now than it was in Immanuel Kant's time. 
Whereas Kant's cosmopolitan theory was prompted by a deep aversion to the 
ravages of war, contemporary cosmopolitan theory is a response to a much 
wider range of global problems: economic injustice, poverty, malnutrition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Modernization and Dependency: alternative perspective in the study of Latin American 
underdevelopment.  
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human rights abuses and ecological degradation. (Eckersley 2007: 675) 
 
Cosmopolitan democracy attempts to reconstruct a democratic principle in that “it 
reconnects mechanisms of representation and accountability with social practices and 
power relations that operate within, across and beyond territorial borders” (Frith 
2008: 216). In short, the theory of the cosmopolitan requirement 
 
entails providing citizens with the opportunity to participate in world politics 
parallel to and independently from the governments of their own states. Our 
own understanding of cosmopolitan democracy is that such a transformation 
of global politics could also generate progressive alternations in domestic 
policies. In particular, we assume that if global politics becomes more 
accountable and representative, this may also have an important effect on 
domestic politics, allowing each political community to further consolidate its 
own political institutions. (Archibugi & Held 2011: 436) 
 
So in order to comprehend the notion of cosmopolitan democracy, it is important to 
note that in the aftermath of the Cold War, as many authors state (Buzan 1998; 
Strange 1996; Rumford 2003; Held 1995; Shaw 1997), sovereign states or nation-
states, which were once universal, have been losing their classical position in the 
global system. 
Shaw (Ibid: 500) points out that “the most recent phase of globalization, in the 
second half of the twentieth century, has certainly involved a decline in the autonomy 
of the nation-state, as simplistic theories of globalization imply.” According to 
Strange (1996: 3-4), the notion of the state “has been swept away by a pace of change 
more rapid than human society had ever before experienced.” So, the idea that the 
state is in control of everything, in particular borders, has now lost its authority and 
this has become a hot topic for many social scientists: 
 
Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, 
on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And 
the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority 
to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies, and in a 
growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and 
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weaker ones without it. (Ibid: 4) 
 
Hence, as has been argued, since the post-Cold War period, “[m]any issues and 
problems – pollution, the use of diminishing resources, the regulation of global trade 
– [could not] be acted on effectively by any single nation-state” (Rumford 2003: 20). 
The question arises as to how nation-states have been embedded in such a complex 
network of political power. The answer can be examined in the framework of 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’, which was developed by a group of thinkers13 who 
expanded the theory of a new democracy both within states and at a global level, 
which it (cosmopolitanism) “embedded in rules systems and institutions which have 
transformed the sovereign states system in a number of important respects” (Held 
2002: 313). As Rumford describes it, the “Westphalian regime of a world of nation-
states has given way to a cosmopolitan world order” (2003: 384).  
In short, cosmopolitan regimes of democracy have put the nation-state under 
severe pressure by the democratic developments within the globalized world system 
(Ibid), which required that political power be handled by democratic actors14 and a 
strong rule of law.15 The model of cosmopolitan democracy was developed and 
allowed the citizens of the world to enjoy fundamental human rights (Held 1995), and 
it pushed states to consider the rule of law for governing democracy; respect for 
human rights and the functioning of a democratic market economy. So, actors such as 
the European Union (EU) have become a main “bearer of such practices and 
conform(s) to …‘cosmopolitan democracy’; emerging forms of transnational 
governance [work] to ensure that the democratic state will be the global norm, and 
also that democracy will be deepened in countries” (Rumford 2003: 384). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: an agenda for a new world 
order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Koehler, eds., Re-imagining Political 
Community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). For more detail, see 
Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: toward cosmopolitan democracy 
(Princeton University Press, 2008).  
14 These bodies of democratic actors consist of non-governmental international organizations such as 
the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe, 
and independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International (Archibugi 
2012; Archibugi & Held 2011).  
15 See Archibugi and Held, 2011, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents, regarding rule of law 
such as International Criminal Court (ICC), The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International 
administrative courts.  
	   15	  
particular, the enforcement of the cosmopolitan regime of democracy has been 
demanded of the candidates for EU accession.  
Since then, the cosmopolitan regimes of democratization have had to be 
employed by EU candidates and, since Turkey had been knocking on the EU door 
(see more in Chapter Seven regarding Turkish-EU relations) ever since the 
establishment of the republic (the last request of the first president of the Turkish 
republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was for Turkey to join western civilization), the 
question arises as to whether Turkey has adopted a cosmopolitan regime of 
democratization and seen the GAP project not only in terms of economic growth and 
security but also as a vehicle for local cultural and political rights in the south-east, as 
well as creating a functioning democratic market economy in the region. Whether or 
not Turkey has been adhering to authoritarian law,16 it is the obligation of this thesis 
to explore how far the republic has grasped the cosmopolitan criteria in relation of the 
GAP ‘social development’ project. Hence, in Chapter Seven, the study will further 
analyse the concept of the cosmopolitan principle and see to what extent it has 
impacted on Turkish politics in relation to the project.  
 
1.5. Chapter outline 
 
The main aim of Chapter Two is to outline the construction of the GAP project, its 
historical background and the incorporated proposal for a ‘social development’ 
programme for the south-east region.  
Chapter Three is divided into two sections. Firstly, it discusses the Turkish-
Kurdish historical background and draws attention not only to historical Turkish state 
policy in the region but also to the uneven socio-economic development between the 
region and the rest of the country. Secondly, the chapter analyzes the GAP project 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Turkey still ruled by an authoritarian law, which was imposed by the former chief of staff, Kenan 
Evren, a leading commander in the 1980 coup who was later installed as president of Turkey. It 
delivered the military “the right to veto constitutional amendments and appoint constitutional court 
judges” (Jacoby 2005: 647). Additionally, the 1980s military intervention saw the drafting of the new 
constitution in 1982, which further entrenched the military in day-to-day Turkish politics. Under 
Article 118, it was declared that:  
The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its view on taking decisions and 
ensuring necessary cooperation with regard to the formation, determination, and implementation of the 
national security policy of the state. The council of Ministers should give priority consideration to the 
decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures it deems necessary for the 
preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the 
country, and the peace and security of society.  (Özbudun 2000: 108) 
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through the lens of modernization/development theory, drawing upon its 
interrelationship with GAP. It demonstrates how the GAP ‘social development’ 
project was formed in the framework of the modernization/development theory in 
order to fill the socio-economic gap between the south-east and the west of the 
country.  
The main aim of Chapter Four is to critically engage with the literature on 
GAP and its ‘social development’ project in order to indicate its limitations, draw out 
the significant questions, and identify important issues regarding the current state of 
GAP’s social programmes, which are not addressed clearly in the existing literature 
but are revealed in this thesis.  
Chapter Five critically analyses the GAP ‘social development’ project and 
investigates whether it has led to sustainable development. Whilst the chapter 
analyzes the results of the project, it also reveals the Turkish state’s hidden politics 
regarding the project. 
Chapter Six elaborates on the positive progress of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project and the way in which Turkey has gained power production from 
it. The chapter also reveals the negative impact of the project, which has wreaked 
destructive effects on people’s lives in terms of displacement, destruction of historical 
sites and the environment. This chapter is also based on a competitive analysis of 
GAP with the Aswan project in Egypt. While it explores the destructive elements of 
both projects, the differences appear to lie in policy-makers’ mind-sets with regard to 
social development issues. 
Chapter Seven focuses on an account of numerous obstacles that the project 
has encountered in the struggle to achieve its key aims and realize sustainable social 
development. Thus, the chapter mainly concentrates on regional political instability 
and new political developments such as the rise of the Kurdish national movement, a 
pro-Kurdish political party and the failure to resolve the Kurdish question or 
undertake a successful peace process with the PKK.  Finally, the chapter reveals the 
Turkish state’s scepticism about the concept of the cosmopolitan regime of 
democracy development, led by the EU, which demands empowerment of the people, 
as regimes of democratization may have an important, essentially negative impact on 
Turkish authority in the south-east, which Turkish policy-makers believe may lead to 
Kurdish self-determination.  
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Chapter Eight draws together the final arguments based on analysis of my 
theoretical and empirical work, and concludes that the emergence of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project, as a tool to deal with the south-east’s socio-economic 
backwardness, has faced internal or regional political developments on the one hand 
and an external political development in the shape of the globalized world system on 
the other, both of which have had a crucial detrimental impact on the completion of 
the project.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
What is the Southeast Anatolia Project or Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Whilst the main aim of this chapter is to outline the background of GAP and the 
formation of its ‘social development’ manifestation, it also examines the data related 
to power production and progress in irrigation. Therefore the chapter is divided into 
two sections: the examination in the first section (‘Historical Background of the GAP 
Project: Physicality and Construction’) of the physicality, construction and historical 
background of the project leads us to study and identify its varying typological 
formation in different periods. 
 The chapter begins by outlining the complexity of the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers’ (discharge) waterways in the region and describing these rivers’ historical 
significance for human beings in Mesopotamia. It outlines the exploration of the 
potential of Euphrates and Tigris river water in the south-east of Turkey, and then it 
inspects each river’s geographical location and dimension. The chapter argues that 
both rivers are of historical importance in the region, and stresses that the massive 
dams that Turkey has constructed on these ancient rivers through the GAP project 
have played a significant role in human life.   
The second section (‘Origin of GAP and the Formation of the “Social 
Development” Project’) concentrates on the main concern of my study, the GAP 
‘social development’ project and its programme under the GAP-Master Plan. The 
section defines the programmes incorporated in GAP’s ‘social development’ project, 
led by governmental agencies, including the Master Plan and other Action Plans such 
as the GAP Entrepreneurship Regional Development programme or Bölgesel 
Kalkinmada Girisimciligin Gelistirilmesi (GAP-GIDEM), which is designed to 
encourage business men and firms to invest in the south-east, Multi-Purpose 
Community Centres or Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM),17 which were 
created mainly to help young girls who migrated from villages and rural areas to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 ÇATOMs were established between 1992 and 1994 and, since 1995, they have been active in nine 
provinces of the south-east. There are now 44 ÇATOM centres in the region. See more in 
www.gap.gov.tr. (accessed 20 March 2013)  
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cities, and who were struggling to cope with their new lives in the city, the GAP 
Youth House Centre or GAP Gençlik Evleri,18 which was established to enable young 
people to be involved in social activities, and also Children’s Development Centres or 
Çocuk Gelisim Merkezleri, which, like ÇATOM centres,  provide social services, in 
particular for children, mainly from poor families, who needs help in terms of 
education and other social activities. This section outlines these programmes to enable 
understanding of how it was proposed that the project would overcome the south-
east’s poor socio-economic situation, improve the living standards and quality of life 
of the local people, and increase their per capita income.19   
In addition, the chapter scrutinizes the origins of GAP, surveying the project 
as it was in the 1930s, 1950s and post-1980s. It also discusses the dams which have 
been built as a part of the GAP project, and assesses the nine south-eastern provinces 
where the project is located. This will provide a basis on which to describe the ways 
in which the organization of the GAP Regional Development Administration has been 
constructed.  
 
2. 2.  Historical background of the GAP project: physicality and construction 
 
2.2.1. Euphrates and Tigris water: exploration of the potential 
 
Unlike the Nile river, which “is maintained almost entirely by rainfall from outside 
the region in Ethiopia and East Africa” (Anderson 2000: 74), the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers are wholly fed by indigenous rainfall and snow, when it melts in summer and 
flows down from the mountains. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are the most 
significant water resources in Turkey, between them providing 28% of the total water 
potential of Turkey’s supply. The two rivers also make Turkey a major riparian 
country (upstream of Syria and Iraq). “Estimates on the total annual flow of Euphrates 
vary between 28.7-30.5 billion cubic metres. The Tigris’ estimated annual total flow 
is between 43-52.6 billion cubic metres” (Allan 2002: 71). Almost 90% “of the mean 
flow of the Euphrates is drained from the Tigris and its tributaries, with the average 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 GAP Youth House Centre exists in nine south-eastern provinces: Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, 
Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak. Its main aim is to integrate these young people 
into mainstream society. See www.gap.gov.tr for more details  (accessed 16 April 2014).  
19 As indicated, this chapter mainly outlines the project proposals. In Chapter Five, I will focus on 
whether the project has made progress and become a sustainable development project.   
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total discharge determined as 52 bcm/year. Turkey contributes approximately 40[%] 
of the total annual flow, whereas Iraq and Iran contribute 51[%], and 9[%], 
respectively” (Kibaroglu 2007: 2). As we see from the above statistics, the water of 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is of great significance in the region. Although it is not 
my purpose to study in detail the role of these two rivers in the Middle East more 
widely, it is contextually important to look at their significance. In the following 
section, I concentrate on their historical significance for the region. 
                      
 
                    
                    www.economist.com  (Accessed 15 April 2015).  
 
Map 2.1. The location of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Both have their source 
in north-east Turkey, and flow through the south-east region on their way 
towards the Persian Gulf.   
 
2.2.2. The role of the Euphrates -Tigris in Ancient Mesopotamia  
 
The Karasu and Murat are the main sources of the Euphrates River, beginning on 
slopes in the north-east of Turkey and joining together north-west of Elazig city in 
eastern Turkey. While the Karasu originates north of the city of Erzurum, the Murat 
begins north of Lake Van city in the same region. The Euphrates thereafter flows 
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“through the southeastern Taurus Mountains and crosses into Syria at Karkamis 
(Carablus, ancient Carchemish) downstream from the Turkish town of Birecik” 
(Kolars and Mitchell 1991: 4). The 2,700 km long river traverses Syria and enriches 
its flow from the Syrian tributaries of the Balikh and the Khabur. At 360 km 
downstream from the Iraqi-Syrian border, it joins its sister, the Tigris, which merge as 
the Shatt al-Arab, and flow into the Persian Gulf.20 
 The 1,900 km long Tigris River is a typical mountain stream; the second 
largest river in southwest Asia, it rises in eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar, cuts 
through the Taurus Mountains, and flows for 400 km through the east and south-east 
of Turkey (populated mainly by Kurds). The Tigris then cuts through the border city 
of Cizre,21 in the south-east of Turkey, where it delineates the border between Turkey 
and Syria for 32 km, then crosses into Iraq. “On its journey through Iraq, numerous 
tributaries enter the left bank of the Tigris from the Zagros Mountains to the east. 
Among these tributaries are the Greater Zap, the Lesser Zap, the Adhaim, and the 
Diyala” (Kolars and Mitchell 1991: 6). Finally, the Tigris is united with its sister 
river, the Euphrates, and continues as the Shatt al-Arab for 179 km until it reaches the 
Persian Gulf (Langer 2009: 3).  
Along with the Yellow River, the Indus, Mississippi, Amazon, Congo and 
Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have played a significant role in human affairs 
since ancient times. These two ancient rivers hold a place in the myth of the Garden 
of Eden, “believed by most to be the birthplace of civilization and by some to be the 
birthplace of humanity” (Mountjoy 2005: 2), which is globally known as 
Mesopotamia.22 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Although the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are joined together and flow, next to the border of Iran, into 
the Persian Gulf, the water of these rivers is not as important for Iran as it is for Syria and Iraq. The two 
rivers play a significant role in Turkey, Syria and Iraq, and the agriculture of all three countries has 
been dependent on these rivers for thousands of years. However, the Euphrates’ water is the most 
important source of Syria’s domestic consumption, industry and agriculture (Schulz 1995:100).  
21 Cizre city has a privileged place for the Kurds because of the story of ‘Mem and Zin’ (Mem u Zin), 
an epic Kurdish romantic drama, a tragic love story similar to William Shakespeare’s ‘Romeo and 
Juliet’. The oral versions of ‘Mem and Zin’ were put in writing by Ehmede Khani in 1692 (Van 
Bruinessen 1992; Meho 1997). 
22 Ancient Mesopotamia is located between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and, in the modern world, 
lies within the geographical areas of Syria, Iraq and Turkey.  
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 www.ancientmesopotamians.com (Accessed 15 April 2015)  
 
Map 2.2. The map shows how ancient Mesopotamia encompassed the land 
between the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, an area commonly believed to be 
the cradle of civilization.   
 
It was on these ancient Mesopotamian rivers that the Sumerians introduced the 
world’s first arches and writing systems, built cities, potter’s wheels, metalworks, 
wheeled carts, the science of mathematics and astronomy (Stansfield 2007) and key 
inventions that helped transform the way humankind lived and developed. The 
Sumerians also constructed dams and dug canals for cultivating their crops and 
providing economic benefits, and they achieved military, commercial and political 
advantages in the regions around these rivers. It is believed that “the introduction of 
law and government came about in Sumerian culture because of large-scale irrigation 
projects that required a complex working relationship among many people” 
(Mountjoy 2005: 17).  
Sumerians believed that since water was so close to the surface, the earth was 
simply a large disk floating on the sea, or Nammu. From the eternal Nammu came 
fish, birds, and any animals they saw in the marshlands. Because they viewed Nammu 
as a god, in their view of creation, water was the source of all life. Considering their 
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location in the arid land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their dependence 
upon those rivers for life, this creation view, which denotes the importance of water, 
mirrors their experience in Mesopotamia (Mountjoy 2005: 25). 
Sumerian civilization laid the foundations for later societies and advanced 
development in agricultural productivity, the domestication of cattle and of sedentary 
life and social organization along the sacred banks of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. 
In addition, many of the great cities of ancient times stood on or near the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers (including some which still exist); the Assyrian capitals of Asshur, 
Nimrud and Ninevah, the Sumerian cities of Nippur and Ur, the ancient cities of 
Ashur, Calah and Nineveh, the Median city of Amed (known as the capital of 
Kurdistan to the Kurdish, located in south-east Turkey), and the Abbasid towns of 
Baghdad, Samarra and Mosul all flourished on the banks of the two rivers (Kolars and 
Mitchell 1991). The waters of these ancient rivers have not only played a significant 
role in cultural identity but also the religious beliefs of mankind, hosting some of the 
earliest advanced civilizations of the world. Notwithstanding, in the face of opposition 
from historians, archaeologists and environmental groups, both domestic and foreign, 
the Turkish state has constructed its massive dams project, GAP, on these ancient 
rivers. 
.  www.gap.gov.tr (22 May 2015) 
 
2.2.3. The south-eastern provinces and the location of the GAP project 
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The GAP project, which is a “combination of twenty-five sub-irrigation systems, 
twenty-two dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris-Euphrates” 
river basins (Kliot 1994: 125), is one of the largest of its kind in the whole world and 
is located in the south-east of Turkey. The GAP region covers an area as large as 
Belgium, equivalent to one quarter of Italy or one third of England. Encompassing 
nine provinces, the region covers 75,193 square km or 9.7% of Turkey’s total 
territory. The region comprises nine cities, 80 towns and 4,297 villages, and contains 
about 10% of Turkey’s population. It is bordered by Iraq and Syria, and contains the 
world’s largest settlement of Kurds, not only in the south-east of Turkey but also 
across the border in Syria and Iraq (Kliot 1994). Although there are Turks, Arabs and 
other ethnic minorities in the region, the majority of the population are Kurds. This 
heavily populated Kurdish region has always had a proportionally tense relationship 
with the Turkish state (see Chapter Three).    
 The names of the nine provinces of the GAP region are: Adiyaman, Batman, 
Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak. It is crucial to shed a 
light on the overall view of these provinces, since they are in the heart of the GAP 
project, which I believe it will increase us a wider knowledge not only on the region 
but also the region’s socio-economic factors. The city of Adiyaman is located 
between Eastern Anatolia and the South-Eastern Anatolia region, and is in the middle 
of the Euphrates region. Adiyaman’s economy is mainly based on agricultural 
products such as chickpeas, wheat, lentils, cotton, tobacco, grapes and peanuts. The 
industrial development of Adiyaman has not been expanded except for a few state 
institutions such as Sumerbank (cotton Industry Enterprise), milk and cement 
factories. Batman, situated near the ancient city of Hasakeyf, is one of the richest oil 
providers in the south-east. Batman’s economy is mainly based on oil and agriculture. 
As in Adiyaman, industry has not flourished much in Batman. Despite the fact that 
the city holds rich oil reserves, which meet one fifth of the oil needs of the country, 
the city is mainly reliant on agriculture. Unlike its neighbouring cities, Batman has 
little historical texture apart from Hasankeyf, which is located in the city’s provincial 
territory. Diyarbakir, one of the biggest Kurdish cities, is located in Upper 
Mesopotamia, on the bank of the Tigris, and is one of the most significant settlements 
in the south-east of Turkey. The city is generally considered to be the (unofficial) 
capital city of Kurdistan. Its economy is based on agriculture, stockbreeding and 
industry. As a consequence of the war between the PKK and the Turkish state, 
	   25	  
migration to the city has risen substantially, and this, combined with the current 
sluggish economy of the city, has resulted in unemployment rates of over 30%, with 
literacy and health statistics far below the country’s average. Gaziantep, like 
Diyarbakir, is one of the most important provinces in historical terms. It is located in 
South Eastern Anatolia, between the Mediterranean and Mesopotamia. Gaziantep is 
the only city in the GAP region that, with its well-developed industrial and 
commercial organization, contributes to the Turkish economy. The province of Kilis 
is located near the Syrian border, between the Mediterranean and the south-east. 
Kilis’s economy, like other provinces in the region, is based on agriculture, and olives 
and grapes are the main products. Mardin is a significant ancient city, its economy 
again being mainly based on agriculture. Despite the city being a candidate for 
UNESCO’s list of ‘Cities of World Heritage’, its socio-economic conditions are 
among the most backward in the south-east region. Siirt is located in South-Eastern 
Anatolia, and the city is surrounded by mountains with plateaus. It is one of the most 
significant impound basins of the Tigris River, and its main economy, like other cities 
in the region, is based on agriculture and livestock. The city of Sanliurfa or Urfa 
occupies a unique place in the history of the region. It is a centre for many religions. 
Urfa was chosen as the centre for the GAP project. The first international airport in 
the region and the regional GAP headquarters were built here. The Ataturk dam with 
its water tunnels delivers water to the city’s dry land, such as the Harran Plain.  So, 
Sanliurfa, with the completion of the Ataturk dam, has benefited economically to 
some extent. Sirnak is situated on the high mountain of Judi. The economy of the city 
is the least developed in the region and the city has not industrialized at all. Sirnak 
mainly relies on agriculture and livestock breeding (see more in a report by the 
‘National Industrialists and Businessmen's Association’ or Ulusal Sanayici ve 
Isadamlar Dernegi (USİAD 2008); Kolars and Mitchell 1991; GAP Action Plan and 
Review Report 2008; Can Suyu: GAP, published as a book by GAP Regional 
Directory 2010).  
 
2.2.4. GAP organization, dams and the capacity of power generation and 
irrigation 
 
“For organizational convenience, the GAP is divided into the Euphrates and Tigris 
development plans” (Kolars and Mitchell 1991: 19). The GAP project comprises 13 
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main irrigation and energy schemes, “7 of which are on the Euphrates River (Lower 
Euphrates, Karakaya, Euphrates Border, Suruc-Baziki, Adiyaman-Kihta, Gaziantep-
Araban, Gaziantep) and 6 on the Tigris (Tigris-Kralkizi, Batman, Batman-Silvan, 
Garzan, Ilisu, Cizre” (Kolars and Mitchell 1991: 19).  
 
Euphrates Tigris  
Karakaya Dam Dicle - Kralkızı  
Lower Euphrates Batman  
Euphrates Border Batman - Silvan  
Suruç - Yaylak  Garzan  
Adıyaman - Kahta  Ilısu  
Adıyaman – Göksu -Araban  Cizre  
Gaziantep  
 
Table 2.1 shows the planned energy capacity and irrigation potential of 22 dams on 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. There are other sub-dam projects, but this study only 
deals with the main dams which are planned under the GAP administration.  
 
Euphrates River Install capacity 
(MW) 
Energy production 
(GWh/yr) 
Irrigation area 
(ha) 
Karakaya Dam 1,800 7,354 ___ 
Lower Euphrates 2,450 9,024 689,749 
Euphrates Border 852 3,168 ___ 
Suruç - Yaylak          ___     ___ 113,136 
Adıyaman - Kahta  195 509 81,130 
Adıyaman – Göksu -
Araban  
7 43 71,589 
Gaziantep      ___    ___ 144,064 
Total  5,304 20,098 1,099,677 
Additional individual 
projects  
14 42 62,830 
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Tigris River Install capacity 
(MW) 
Energy production 
(GWh/yr) 
Irrigation area 
(ha) 
Dicle - Kralkızı  204 444 130,159 
Batman  198 483 37,351 
Batman - Silvan  240 964 245,372 
Garzan  90 315 60,000 
Ilısu  1,200 3,833 ___ 
Cizre  240 1,280 121,000 
Total 2,172 7,247 593,882 
Additional individual 
projects 
         ___      ___ 36,548 
Total of 13 sub-
projects 
7,490 27,387 1,792,937 
DSI General Directory 2010/www. gap.gov.tr (Accessed 20 January 2010).  
Table 2.1 
 
As table 2.1 shows, Turkey planned to construct 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power 
plants, and intended to irrigate 1.8 million hectares of land. It is important to note that 
9.7% of Turkey’s earth potential and 20% of its economically irrigable land is located 
in the GAP region.23   
 That 20% of irrigable land could potentially be increased by 50%, which could 
then “more than quadruple the gross regional product” (Ünver 1994: 30). Moreover, 
the region as a whole could “provide about 28% of all national water supply by 
rivers” (Ünver 1994: 28). Despite the fact that only 9.7% of Turkey’s earth potential 
is in the south-east, this amount of land could provide most of the country with fresh 
water, food, power and economic advancement if it is carefully used, which makes 
GAP one of the most ambitious development projects since the creation of modern 
Turkey. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the project will generate over 27 billion 
GWh of electricity annually, doubling Turkish hydroelectric production.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For more see, gap.gov.tr/files/ek-dosyalar/gap/gap-son-durum-2010 (accessed 20 January 2010).  
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 www.kurdishherald.com (Accessed 11 May 2015). 
Map 2.3.  
 
2.2.5. The location of the 22 dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers included in 
the GAP project. 
 In order to understand the GAP project as a whole, I will now discuss each of these 
dams, not only their locations but also their descriptions and current conditions. It is 
crucial to examine these dams in detail, since they are the core foundation of the GAP 
project, and doing so will give us a clearer idea of their impact in the region. The next 
section describes each dam, starting with those on the Euphrates, and followed by the 
Tigris dams. 
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2.2.5a. Dams on the Euphrates  
 
Karakaya Dam 
 
The Karakaya Dam is the second most important dam on the Euphrates River in the 
south-east region. It is near Cungus in the Diyarbakir province.  It is also located near 
the Keban Dam, which is about 167 km downstream. The Keban Dam is located near 
the town of Keban on the upper Euphrates, and is the first major Turkish water 
development programme, which involved a contract for construction “between the 
Turkish government and SCI-Impreglio, a Franco-Italian consortium” (Kolars and 
Mitchell 1991: 26). By 1975, the Keban Dam was completed and generating power, 
and it is considered to be the best source of hydroelectric power in Turkey. When the 
dam was completed, it almost “doubled the electricity produced in Turkey at the 
time” (Langer 2009: 4). It was also the first such project to have led to wide-scale 
displacement, as around 25,000 local people were subjected to enforced resettlement 
from the site (Kliot 1994; Öktem 2002).However, since the Keban Dam is not 
officially part of the GAP project (Kliot 1994: 126), we are not examining it in more 
detail.  
 Construction of the Karakaya Dam began in 1967, and it was completed in 
1988. It is a concrete arch-gravity dam, 187 metres high, 462 metres long, and its 
reservoir area at normal water surface elevation is 268 square km. The total install 
capacity of the dam is 1,800 MW and its power generation is 7,354 GWh annually.24 
The flooding involved in creating the Karakaya Dam affected over 100 villages with 
249 families (Ghassemi and White 2007), and it was the second dam that led to mass 
displacement of people, in this case at least 15,000. 
 The Karakaya Dam was given the go-ahead before the GAP project was 
initiated, and it was built for energy production only. This dam, like the Keban Dam, 
could not be beneficial to the region’s development in terms of irrigation, but it 
provides energy production for the whole country via an interconnected system. 
However, when the GAP project was implemented in the region, Karakaya was 
incorporated in it as a gesture of reward. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Devlet Su Isleri Genel Müdürlü Baraj Detay, www2.dsi.gov.tr/baraj/detay.cfm?BarajID=104 
(accessed 12 February 2015).   
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Atatürk Dam 
 
The Atatürk Dam is one of the largest dams in the world. This ambitious project is 
one of the largest in GAP and, as Kliot (1994: 126) puts it, is certainly the ‘Jewel in 
the Crown’ of the project. The dam is located on the border of Adiyaman and 
Sanliurfa cities, on the Euphrates River (Langer: 6). It is over 180 km downstream 
from the Karakaya Dam and near to the town of Bozova. Construction started in 1983 
and it was completed in 1990. It is “180 m high clay core and rock-filled wall [and] 
impound[s] an 817 sq. km lake with a volume of 48.7 Mm3” (Kolars and Mitchel 
1991: 38).  
 The main purpose of the Atatürk Dam, as stated by the government agency 
responsible, was irrigation and electricity production in the GAP region.25 The dam’s 
power production capacity is 2,450 MW and is the largest of a series of 19 power 
plants belonging to GAP. It produces 8,900 GWh of power annually. The dam can 
irrigate over 700,000 hectares, which makes “it the first or second largest irrigation 
from a single source scheme in the world” (Ibid: 38).   
 Two major irrigation tunnels, the ‘Sanliurfa Tunnels’, discharge water from 
the reservoir (each with a diameter of 7.62 metres and length of 26.4 km) into the 
Harran plain in Sanliurfa province. Water from these tunnels enables Harran to 
produce over 400,000 metric tons of cotton, nearly 60% of the nation’s entire cotton 
production. So GAP, as a consequence of the Atatürk Dam’s irrigation capacity, is the 
regional leader in terms of agricultural production in Turkey and can contribute 50% 
of the country’s food production. All the dams have had some negative impact on the 
local population and historical sites, but the impact of the Atatürk Dam has been 
substantially greater. With the completion of the dam, over 30,000 people have been 
displaced (Kliot 1994), and many archaeological sites, historical villages and towns 
flooded. The construction of the dam also led to geopolitical disputes. When Turkey 
stopped the flow of the Euphrates River in order to fill the dam, a process which took 
three months, “Turkey was accused by the downstream countries of violating 
international law, being insensitive to the water requirements of downstream 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Devlet Su Isleri Genel Müdürlü Baraj Detay, www2.dsi.gov.tr/baraj/detay.cfm?BarajID=104; 
see also www.dsi.gov.tr (accessed 12 February 2015). 
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countries” (Altinbilek 2000: 327). In particular, Syria “protested that Turkish 
interventions damaged Syrian agriculture and water supply, and wrote angry letters 
not only to the Turkish government but also to foreign investors and constructors 
involved in GAP projects” (Warner 2008: 283).    
 
Birecik Dam  
 
The Birecik Dam is the fourth largest dam on the Euphrates. It is situated 30 km 
upstream from the Turkish-Syrian border, about 100 km downstream from the 
Atatürk Dam, and over 8 km upstream from Birecik town in Sanliurfa province (Kliot 
1994). The construction of the Birecik began in 1997, and by 2001 it was fully 
completed. The structure of the dam consists of a concrete gravity and clay core sand 
gravel fill. The dam’s volume is 9,400 cubic mm. The height, from the riverbed, is 63 
metres and the volume of the reservoir at normal water surface elevation is 1,220 
cubic hm. The reservoir area at normal water surface elevation is 56 square km.26  
The dam is built for the purpose of irrigating land close to the Syrian border 
and for power generation (Soffer 1999: 93). Its annual energy output is 2.5 billion kw, 
with a power output of 672 MW, and its irrigation area is over 92,700 hectares. In 
terms of negative impact, it has affected 44 settlements and displaced 30,000 people. 
When the flood caused by the dam began, nine villages were destroyed; 
“impoundment also had its partial effects in 3 more villages and a part of the town of 
Halfeti. The dam also affected farmlands of 31 more villages while leaving the 
settlements intact.”27 Furthermore, the dam also flooded many ancient cities.  
 
Karkamis Dam 
Karkamis is located near the town of Karkamis in Gaziantep province, where the 
border checkpoint takes place between Syria and Turkey. It is built on the Euphrates 
River, downstream from the Birecik Dam, and is about 4.5 km away from the Syrian 
border. Construction began in 1996 and was completed in 2000. It is an embankment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See more at www2.dsi.gov.tr/baraj/detay.cfm?BarajID=104; see also www.DSI.gov.tr. (accessed 12 
February 2015) 
27 See ‘Fiziksel Planlama Çalismalari, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/fiziksel_planlama_calismalari.aspx; 
or see www.gap.gov.tr for more information (accessed 18 March 2015). 
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dam (concrete section), 21.2 metres high, with a volume of 210,000 cubic metres. Its 
reservoir capacity is 157,000 cubic metres and its surface area is 28.4 square km 
(Kliot 1994; Kolars and Mitchell 1991).  
The Karkamis Dam is for hydroelectric power plants only, its capacity is over 
180 MW and it produces 652.5 GWh annually. It is considered to be “be the fifth dam 
on the Euphrates and serves as a complementary project to the Birecik Dam” (Kliot 
1994: 129).  Karkamis town (or Girgames in Kurdish) is one of the world’s most 
ancient cities, dating back to 300 BC, and is believed to be the place where the 
world’s first written peace treaty, the Treaty of Kades between Ramses II and 
Hattusili III, was signed. Recent mine clearing operations (2010-11) between the 
Syrian and Turkish borders enabled excavations by archaeologists from Italy and 
Japan to take place.28 Although this dam is not as important as the Atatürk or Birecik, 
its position near the border with Syria makes it more interesting in terms of security 
issues.  
 
Camgazi Dam 
 
The Camgazi Dam, which is located in the west at a distance of 17 km from 
Adiyaman province, was constructed on the Doyran and Kuzgun rivers. It was 
completed in 1999. The dam has a volume of 5,512 cubic metres. The height, from 
the riverbed, is 45 metres and the volume of the reservoir at normal water surface 
elevation is 56 cubic hm. The reservoir area at normal water surface elevation is 6 
square km. The dam was constructed for irrigation only, and its irrigation area is 
6,532 hectares. Although this dam may not be used for energy production, it is of vital 
importance to irrigation, which, as the governor of Adiyaman, Ramazan Sodan, said, 
would bring a net profit of 20 million Turkish lira to the farmers of the city.29 Such a 
dam might be smaller than the Atatürk Dam, but all the dams in the region are 
potentially golden projects for future food production if Turkey were to make this a 
priority.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 3 June 2014). See also Kolars and Mitchell (1991), The 
Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project; Turkey. Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism (2007), The Ascending Place of Light: GAP (Southeast Anatolia Region). 
29  See Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi20/Adiyaman.htm, or 
www.haritamap.com (accessed 2 October 2015).  
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Hancagiz Dam 
 
Hancagiz Dam is located in Nizip town in the Gaziantep province, on Nizip River. 
The construction of the dam started in 1985 and was completed by 1989. The dam has 
a volume of 3,600 cubic metres. The height, from the riverbed, is 45.5 metres and its 
reservoir volume at normal water surface elevation is 100 cubic hm. The dam’s 
reservoir area at normal water surface elevation is 7.5 square km. Hancagiz Dam, like 
Camgazi Dam, was built for the purpose of irrigation, and irrigates 6,945 hectares in 
Barak plain 10 km away from Nizip town.30 
 
Kayacik Dam 
 
The construction of the Kayacik Dam began in 1993 and was completed by 2005 as 
part of the GAP project. The height of this dam is 45 metres and it has a volume of 
1,853 cubic metres. Its reservoir volume at normal water surface elevation is 117 
cubic hm, and the area of the reservoir at normal water surface elevation is 11 square 
km. The dam is located in Gaziantep province, on the Afrin River, one of the two 
streams that join south of the city to form the Sajur River, which originates in Turkey 
and flows into the Euphrates in Syrian territory. Though the dam has not had a major 
impact on historical sites and human life, it affects the flow of water into Syrian 
territory. Kayacik Dam, like Hancagiz and Camgazi Dams, is built for irrigation only, 
and can irrigate an area of 10,400 hectares.31 
 
Gömükan Dam 
 
The Gömükan Dam, with an area of 7.762 hectares, is under construction. The stated 
intention of the project is to generate water for Adiyaman city, providing 31.5 cubic 
hm annually. The dam will affect thousands of local people’s livelihoods and will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  See ‘Hancağız Barajı - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü’, 
www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi20/Gaziantep.htm, or Hancağız Barajı'nda patlama (accessed 2 October 
2015: 2 kişi enkaz altında - Milliyet, www.milliyet.com.tr/hancagiz-baraji.../default.htm; see also 
www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 2 October 2015).  
31  See Kayacık Barajı - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi20/Gaziantep.htm;  see also Kayacık Barajı Nerede Haritası Oğuzeli 
Gaziantep, www.haritamap.com/Gaziantep (accessed 23 October 2013).  
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destroy many settlements. The Turkish government, without considering local 
thoughts on the project, is building this dam for water security only.32 Despite the 
government claiming that the dam is mainly intended to provide fresh water for the 
city, its main concern is to create an extra water provider for the Camgazi Dam in the 
event of any future drought. 
 
Kocali Dam 
 
The Kocali Dam has been in the process of construction since 1988, though it was 
hoped that it would be completed by 2014. The hydroelectric plant’s capacity will be 
40 MW and its power generation will be 120 GWh annually. The project will have the 
capacity to irrigate 21,605 hectares. It is not only intended for irrigation and power 
production but also, like Gömükan Dam, will provide water to Adiyaman (31.5 cubic 
hm/yıl (1.0 m³/s)).33 
 
Sirimtas Dam 
 
The construction of the Sirimtas Dam has begun and some digging is in progress. The 
dam is located in Adiyaman province. The capacity of the dam is 28 WM and its 
hydroelectric plant will generate 87 GWh annually.34 
 
Büyükçay Dam 
 
The Büyükçay Dam is located in Adiyaman province and is under construction as part 
of the Adiyaman Kahta project. This dam is intended for electricity production and 
irrigation. The capacity of the dam is 30 MW and its power generation is 84 GWh 
annually. The project is intended to irrigate an area of 12,322 hectares annually.35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Doğan, Koçali Ve Gömükan Barajı İle İlgili Açıklama Yaptı, www.haber3.com/Son Gelişmeler 
(accessed 23 October 2013). 
33 See more at AK Parti’li Aydin, Koçali Baraji Insaatinda, www.milliyet.com.tr/ak-parti-li-aydin-
kocali-baraji-ins (accessed 6 May 2015); Koçali Barajı İnşaatı Sözleşmesi İmzalandı, www.dsi.gov.tr/ 
Haberler (accessed 11 November 2014). 
34 See more in Sincik Sırımtaş Barajında Su Tutulmaya Başlandı - Haber, www.haberler.com/ Haber 
(accessed 9 May 2013); see also www.gap.gov.tr. 
35  See more in Güncel Haberler: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Orman ve Su İşleri, 
www.ormansu.gov.tr/.../Orman_ve_Su_İşleri_Bakanı_(accessed 17 November 2012); 
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Kahta Dam 
 
The Kahta Dam is located near Kahta town in Adiyaman province. This project on the 
Euphrates River will irrigate over 77,000 hectares and generate 196 MW of 
electricity.36  
  
Çataltepe Dam 
 
The Çataltepe or Çetintepe Dam is planned but construction has not yet begun. It is 
intended only for irrigation, and will be considerably smaller than the other dams. It 
will be located near the border of Adiyaman province.37 
 
Kemlin Dam 
 
“The minimum reservoir capacity of the Kemlin Dam is 2.78 cubiMm3, its effective 
reservoir capacity is 31.72Mm3” (Kolars and Mitchel 1991: 111), and the plan is for 
the dam to be located in Gaziantep province near the border with Syria. Kemlin Dam, 
like Çataltepe, will be considerably smaller than the others, and the plans for 
construction still exist only in the GAP Master Plan.  
 
Of the above 14 dams on the Euphrates, seven have been completed. These seven are 
the most profitable dams compared with the unfinished ones; Karakaya, Birecik and 
particularly Atatürk Dam are the core projects in terms of irrigation and, in particular, 
hydropower plants. However, a further eight of the twenty-two dams listed in the 
project lie on the Tigris River, as described below.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
www.milliyet.com.tr/ahmet-aydin-dan-buyukcay-muj (accessed 5 December 2014). 
36 See DSİ Genel Müdürlüğü - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/hizmet.../tarim 
sulama.pdf (accessed 5 December 2014).  
37 Çetintepe Barajı İnşaatında Göksu Çayı Derivasyon, www.dsi.gov.tr/ Haberler (accessed 14 August 
2014); çataltepe barajı dolgu malzemelerinin genel özellikleri-ıı ıgiriş, oaji.net/articles/2014/1084-
1415287282.pdf (accessed 14 August 2014).  
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2.2.5b. Dams on the Tigris   
 
Kralkizi Dam 
 
Kralkizi Dam is located on the Maden tributary of the Tigris, which is situated 
between the city of Batman and Diyarbakir province. The type of dam is earth-fill, its 
height is 113 m. Its reservoir area at normal water surface elevation is 1,300 square 
km. The dam’s total install capacity is 94 MW and its power generation is 146 GWh 
annually. The construction of the dam began in the mid-1980s and it was completed 
in 1997.38 Although the Kiralkizi Dam was presented as an integrated regional 
development project, it main purpose, like the Keban and Karakaya Dams, was to 
generate power production for the whole country.  
 
Dicle Dam 
 
The Dicle Dam is located in Diyarbakir province, over 20 km downstream of the 
Kralkizi Dam. Construction began in 1986, and by 1997 the dam was completed 
(Soffer 1999). The height of the dam is 75 metres and its reservoir area at normal 
water surface elevation is 24 square km. The dam has an installed hydroelectric 
capacity of 110 MW and it is intended to produce 296 GWh of electricity annually.39 
While the dam is designed for power production, it is also intended to irrigate an area 
of 128,080 hectares, as well as providing over 80% of the drinking water for 
Diyarbakir city. 
 
Batman Dam 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Kralkızı Barajı HES - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi10/diyarbakir.htm (accessed 13 May 2013).  
39 See Dicle Barajı HES - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi10/diyarbakir.htm (accessed 13 May 2013).  
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This project is located in Batman province on the Batman River, which is a major 
tributary of the Tigris. Batman Dam is 85 metres high and its reservoir area at normal 
water surface elevation is 49.25 square km.40 The dam has a capacity of 185 MW, and 
is expected to annually generate 483 GWh of power. The irrigation system is still 
included in the programme, and should be able to offer 37,744 hectares of irrigation 
once it begins to deliver water. Work on the project started in 1986, and it was 
completed in 1999 (Soffer 1999). 
 
Ilisu Dam 
 
The $1.5 billion Ilisu project, located in Ilisu village on the Tigris River between 
Mardin and Sirnak, is now under construction. It is located 65 km upstream of the 
Syrian and Iraqi border. The dam is 1,820 metres long and 135 metres high. The dam 
is intended to create a reservoir with a maximum volume of 10.4 billion cubic metres 
and a surface area of 313 square km (Rohr 1999: 1).  This dam is the largest hydro-
power project in Turkey, has the capacity of a 1,200 MW power station, and is 
expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually (Bosshard 1998). 
This hydroelectric based power plant project will have huge negative impact, not only 
on historical sites and human life, but also on the natural environment. It is claimed 
that the dam will “require the forced resettlement of close to 34,000 people […] and 
could negatively affect the lives of up to 78,000 people” (Langer 2009: 17).  
 
Silvan Dam 
 
This dam consists of a rock fill, and its height is 175.5 m; it is a concrete cover front 
face dam. The project is located in the district of Silvan town in Diyarbakir province, 
lying between Batman and Silvan (Kliot 1994: 130). The project’s power production 
capacity is 150 MW. It will produce 623 GWh power annually and is intended to 
irrigate 213,000 hectares of land. After the Atatürk Dam, the Silvan is the second 
largest dam in terms of irrigation in the GAP project framework. According to 
government statement mentioned in the official website that once the project is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Batman - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi10/batman.htm (accessed 
13 May 2013).  
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completed, it will be in the position to provide substantial jobs for the locals. The dam 
is now under construction, and the government has promised to complete it by 2016.41 
This will be one of the most important projects in terms of regional development 
within the framework of GAP.  
 
Kayser Dam 
 
The Kayser Dam has been planned but construction has not yet started. It is to be 
constructed on the Zore River, located on the border between Batman and Diyarbakir 
city. The dam will be built for power production and its total installed capacity will be 
90 WM, and it will generate 341 GWh annually. When activated, it will flood many 
people’s livelihoods, affecting 20 settlements, and destroying many fruit trees. All 
kinds of fruit which cannot be found in other places grow in the Zore River valley, 
including thousands of walnut trees. A variety of valuable kinds of vegetation grow. 
When flooding begins, all these fruits, trees and vegetation will disappear. 42  
 
Garzan Dam 
 
The construction of the Garzan Dam is in process. This project, which is located 
between the town of Silvan in Diyarbakir province and Siirt province, is located on 
the Garzan tributary, and is designed to produce 90 MW of electricity. It is argued 
that when the dam is completed, it will irrigate 60,000 hectares of land (Soffer 1999: 
95). 
 
Cizre Dam 
 
This dam is located in the Silopi – Nusaybin – Cizre region, and it is also close to the 
junction of Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iraq (Soffer 1999). The original tender 
for the dam was issued in 2008, and it was expected that it would be fully constructed 
by 2012, but it has not yet been completed. The dam is mainly for generating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Silvan Barajı Bölgeye Hayat Verecek,www.dsi.gov.tr; Silvan Barajı, 318 bin kişiye iş imkanı 
sağlayacak – Hürriyet, www.Hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25184875.asp (accessed 20 September 2014). 
42 See Kayseri - Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, www2.dsi.gov.tr/bolge/dsi12/kayseri.htm; Baraj bu 
eşsiz doğayı yutacak - Batman Çağdaş, www.batmancagdas.com/baraj-bu-essiz-dogayi-yutaca 
(accessed 20 September 2014). 
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electricity, at a rate of 240 MW (Kliot 1994: 130). By the time it is completed, many 
villagers will have been deeply affected.  
 
As I have outlined, there are fewer dams planned on the Tigris than on the Euphrates. 
While there are 14 dams on the Euphrates, on the Tigris there are only eight, and most 
of those on the Tigris have not been fully completed (only three out of eight, against 
seven out of 14 on the Euphrates). Having briefly described the dams here, I will 
investigate them in more detail, in order to assess their impact on the region, when I 
look at the GAP project’s positive and negative effects in Chapter Five.     
 
2.2.6. The current physical progress in the Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power 
Plant (HEPP) Project 
  
Irrigated area:                          1.8 billion hectares (ha) 
Completed area:                        340,535 ha (18.92%) 
Under construction:                   63,955 ha (3.56%) 
Planned area (remaining): 1,395,510 ha (77.52%) 
 
The above figures indicate that the total irrigated area in the GAP region is 1.8 billion 
ha, and this was supposed to be completed by now according to the information from 
the Turkish government. As the figure shows, only 340,535 ha (18.92%) of land 
irrigation has been completed, whereas 1,395,510 ha (77.52%) of irrigation remains to 
be completed; as for the 63,955 ha (3.56%) of land for which irrigation projects are 
under construction, it is not yet known when these will be completed.43   
 
Completed (HEPP): 5,534 MW (74%) 
Ready to proceed: 240 MW (3%) 
Under construction: 1,200 MW (16%) 
Remaining: 516 (7%) 
 
So, based on 2011 data, progress in terms of irrigation is slow and almost nothing is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For more detail see State Water Works (DSI) General Directory 2011, www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 11 
May 2011).  
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happening, in contrast with the substantial progress in the generation of hydroelectric 
power. Since 2009, install capacity has reached 5,534 MW; that is, 74% of the 
project’s hydroelectric production targets have been realized.44 
 To recap, on completion the dams in the GAP project are expected to provide 
50% of Turkey’s water generation (Anderson 2000: 292). By the year 2010, nine 
main and one sub-project hydroelectric power plants have been completed, that is, 
74% of hydroelectric power production, whereas irrigation remains under 19%. When 
the project is fully completed, Turkey hopes to gain hydroelectric capacity of over 
7,500 MW, which will generate 27 million GWh of electricity a year, boosting 
Turkish electricity output by more than 70%. These figures would be achieved 
through GAP’s anticipated “combination of twenty-five irrigation systems, twenty-
two dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris-Euphrates” river 
basins (Kliot 1994: 125).    
 The above sections have concentrated on the physicality of the GAP project; 
where the project receives its water and the potential of that water (from the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers), and the importance of those rivers in the region. They 
have also included details of the location of the GAP project and descriptions of the 
22 dams involved in the project, along with an analysis of its progress in terms of 
irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. The following section focuses on the 
organization and transformation of the project from water/land resources into a ‘social 
development’ project, and describes the aims of the project in this regard. 
 
2.3. Origin of GAP and the formation of the social development project 
 
2.3.1. Origins  
 
It is important to note that the Euphrates and Tigris rivers were among the main 
interests of the Turkish policy-makers at the very beginning of the republic. In the 
early days of the republic, and in the aftermath of the Second World War in particular, 
Turkish policy-makers put serious effort into changing and developing all aspects of 
their new country, and electricity emerged as one of the urgent necessities to enable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See GAP'ta Son Durum - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_ta_son_durum.aspx (accessed 2 February 2015).  
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the development of their newly constructed country. In order to utilize its water 
resources for the purpose of power production, Turkey established several 
organizations to survey the potential of these resources.45  
 Despite the fact, as we pointed out in Chapter One, that the origin of Turkish 
water resource development began with the establishment of the General Directorate 
of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in 1954, the idea of establishing such a large project 
goes further back, to the early era of the Turkish republic in the aftermath of the First 
World War. 
 The original concept regarding the rational utilization of the water resources of 
the Euphrates River emerged from the Turkish ‘Administration for Electricity 
Studies’ Electrical Resources Survey (Elektrik Isleri Etut (EIE)) in 1935 and, one year 
later, upon Kemal Atatürk’s directive, a survey was undertaken into the potential of 
both rivers for the purpose of power production.46 Arising from the conclusions of the 
EIE water survey, in 1958, a further survey by the General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su Isleri (DSI)) resulted in the drawing up of 13 projects, 
five on the Tigris and eight on the Euphrates, mainly for the purpose of energy 
production, but also for irrigation. These projects provided the foundations for the 
subsequent GAP project. 
 The Administration’s survey concentrated for a long period on aspects of the 
water flow, which were recorded by the observation stations along the course of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The next stage was the launch by the DSI of its first 
studies within the framework of the Keban Dam in 1966, and in 1974 this dam was 
put into service for the purpose of power production. In 1976, the construction of the 
Karakaya Dam began, and in 1980 the Euphrates and Tigris projects were brought 
together under the name of the ‘Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)’.47 The Atatürk 
Dam, which was renamed in honour of Kemal Atatürk, the first president of the 
Turkish republic, began to be constructed in 1981 under the framework of GAP. In 
1986, the task of running the GAP project was given to the State Planning 
Organization or Devlet Planlama Teskilati (DPT), with the remit of providing the 
framework for integrated regional development. In 1989, Turkey set up its GAP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For more detail see State Water Works or Devlet Su Isleri (DSI) website www.dsi.gov.tr.  
46 See more in ‘Can Suyu: GAP’, published as a book by GAP Regional Directory (2010)’ p. xxvii. 
47 See more in ‘Can Suyu: GAP’, published as a book by GAP Regional Directory (2010). 
	   42	  
Master Plan, under the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development 
Administration (GAP-RDA).  
 According to the regional director, Mehmet Acikgöz, whom I interviewed in 
his office at GAP headquarters in Sanliurfa: “developments in the world brought a 
new concept of development, and the insight of the GAP Master Plan, in 1989, has 
been created in line with global development” (personal interview, July 2011). 
Although in terms of Turkish energy needs, GAP was rooted in the 1930s, it has 
undergone periodic shifts from time to time, so that by 1989 it had become a ‘social 
development’ project, and it was intended to deal with the south-east region’s socio-
economic situation through the GAP Master Plan. The plan was to be completed by 
2005, and the whole project was regulated by the Southeastern Anatolia Project 
Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA) as discussed below.48  
 
2.3.2. Organization of the GAP Regional Development Administration  
 
GAP Development Higher Council 
1. Prime Minister 
2. State Minister in charge of GAP 
3. State Minister in charge of state planning organization 
4. Minister in charge of public works and settlement 
5. Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
                                
   GAP Regional Administration  
1. Headquarters Directorate 
2. Regional Directorate  
3. Coordinating Council   
 
 
The GAP Higher Council is the highest decision making authority in the GAP 
organization. The Council is authorized to investigate and decide all kinds of plans, 
schemes and programmes developed by the project administration. “The Council is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See more about the GAP Master Plan and the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development 
Administration (GAP-RDA) in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 8 April 2015).  
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composed of the Prime Minister or a State Minister acting on behalf of the Prime 
Minister, State Minister in charge of the State Planning Organization and the Minister 
of Public Works and Settlement.”49 What is significant about the organizational role 
of the GAP Regional Development Administration is that it incorporates GAP into the 
highest level of state planning, thereby ensuring that the project is at the highest level 
of state policy. It regulates development under the prime minister and the state 
ministers, and the directors selected for this role in the project are highly 
knowledgeable not only about water issues or dams, but also about the geopolitics of 
the region.  
 
2.4. Development of the GAP social development project under the GAP Master 
Plan 
  
GAP, through its Master Plan, offered the most ambitious regional development 
project in the south-east region “by encompassing not only hydropower and irrigation 
infrastructure development as originally planned, but also all related sectors including 
industry, transportation, rural and urban infrastructure, environmental protection and 
social sectors in the [r]egion” (Altinbilek and Tortajada 2012: 173). The core 
objective of the Master Plan was to transform south-eastern Turkey into, as Kolars 
puts it, an 'Agro-related Export Base’. The aims of the plan, as defined by Kolars 
(1994: 66), were: 
 
1.  To raise income levels in the GAP region by improving the 
 economic structure, in order to narrow the income disparity between 
 this region and other regions. 
2. To increase productivity and employment opportunities in rural 
 areas. 
3. To enhance the assimilative capacity of large cities in the region. 
4. To contribute to the national objective of sustained economic growth,
 export promotion and social stability by efficient utilization of the 
 region’s resources. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See ‘GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı’, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 22 March 2012).  
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The transformation of the project into a multi-sectoral and integrated regional social 
development programme for south-eastern Turkey, meant that the strategies involved 
in the GAP Master Plan were reconsidered. The plan focused on the centralized 
development of strategies around four basic components:  
 
1. To develop and manage water resources and land resources for irrigation, 
domestic and also urban and industrial use.  
2. To improve the region’s soil use by introducing better agricultural practices, 
crop patterns and management. 
3. To encourage private entrepreneurship and manufacturing industries by giving 
special weight to agriculture related and local resource based production lines. 
4.  To improve social services and urban infrastructure facilities and create 
opportunities for employment, with a view to persuading local populations to 
migrate to the cities, and to attract qualified personnel from the western 
Turkish cities into the region.  
  
While the Master Plan provided aims and objectives for the implementation of the 
project, as an integrated regional social development programme, GAP needed action 
plans to achieve its targets. More specifically, the Master Plan was “a guide 
facilitating the integration and coordination of development efforts made by various 
governmental agencies” in the GAP region.50  
 “Macro-level planning and management, coordination, monitoring, evaluation 
and implementation in selected areas are carried out by the GAP Regional 
Development Administration (GAP-RDA) as well as other respective state agencies” 
(Ünver 1997: 459-60), in order to determine the south-east’s potential and to identify 
blockages in the socio-economic development process, in an attempt to reach its 
development objectives, strategies and targets.  In order to reach its targets, the 
Master Plan needed to incorporate social action plans. 
 
2.4.1. GAP-Social Action Plan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See more in ‘GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı’, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 20 May 2012).  
	   45	  
 
Between 1992 and 1994, a series of regional surveys was conducted by experts in the 
South-Eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA), 
who emphasized that a scheme of this size would have a significant impact on the 
existing social structure of the region. As a result of these surveys, the GAP Social 
Action Plan was created by GAP-RDA to provide a general framework, containing 
“basic policies, targets, strategies and implementation measures for ensuring the 
social development of the region through a human-faced approach” (Kibaroglu 2002: 
177). The Action Plan was created for a five year period in order to interact “between 
sectors, population projections and spatial development forecasts on the basis of 
numerous studies” (Ünver 1997: 459-60). The Action Plan aimed at radical changes 
in the economic structures and improvement in the socio-economic situation, 
including increased production and issues related to the health service and education, 
including enrolment ratios in schools. These changes were targeted to take place by 
2005. 
Thus, “effectiveness in attaining project objectives is closely related to the 
extent to which this structure is appropriately taken into consideration of the project’s 
design and implementation stage, and the participation of the people living in the 
region” (Kibaroglu 2002: 177). According to the Turkish state, the aims were:51   
 
1. To enhance the social structure: that is to increase the presence and influence of 
modern organizations and institutions with a view to removing those traditional ones 
which obstructed development; to build an infrastructure which would enable the 
local sub-culture to combine with the national culture; to support families and 
enhance intra-family relations.  
2. To improve the efficiency of agricultural services by extending practical tasks 
to farmers’ organizations as well as to private ones; by changing the role of 
the government to provide more services; by investing public funds in 
education and training in the fields of basic research, education and vocational 
training; by ensuring that all farmers had access to quality information 
concerning their local conditions; by removing crop patterns, production 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 These five basic principles of the GAP Social Action Plan are referenced from my interviewee, the 
President of GAP, Karahocagil, July 2011, GAP Headquarters, Ankara. See more at www.gap.gov.tr 
(accessed March 2011). 
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relations, types of ownership and employment that obstructed dynamic 
development in agriculture; by assessing the most favourable sizes of farming 
enterprises in the region and by eliminating factors that prevented enterprises 
from reaching these sizes; by taking measures to preserve such communal 
land.  
3. To bring down unemployment; to appeal to investors; to encourage women 
into the workplace; to increase income levels, which would help to ensure a 
balanced distribution of income; to support employment, health and the 
environment.  
4. To increase the level of education, especially for girls; to ensure equal 
educational opportunities in all sections of the population and promote 
literacy; to support vocational and technical training; to raise the social and 
educational profile of women who remained marginalized. 
5. To expand preventive health services and ensure people’s access to them; to 
identify and prevent the health problems that might follow the expansion of 
irrigation in the region. 
In addition to these aims, it was planned to follow demographic policies, which 
would encourage population movements so as to enhance the economic and social 
potential of the region, to encourage the concentration of the population in central 
villages and cities. Finally, it aimed to encourage the settlement of nomadic and 
semi-nomadic tribes “whose living environments are continuously shrinking as a 
result of social and economic changes; to observe principles relating to social, 
economic and cultural development in the resettlement of communities affected by 
dam lakes.”52 
 
To summarize, GAP was designed as an extensive, multi-sector, integrated 
regional development project, which aimed at economic growth and regional 
development via a concentration “on industry, transportation, urban and rural 
infrastructure, environmental protection and social sectors such as 
employment generation, health, education, capacity building and gender 
equity (Altinbilek and Tortajada 2012: 193).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed in 2 March 2011); or, GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 
GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx. 
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In 1995, the Turkish state managed to convince international actors that the 
philosophy of GAP was to achieve sustainable socio-economic development, which 
was “adopted in the context of GAP activities upholding the principles of human 
development, participation, equality and fairness.” 53  A cooperative conference 
between the GAP administration and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) took place that year, which, as Carkoglu and Eder (2005: 167) revealed, laid 
the foundations for a joint GAP-UNDP programme for sustainable development in the 
GAP region and supported 29 different projects grouped under five headings to 
promote: 
 
1. social sustainability and the development of social services 
2. agricultural sustainability and increased agricultural productivity 
3. local entrepreneurships and economically viable industrial growth  
4. human settlements  
5. optimal and sustainable utilization of natural resources 
 
 
However, when the GAP-Social Action Plan of the early 1990s had still not 
succeeded in reaching its sustainable socio-economic development target by 2005, a 
further Social Action Plan was established in order to fulfil the objectives of the 
original plan. This five year plan ran from 2008 to 2012.  
 
2.4.2. GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centres (Bölgesel Kalkinmada 
Girisimciligin Gelistirilmesi (GAP-GIDEM)) 
The GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centres (Bölgesel Kalkinmada 
Girisimciligin Gelistirilmesi (GAP-GIDEM)), created in 1996 and financed by EU 
grants, promoted private sector investments in GAP regions and provided consultancy 
services to entrepreneurs. The remit of GAP-GIDEM is “to operate as a sub-project 
within the framework of the GAP Regional Development Administration.”54 Turkish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 2 March 2011); or GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 
GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap nedir.aspx (accessed 2 March 2011).  
54 See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 22 October 2011); or GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 
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policy-makers wanted to increase, through exploitation of the substantial natural 
resources of the GAP region, its contribution to the Turkish national GDP, which only 
stood at about 5%. Moreover, the GAP region contains 10% of the country’s 
population, but the region’s share in industrial value is much lower than the 5% of 
GDP. Only about 3.4 % of Turkish enterprises in manufacturing industry are situated 
in the south-east region.55  
 Therefore the Turkish state was attempting to enable the region to catch up 
through the GAP project by providing such resources as the GAP-GIDEM, through 
which Turkey has been aiming to extend information and consulting services to local, 
national and international entrepreneurs who plan to launch investments in the region. 
According to Turkish GAP policy-makers, “The increase in agricultural output can 
only be sustainable if the additional revenues, derived through the realisation of GAP, 
are channeled to feasible investments. It is therefore inevitable to improve the 
entrepreneurial and managerial capacities of local businesses.”56 In short, the above 
statements indicate that once all the principles of GAP ‘social development’ projects 
begin to function, there would be no reason why the project should not achieve its 
main target of enhancing the south-east’s socio-economic status, and this is an issue 
which this study investigates.  
 
2.4.3. Multi-Purpose Community Centres (Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri 
(ÇATOM)) 
 
According to the GAP official website, CATOM was initiated in 1995 with one centre 
and has now expanded to 40 centres in the nine provinces of the GAP region.57 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 2 March 2011). 
55 See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 22 October 2011); or, GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 
GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx. 
56  [PDF] gap eylem planı inceleme ve değerlendirme raporu - emo, 
www.emo.org.tr/.../d73f5b6b5d8b428_ek.pdf?tipi... (Türk Mühendis Ve Mimar Odaları Birliği 
(TMMOB)) Diyarbakir Il Koordinasyon Kurulu [GAP Action Plan and Review Report: criticism and 
recommendations by Turkey Architectural Engineering and Coordination Centre, Diyarbakir 
Coordination Board]. See more in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 22 October 2011); or GAP Nedir - TC 
Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 22 
October 2011). 
57  [PDF] gap eylem planı inceleme ve değerlendirme raporu - emo 
www.emo.org.tr/.../d73f5b6b5d8b428_ek.pdf?tipi... (Türk Mühendis Ve Mimar Odaları Birliği 
(TMMOB Diyarbakir Il Koordinasyon Kurulu) GAP Action Plan and Review Report, Criticism 
Recommendations by Turkey Architectural Engineering and Coordination Centre, Diyarbakir 
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According to Adalet H. Akbas (personal interview, July 2011), the coordinator of the 
GAP social project, with particular responsibility for the activities of ÇATOM, these 
centres were mainly based in poor areas of the cities and their main aim was to assist 
women and young girls who had migrated from villages to the cities, offering them 
education and help with social problems. Our task, she said, “is to provide training 
courses on literacy, health, mother-child health, hygiene, nutrition and social activities 
- basically, to ensure the participation of women in public life.”  
Another main aim was to draw women into GAP’s programme of 
development and programme management. GAP policy-makers were trying to slowly 
draw women into ÇATOM management, so that they could play their part in the 
ÇATOM community. ÇATOM’s target was to empower disadvantaged women who 
had migrated from villages to the suburbs of cities, and who had never had the chance 
to get access to the services that the state provided. The main objectives of ÇATOMs 
can be summarized, according to Akbas and the official website as follows: 
 
1. Creating opportunities for women to become aware of their problems and 
launch initiatives for their solution, 
2. Ensuring that women take part in the public sphere and benefit more from 
available services, 
3. Enhancing female employment and entrepreneurship, contributing to equal 
opportunities by empowering women, 
4. Starting the process of gender balanced development and developing 
replicable models relevant to local circumstances for participatory community 
development.58 
 
Through ÇATOMs’ social activities, the GAP policy-makers have tried to reach 
locals, in order to draw young girls and women into the centres. The strategy of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Coordination Board; and [PDF] Ulusal Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (USİAD) GAP Raporu – 
National Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, www.usiad.net/index.php?option=com...gap-
raporu...raporlar... GAP' ta Ne Oldu! Bölgede Ekonomik, Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler. Editör: 
Dursun Yildiz. Hazırlayan: ADA Strateji. Mart - 2008. Ulusal Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği. See also 
www.gap.gov.tr; or GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, 
www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 22 October 2011).  
58 See more in www.gap.gov.tr; see also GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, 
www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 22 October 2011).  
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ÇATOMs project was and is to contribute to an interdependent relationship between 
the local communities and the rest of Turkey.   
 In order to introduce such services to these disadvantaged women, Akbas said, 
“we go from door to door and tell locals how we work and what we provide, and tell 
them that if they were to join us, we would sort out their problems” (personal 
interview, July 2011). The concept of the ÇATOMs might appear to be based on a 
very holistic approach, if there were no political aspect to the project. Since the 
purpose of this chapter is to define and understand the structure of the GAP project, I 
will analyse it in terms of its politicization later in this thesis, (see Chapter Five and 
Six) and I will also examine to what extent ÇATOM centres have played a role in 
making progress in the context of GAP’s social development project. 
 
2.4.4. GAP Youth House Centres (GAP Gençlik Evleri)  
 
‘GAP Youth House Centres’ were mainly located in cities and aimed to create social 
activities and solve youth problems. The ‘GAP Youth House Centre’ project was 
launched in the region in 1999, like ÇATOM, as part of the ‘Social Action Plan’. The 
rise in the population of the GAP region and the increase in unemployment caused by 
resettlement (intensive rural to urban migration within the region), caused serious 
damage to families. Those most affected were young people.  
 According to the government and independent records,59 the percentage of 
young people and children in the GAP region is significantly high, and above the 
country’s averages. The 2000 General Population Census shows that 41.8% of the 
population of the GAP region was aged 0-14,  54.7% were 15-64, and 4.1% were 65 
and over, whereas the distribution of the total population of the country by the same 
age groups was, respectively, 29.9%, 64.3% and 5.6%.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  www.gap.gov.tr, Gençlik için sosyal gelisim projesi; [PDF] gap eylem planı inceleme ve 
değerlendirme raporu - emo, www.emo.org.tr/.../d73f5b6b5d8b428_ek.pdf?tipi...  (Türk Mühendis Ve 
Mimar Odaları Birliği (TMMOB Diyarbaki Il Koordinasyon Kurulu) GAP Action Plan and Review 
Report, Criticism and Recommendations by Turkey Architectural Engineering and Coordination 
Centre, Diyarbakir Coordination Board; and [PDF] GAP Raporu - USiAD, 
www.usiad.net/index.php?option=com...gap-raporu...raporlar... GAP'ta Ne Oldu! Bölgede Ekonomik, 
Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler. Editör: Dursun Yildiz. Hazırlayan: ADA Strateji. Mart - 2008. Ulusal 
Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (accessed 22 October 2011).  
60 See more in www.gap.gov.tr, Gençlik için sosyal gelisim projesi (accessed 5 March 2013).  
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This pattern, in which the age group 0-14 constitutes a larger share of the 
population than the national average, makes it necessary to develop special policies 
and set targets for children and adolescents. Youth in general is the connection of any 
society to its future, and the most dynamic part of that society as well. The GAP 
region has a rather young and dynamic population composition. The proportion of the 
age group 15-24 to the total population of the region was 23%. In relation to GAP 
House Youth Centres, Adalet H. Akbas (personal interview, July 2011) stated: 
 
To enhance communication among the youth, encourage their initiatives and 
organize action in various fields, thereby helping them to become active 
members of their communities. It was hoped that such a dynamic youth social 
project would create positive environments for youth and society. 
 
Akbas stated that Turkey, under the GAP ‘social development’ project, received funds 
for ÇATOM centres from organizations under the United Nations umbrella, such as 
UNICEF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) . She also told 
me that because they were part of the development project and had got a relationship 
with such organizations, they received a 47 million euro fund from the European 
Union. So, GAP ‘social development’ schemes have been perceived as internationally 
significant, with international actors such as the UN taking serious interest in the 
project. In this respect, GAP, with the incorporation of its social development 
perspectives, should not be perceived to be merely a national project but should also 
be seen in an international context. From this point of view, this study is concerned 
not only with the concept of the GAP, ‘social development’ project, but also, 
crucially, with its results.  
 
2.4.5. GAP Child Development Centres (Çocuk Gelisim Merkezleri) 
 
Child Development Centres were created in 2003, again based in the less developed 
area of south-east Turkey. 61  The centres are mainly intended for socially 
disadvantaged children in the south-east, providing activities such as social 
development, reading, writing, sporting activities and assistance for such children. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See www.Milliyet.com.tr (accessed 6 May 2014). 
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The project is principally designed for children aged from 4 to 6 and from 7 to 14, 
mainly ones who had migrated from rural areas within the region. While the children 
between 4 and 6 are offered pre-school education, Turkish language and social 
development, children between 7 and 14 are mainly offered English, mathematics, 
Turkish, reading and writing, including workshops on computers, technology and the 
arts, cinema and theatre, folk dance and many other social activities. Child 
Development Centres are also intended to help children’s parents understand how to 
help their children, how they should deal with disorderly children, and how to make 
sure that their children are developing their lives. The centres also support families 
who are not in a position to support their children by visiting them in their houses, 
providing a basic education and, if necessary, the members from the centres will teach 
parents writing and reading. 62 They face criticism, according to my empirical work, 
on the grounds that such projects are too much focused on Turkish culture and 
society, not offering education based on local culture, and that this is part of Turkish 
policy for controlling the region. I will broaden the argument in Chapter Six, and 
assess whether there are such links between the social projects and Turkish policy in 
the region.  
 
2.5. Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has examined the physicality, construction and historical background of 
the GAP project and the stated aim of the GAP ‘social development’ project in the 
south-east of Turkey. The main purpose of this chapter was not only to outline the 
structure of the project but also, most importantly for this study, to demonstrate how 
GAP, which was a technical land/water development project, was transformed into a 
‘social development’ or integrated regional-social development project. In terms of 
the GAP ‘social development’ project, the chapter outlined the GAP-Master Plan and 
each of the programmes included in the project, helping us not only to grasp these 
social programmes, which were designed to diminish the longstanding backwardness 
of the south-east, but also to understand the whole nature of the project and its 
structure before we analyse its negative and positive progress, if not its mission. 
  Although I will investigate the progress of the project later in this study, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See more at http://www.gapcheetos.org/ (accessed 6 May 2014).  
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chapter has already indicated progress made in irrigation as well as in hydroelectric 
power generation, and noted crucially that while irrigation has barely progressed, the 
hydroelectric power plan has almost reached its target. 
What is most significant is that, despite the GAP project appearing to focus on 
irrigation for the social development of the region rather than for electricity, at least at the 
beginning of the Master Plan, the historical paradigm indicates that, whatever Turkey was 
planning in 1935-6 for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and whatever it is planning now, it 
follows its traditional policy. In the 1930s, and later in the 1950s, the idea was to utilize the 
water of these two rivers for power production to meet Turkish industrial needs; and it is 
evident now that Turkey, through the GAP project, has achieved 74% of the country’s 
hydroelectric production, but the proportion of irrigated land remains under 19%, despite the 
fact that GAP was supposed to provide a development programme designed to raise people’s 
income levels and living standards. 
Accordingly, in the following chapter, I will paint a broad socio-political 
canvas and employ modernization/development theory from which to assess why and 
how the GAP ‘social development’ project has materialized and exactly what factors 
pushed Turkish policy-makers to propose such a project for the south-east, a region 
which had hitherto been socially and economically neglected.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Narrative of the south-east: political, socio-cultural and socio-economic aspects  
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
As this thesis examines GAP and its ‘social development’ project in the Kurdish 
south-east region of Turkey, in order to make the concept of the GAP social 
programmes more comprehensible it is important to outline the materialization of the 
‘social development’ project in the framework of development/modernization theory 
and in the context of the south-east underdevelopment narrative factors. Thus, this 
chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which is primarily about Turkish–
Kurdish relations in their historical framework and, in particular, the situation with 
regard to the socio-economic development of the south-east, as this region has been 
politically unstable for decades.   
When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk built his new country out of the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire, his followers and his state policy-makers focused on Turkey’s 
overall socio-economic situation, which seriously needed to be modernized. But while 
most of the country has benefited from the new economic development and has been 
successfully modernized, the south-east of Turkey has not been so lucky. The region 
has continued to live under tribal dynasties, and the people of the region have not 
been able to create their own independent socio-economic structure, mainly because 
of being a semi-feudal society and also on account of long term Turkish politics in the 
region. Hence, this chapter examines to what extent political instability, volatile 
historical Turkish-Kurdish relations, Turkish policy towards the Kurds in the region, 
and the structure of the region’s social formation have played a role in pushing the 
south-east further into underdevelopment. 
The second section explores the materialization of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project in the context of modernization/development, which will lead us 
to theoretical and practical explanations of what we mean by the word ‘development’, 
and to what extent GAP has been formulated within that framework.  
 
However, before examining Turkish-Kurdish relations, the historical background of 
	   55	  
Turkish politics in the south-east, the state of the region’s political and socio-
economic paradigm and analyzing GAP’s ‘social development’ project in the lens of 
development/modernization theory, it is appropriate to present a review of the most 
relevant literature on development/modernization in Turkey. So the chapter begins by 
reviewing literature looking at the formation of the Turkish state, which itself is 
considered to be a part of the modernization process. The literature focuses on 
reviewing the ways in which Turkey has become modernized/developed via its 
nation-state regime, by leaving traditional society behind and creating secularity, 
rationality and a modern industrial economy.  
Secondly, the chapter examines post-war Turkish-Kurdish relations and 
Kurdish uprisings against the new Turkish republic’s policies in their region.  
The third section focuses on the socio-economic situation of the south-east 
region, including consideration of the Kurdish social structure and Turkish policy in 
the region, to see whether these two issues have any role in the region’s socio-
economic situation.  
Fourthly, the chapter assesses development/modernization theory and explores 
the interrelation of GAP’s social development project with the theory.  
Finally, the chapter looks at critical approaches to modernization/development 
theory.  
Examining all these issues will support this study of GAP, and will assist in 
clarifying not only the materialization of the GAP project and the overall 
longstanding historical narrative, but also its current status, as the main aim of this 
thesis is to reveal whether GAP has reached its key targets.  
 
3.2. History of development and modernization in Turkey: from the foundation 
of the Turkish republic to the 1980s 
 
In order to understand GAP’s ‘social development’ programme and its success or 
failure, it is necessary to look at the historical background of Turkish 
development/modernization since the country’s creation in 1923, to enlighten us as to 
why the country overall has been developed but the south-east has struggled. Despite 
the fact that in the 1920s the newly created Turkey had the massive task of 
reconstructing its economy, which was deeply damaged due to the Ottoman state’s 
integration into the capitalist system as an open market, the newly created Turkish 
	   56	  
republic managed to industrialize its new “country through joint investment with 
foreign capital as well as through the establishment of State Economic Enterprises” 
(Aydın 2005: 26). So, the crucial issue is that Turkey, since its creation in 1923, has 
been modernized/developed via its nation-state regime through leaving traditional 
society behind and creating secularity, rationality and a modern industrial economy.  
Accordingly, as Henze (1993) states, ever since the end of the First World 
War, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk built his new country out of the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire, state and intellectual–bureaucratic elites in Turkey have pushed to 
introduce westernizing reforms in government and society. Atatürk, the first president 
of modern Turkey, wanted to establish the country on the basis of a European–type 
parliamentary system of government and as a member of Western civilization. 
Atatürk and his state policy-makers knew that leaving traditional society behind was 
not going to be easy for a society that had been living according to these customs for 
700 years under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. In order to create a new society, 
secure the new Turkish state and to modernize, Atatürk believed that a republican 
regime would be the best formation for the future of Turkey, and this was constructed 
in 1923 based in the current Turkish capital, Ankara. In order to develop and 
strengthen his new state, Atatürk immediately objectified his reforms and the 
ideology of Kemalism (named after him - Kemal Atatürk). Kemalism was informed 
by six basic principles: nationalism, populism, republicanism, secularism, etatism and 
revolutionism were created to bring Turkey to a state of contemporary civilization, 
development/modernization, and to secure the state (Kili 1980; Akural 1984; 
Rumford 2003; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).  
The six principles are briefly explained as follows: although Atatürk witnessed 
the fact that radical nationalism had been problematic (such as Nazi Germany, fascist 
Italy and Francoist Spain), nationalism was the most crucial of these principles. First 
of all, unlike Arab nationalism, which intertwined with religion, Kemalist nationalism 
was secular. ‘Turkishness’ was not determined by one race, but by the degree a 
person associates himself with it (Kili 1980: 388). In Kemalist nationalism, everyone 
in Turkey was considered to be a Turk and there was no recognition of other 
ethnicities, such as Kurds. The core assumption of Kemalist ‘nationalism’ was based 
on securing the state and protecting Turkish independence, by which the Turkish state 
could achieve development/modernization. ‘Populism’, for Kemalists, was the crucial 
dominant mechanism to secure Kemalism: ‘populism’ demanded “a social system 
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based on work, and emphasized national unity both for national security and 
development” (Kili 1980: 388). Once Turkishness was developed, it was considered 
that all the threats to the Kemalist ideology would be easy to control. According to the 
principle of ‘republicanism’, Atatürk believed that a republic would be the best potion 
to secure national sovereignty and would be the best option for the young generations 
of the new Turkey (Kili 1980; Akural 1984), who would take Turkey into the 
modernized world. Moreover, ‘secularism’ in Turkey must be understood differently 
from French secularism. To secure the unity of Turkey, Kemalist “‘secularism’ is a 
line of democratization between traditionalism and reformism” (Kili 1980: 391). 
Since Atatürk “viewed the caliphate as a threat to the security of his regime, and […] 
abolished it in 1924” (Akural 1984: 126), the Muslim establishment has been under 
control of the Kemalist state, which religion could not challenge. In addition, although 
Kemalist state policy agreed to the functioning of a liberal market economy, 
according to Kemalist ‘etatism’, “the state was to regulate the general run of 
economic activity in areas in which private enterprise had proven to be inadequate, or 
if national interest required it” (Kili 1980: 391). As Kili (1980: 391) states: “Through 
‘etatism’ the state acquired the right to interfere with, and to control the Turkish 
economy.” Finally, ‘revolutionism’ basically meant protecting the Kemalist principles 
and modernization was sure to be developed under Kemalist state formation. As 
Akural (1984: 141) states, “what Atatürk meant by revolution (İnkilapçılık) has never 
been sufficiently clarified.” 
On the basis of these six constitutional precepts, the Turkish state was 
intended to create a secular unity between itself and the nation, thus the country 
would become a secular nation-state. In assessing Turkish 
modernization/development, it is impossible to ignore the fact that it was founded on 
these principles, and it is important to expand on these factors.  
Rumford (2003) states that Kemalism was aimed at making Turkey a civilized 
and advanced modern society; because it was based on the premise that modernity 
equals progress, that is, on the creation of a modern nation through the introduction 
and dissemination of western reason and rationality into a society that was regarded as 
traditional and backward. Similarly, Keyman (2007: 221) points out that through the 
Kemalist nation-state, Turkey created secularity, rationality and a modern industrial 
economy. The concept of the nation-state, and its power to reshape a backward 
society into a secular-rational social model, “was seen as the key for the possibility to 
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enlighten the people and help them make progress” (Ibid) so that they would reach the 
standards of contemporary western civilization. Again, Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) argues 
that for the secular nation-state of Turkey, modernization meant westernization, 
which was viewed as successful, so traditional society was left behind and a modern 
western model was adopted.  
When Atatürk died (1938), the Kemalist elite continued modernizing Turkey 
by constructing political and cultural institutions to attain a contemporary western 
standard of living, in other words, to establish a western civilization in the new 
Turkey. As Berkes (1964) describes, in order to achieve the standards of western 
civilization, the Kemalist elite began to demolish the socio-religious elite and Kurdish 
identity on the grounds that they were perceived as major threats to the unification of 
modern Turkey. For instance, the Kemalist state elite changed the written script to 
Roman letters, and banned traditional eastern dress, in order to turn the face of the 
new Turkey to the West. In addition to this, in order to achieve economic growth in 
both industry and agriculture, Turkey also designed a five-year development plan. By 
the 1930s, the world was in recession,63 and this provided an opportunity for the 
newly formed Turkish state elite and the state policy-makers to seek development 
strategies. Aydın (2005: 27) defines this period as the Turkish etatist period (1930–
39). Aydın (Ibid) comments on this period:  
 
[The Turkish] state’s active involvement in capital accumulation and 
investment in economic enterprises took private interests into very careful 
consideration. However, the state entered into economic areas where private 
enterprise failed or was not strong enough, such as the building of 
infrastructural establishments, main industrial institutions, electrical power 
stations, railways and the iron and steel industry. 
 
 The Turkish state policy-makers could not pursue the idea of an organically 
integrated economy. Nevertheless, by the 1950s, Turkey’s integration into the global 
economy had been strengthened. Turkey was gradually joining western institutions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 During the 1930s, the economic collapse that produced high unemployment and led the world into 
economic recession was broadly known as the Great Depression. Specifically, the Great Depression 
began when, in 1929, Wall Street crashed in the US, leading to international economic disorder, and a 
worldwide political and economic crisis. For more, see (Samuelson 1976; Williams 1994; Cargill and 
Mayer Aug, 1998). 
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and this forced the state to move away from etatist policies into a world market after 
the period of world recession which lasted until the end of the Second World War 
(Aydin 2005). 
However, in 1950, when Turkey first moved from rule by a single party to 
multi-party democracy, the victorious Democratic Party “introduced a set of policies 
to pave the way for the liberalisation of the economy and to emphasise agricultural 
development as the engine of the economy” (Aydın 2005: 29). Subsequently, 
Turkey’s five-year development plans, in 1963–67, 1968–72 and 1973–77, created 
steady economic growth.  
 Although the new government adopted a liberal economy in the 1950s, since 
the foundation of the republic, Turkish modernization had been based on a ‘strong-
state tradition’ (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005). This tradition manifested itself as the 
organizing ‘internal variable’ of Turkish politics, as “the state has assumed the 
capacity of acting almost completely independent from civil society, and […] the 
state, rather than the government, has constituted ‘the primary context of politics’” 
(Keyman and Koyuncu 2005: 109). For instance, from 1923 to 1950, Turkey was run 
by a single-party regime, the party which Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had established, 
known as the Republican People’s Party (RPP or CHP). Rule by the RPP lasted over 
20 years. It was a single pro-state party era, during which period the military enjoyed 
controlling the state without fear of civilian intervention in military business. Twenty 
years later, the first competitive elections took place in 1946 between the Democratic 
Party (DP) and the RPP. The Democratic Party lost the election. There was some 
speculation that the state helped the RPP during the election, and, at that time, the DP 
did not have the power to argue for a re-election. In 1950, DP won the election.  
 However, Turkey subsequently had three military juntas, in 1960, 1971 and 
1980, which consolidated the army’s political power by reinforcing its position to the 
point where no civilian political organization could oppose it. This had serious 
repercussions for the country economically and politically, and the south-east was the 
area most effected. The juntas not only harmed people as individuals, they damaged 
the national economy.  
The military was not accustomed to being run by a civilian government, but 
did manage to keep its patience for ten years. During the 1960s the world had 
witnessed radical changes. On the one hand, decolonization of Third World countries 
took place, followed by revolutionary movements, and on the other hand, there was 
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the rise of a new concept in Western Europe, that of western democracy. All this 
affected Turkish people too, especially young students. The changes in the world and 
its effects in Turkey made the military fearful for its powerful position in Turkish 
politics.   In 1960, Turkey experienced the first intervention by the military in politics. 
The 1960 coup was organized by middle-rank officers, and their excuse was the need 
to resolve a constitutional crisis.  
From the time of the first intervention, the Turkish military entrenched its 
place in civilian politics. After the 1960 coup, through article 111 of the 1961 
constitution, the military guaranteed its power over the Council of Ministers, a key 
body of the state for decision-making, including the coordination of all matters 
relating to national security. Ten years later, following the military intervention in 
1971, force commanders “were made members of the Council, thereby enhancing the 
status of its military members” (Özbudun 2000: 108). Following the military 
intervention in 1971, freedom of speech, the right to form trade unions and the right 
of assembly were effectively eliminated. Furthermore, in 1972 the military began to 
terrorize the country. Many students, teachers, lawyers, journalists and trade unionists 
were arrested, imprisoned and tortured by order of the army commanders. The history 
of the 1971 coup is still in the mind of many Turkish people. People from the left-
wing of politics were the most affected, and most of them left the country to become 
refugees in other part of the world, mainly in Europe.   
In 1980, the third military junta took power. The 1980 military intervention in 
politics was quite different from previous ones in its wide-ranging impact. This coup 
brought radical changes to “social, economic and political structures – including laws 
regarding political parties, trade unions, …public professional organisations, 
universities, radio and television” (Özbudun 2000: 26). As Özbudun argues (2000: 
27), the intention of the regime was to “demobilize society at large, especially by 
outlawing all cooperation between political parties and other civil society institutions 
such as trade unions, professional organizations.”  
Not only was this intervention a mark of Turkey’s political instability, but it 
had direct negative effects on the country’s economic health. Many business men and 
women began to take their businesses to other part of the world, because of the 
unpredictable political situation in the country. The 1980s military junta was another 
period which is still in many people’s minds in Turkey, and many are frightened that 
sooner or later the military will come back - this is a serious issue that Turkish people 
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live with every day. The 1980s military junta sank Turkey into deeper economic 
crisis; a high rate of inflation, a shortage of consumer goods and a foreign exchange 
shortage were all the result of the military’s intervention in politics.  
Additionally, the 1980s junta oversaw the drafting of a new constitution in 
1982 which further entrenched the military in day-to-day Turkish politics. Under 
Article 118, it was declared that:  
 
The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its 
view on taking decisions and ensuring necessary cooperation with regard to 
the formation, determination, and implementation of the national security 
policy of the state. The Council of Ministers should give priority consideration 
to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures it 
deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the 
state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security 
of society  (Özbudun 2000: 108). 
 
This radical constitutional change allowed the military forces to legitimate their 
intervention in politics at any time in the name of national security. So, while the 
formation of the Turkish state was aimed at strengthening the Turkish economy and 
moving the country forward into the developed world, these direct military 
interventions had a serious socio-economic impact on Turkish society and the country 
itself (Gunay and Karatekelioglu 2005; Özbudun 2000; Robins 2003).  
There is no doubt that military organizations have played an important role in 
establishing the social, political and economic conditions of the population. In 
particular, for people living in developing countries, the military is the only important 
actor, shaping the quality of their existence. But, this does not mean that the military 
will allow the population to express itself freely. As Fidal states, “Military leaders 
occupy key government positions and openly dictate national policy” (1975: 1), from 
dominating the media to controlling the public and private sectors.  
However, resulting from a political spark set off in the 1970s in the world 
political economy, the post-1980s period saw the emergence of new actors, new 
meaning and new forms of modernization led by the neo-liberal developmentalization 
model for the world. Let me briefly discuss the neo-liberal concept of development 
and assess its impact on the Turkish politic and the role of the state, in particular in 
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the economy. 
Brohman (1996) states,  
 
by the end of the 1960s there were clear signs that …[the] developmentalist 
paradigm had gone into decline and was rapidly being supplanted by a more 
orthodox neoclassical approach in major development sub-fields such as 
international trade, agricultural economics, and development planning.  
 
However, the perspective on ‘developmentalism’ began to shift further during the 
1970s, in particular when the role of the state in the economy and the market was 
sharply challenged by some theorists (neo-liberalists) who “began to argue that the 
widespread involvement of the state in economic activities, was leading to 
inefficiency and slower rates of economic growth than would be achieved if the 
market were left to its own services” (Willis 2005: 47). These theorists, according to 
Willis, were authors such as Deepak Lal (1983) and Bela Balassa (1971, 1981), who 
drew on the classical theories of Adam Smith and others regarding the ‘invisible’ 
hand of the market.  
According to neo-liberal theorists, reducing state intervention in the market 
would create greater economic growth. Thus, the late 1970s saw a major change, 
“prompted both by the rise of anti-Keynesian conservatism in Europe and the US and 
by the seeming inability of the developmentalist approach to offer viable solutions for 
mounting Third World problems” (Brohman 1996: 27).  In view of this, most global 
political economists have moved away from the mainstream ‘developmentalist’ 
paradigm in favour of neo-liberalism.  
  Cohen and Centeno (2006: 32) point out that “Between World War II and the 
economic crises of the 1970s, policy makers tended to rely heavily on the exercise of 
state power in their pursuit of development and prosperity.” They also indicate that: 
 
When a series of political and economic crises began to afflict the global 
economy, government interventionism was subject to a strong intellectual and 
political backlash, and a new ideological movement seeking to resurrect an 
updated ethos of nineteenth-century economic liberalism rose to take its place. 
This new political-economic liberalism-neoliberalism mandated the removal 
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of governments’ hold over the economy and the reintroduction of open 
competition into economic life. (Ibid: 32-3) 
 
In the early 1980s, multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, led by the United States, pushed developing nations towards “a 
package of ‘neoliberal’ reforms that included a reduction of total government 
spending, restricted social spending, privatization of state enterprises, lowering tariff 
and trade barriers, and decontrolling capital markets” (Ibid: 62). 
Simon (2008) argues that the core of neo-liberalism as an economic theory is 
that it aims to deregulate markets in order to promote ‘free’ trade. He stresses: 
 
It harks back to the ideas of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in other words, 
to the very historical roots of neoclassical economics – hence 
neo(new)liberalism. This ideology rapidly became the economic orthodoxy in 
the North and was exported to the global South via aid policies and the 
measures formulated to address the debt crisis. (Simon 2008: 87) 
 
In order to understand the conceptual framework of neo-liberalism, one must look at 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). One of the most important aspects of 
neo-liberal development theory in practice has been the implementation of SAPs since 
the late 1970s. SAPs have often been implemented by national governments in return 
for continuing financial support from the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, “the 
underpinning philosophy of SAPs reflects the market ideologies adopted by the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations and implementation demonstrates the ways in 
which policies development in the North could be imposed on Southern nations” 
(Willis 2005: 51-2). 
What is important to note here is that through SAPs there was a shift; that is a 
series of government-led policies, which are aimed at reducing the role of the state in 
the running of the national economy. As Willis puts it (2005: 52), “This does not 
mean that the state is no longer involved, but rather that the market is given much 
greater power.” These new policies “were designed to cut government expenditure, 
reduce the extent of state intervention in the economy, and promote liberalization and 
international trade” (Simon 2008: 87). Thus SAPs “were explicit about the necessity 
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of export promotion based on the Ricardian notion of comparative advantage” (Ibid: 
87). 
Hence, by the 1980s, the neo-liberal model, involving the restructuring of the 
global economy and politics, was on the rise throughout the world. This development 
has undoubtedly impacted on the role of the Turkish state in civilian everyday 
politics. Turkey’s strong-state tradition began to change as the mentality of 
development and modernity changed. Keyman and Koyuncu (2005: 109) informs us 
of significant factors connected with the post-1980s Turkish structural transformation, 
in terms of political economic issues, stating that “since the 1980s, the process of 
Turkish modernization involved new actors, new mentalities of development and new 
identity claims.” In order to reconstruct its economy, the Turkish state slowly began 
to depart from its statist position with regard to economic development. Thus Turkey 
in the 1980s experienced economic transformation into a neo-liberal development 
model, which led it towards robust, positive socio-economic development.   
 This robust, positive socio-economy began to develop when the democratic 
election which was held in 1983 brought Turgut Özal, the leader of the newly formed 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) to power.  Sumru and Filiztekin outlines 
how, under Özal’s presidency, reforms continued to be introduced. For instance, 
“capital markets such as the reopening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the beginning 
of Treasury auctions for marketing new government debt, the formation of an inter-
bank money market, and other changes” (Sumru and Filiztekin 2006: 20).   
 In short, Özal managed to transform the Turkish economy through a neo-
liberal development model, which not only made him the most influential political 
leader in Turkey since the era of Atatürk, as Öniş (2004) pointed out, but also 
embodied a robust positive aspect of the Turkish economy. However, it is not the aim 
of this study to introduce Özal or define his role in the Turkish economy, but to 
discuss the Turkish economy in the era of his presidency. Öniş (2004) reveals that the 
continuity of leadership throughout the 1980s enabled Turkey to recover swiftly from 
the deep economic crisis that the country had found itself in during the late 1970s. 
Özal’s leadership played an important role in providing credibility for the adjustment 
programme maintained by key international institutions such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank. His eclectic background in economic bureaucracy, private 
business and international organizations helped to inspire confidence and led to 
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increased support for the programme. He was instrumental in accelerating the 
momentum of the liberalization process in the Turkish economy, particularly with 
regard to trade and capital account. Moreover, his style of leadership led to a degree 
of optimism regarding the future of the Turkish economy in the mid-1980s. 
Furthermore, Aral (2001) points out that under his leadership, “Turkey applied for 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in April 1987 as the 
ultimate step in Turkey's search for ‘recognition’ as part of the ‘European family’.” 
 In conclusion, since the creation of the country, Turkey, particularly the west, 
has been modernized, and developed socio-economically, but the south-east has not 
been treated in the same way as other parts of Turkey, and the region has remained 
one of the poorest areas. Regarding the south-east’s socio-economic development, it 
is worth referring to Lorenz and Erickson (1999), who argue that the Turkish 
government’s economic policies had aimed to revitalize agriculture through 
mechanization. These policies improved the Turkish economy overall and aligned it 
with the 20th century, but the economic and agricultural schemes were focused 
specifically on western Turkey. Thus, “while Thrace, the Aegean areas, and the 
Anatolian heartland of Turkey gained much, the south-eastern Anatolia region fell 
farther behind, as did the expectations and hopes of the populace” (Lorenz and 
Erickson 1999: 5).  
To recap, the state, to some extent, has always been the political actor in 
Turkish politics and decision-making, in particular when it comes to issues related to 
security and geo-strategy, geo-politics and critical geo-economic development. In 
particular, since the south-east was and still is the most politically problematic region 
for the Turkish state, the state has always been careful not to let it be fully run by 
civilians. The Turkish state, since the creation of the republic, has always maintained 
an undocumented policy toward the south-east, and this has led the region further into 
socio-economic deadlock.     
  In order to grasp the unequal socio-economic development between the 
south-east and the rest of Turkey (which will be described in greater detail later in this 
chapter), it is important to outline the political and security paradigm in the south-east 
in relation to the Turkish-Kurdish situation, and to see how the historical Turkish 
policy regarding the south-east and political turmoil in the region have played a key 
role in terms of the region’s underdevelopment This is the focus of the following 
section.  
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3. 3. Politics and Turkish policies: paradigms within the south-east region 
 
It has been claimed that the socio-economic and politically volatile issues in the 
south-east have been the result of the tense relationship between the Turkish state and 
the Kurds in the region (Kılıç 1998; Özcan 2006; Kendal 1993). Turkey faced 17 
minor and three major Kurdish uprisings between 1920 and 1938, and since 1984 the 
country has faced its latest conflict in the region, with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), which has resulted in over 35,000 lives being lost between the two sides 
(Heper 2005). From the creation of the Turkish republic, the state and intellectual–
bureaucratic elites have seen the Kurds as a threat to their republican state formation. 
Originally, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk promised autonomy for the Kurds during the 
period shortly after the First World War, saying: “We propose the foundation of 
municipalities where the rulers will be elected by the people living in that region. 
Thus, Kurds will choose their own rulers which will give them autonomy” (Kılıç 
1998: 26). However, the people of the south-east region learnt later that Atatürk had 
something else in mind that they had not been aware of; Atatürk never wanted to re-
establish a country for all but to build “a modern state along European lines with an 
identity that was explicitly Turkish” (McDowal 1992: 14). It is significant to note that 
Atatürk was careful not to upset the Kurds, “and led them to believe that as soon as he 
was firmly established he would recognize their claims to autonomy” (Edmonds 
1971: 91). For example, at the Lausanne Conference, İsmet İnönü, the Turkish 
government representative, stated that the “government of the Grand National 
Assembly is also the government of the Kurds as much as of the Turks” (Özcan 2006: 
67). In the aftermath of the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish constitution of 1924 
revealed its real face, when they succeeded in building their new country. The newly 
built policy-makers of the Turkish state “insisted that ‘anyone who is a citizen of the 
Turkish Republic’ was a Turk” (Özcan 2006: 68).  
 Moreover, after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty (1923), Atatürk and his 
followers “began a turkification process that included, among other things, the 
banning of all Kurdish schools, associations, publications, and other forms of cultural 
expression” (Meho 1997: 9). For instance, although İnönü stated that the government 
of the Grand National Assembly is for both Turks and Kurds, in the aftermath of the 
Treaty, he said:  “In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of 
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influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will 
annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme’” (Özcan 2006: 68). 
When the Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made 
sure that the Kurds were left out of the agreement. At the end of the First World War, 
the Lausanne summit divided the land of the Kurds, Kurdistan, into five pieces shared 
between five countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia, despite the fact that 
under the Treaty of Sevres (articles 62 and 64) in 1920 the Kurds had been promised 
independence by the world community (Edmonds 1971). However, although Turkey 
successfully managed to avoid the Kurdish issue in the Lausanne summit in 1923, 
Turkey has never forgotten the experience of the Sevres Treaty and  “The diplomatic 
lesson drawn by many is that the creation of a Kurdish state will inevitably weaken 
the Turkish state” (Robins 2003: 659).  
 Therefore, since the post-war period, the Kurds were forced into assimilation 
with mainstream Turkey, and Kurdish existence was refused, with drastic 
consequences for the Kurds themselves (Yeğen 1999). The Atatürk Turkish state 
began to “deny that the Kurds have a separate ethnic identity [and] they are not Kurds 
but ‘mountain Turks’” (1975: 8).  Nihat Erim, the Turkish prime minister at the time, 
said: “We accept no other nations as living in Turkey, only the Turks” (Short and 
McDermott 1975: 8). Accordingly, in 1930, the minister of justice, Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, also told the press:  
 
We live in a country called Turkey, the freest in the world. As your deputy, I 
feel I can express my real convictions without reserve: I believe that the Turk 
must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of 
pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be 
servants or slaves. (Abdulla 2012: 17) 
 
As Yeğen (1999:555) puts it, in particular, “from the mid-1920s until the end of the 
1980s, the Turkish state ‘assumed’ that there was no Kurdish element on Turkish 
territory” at all. Whenever the Kurdish question was raised, the Turkish state and 
politicians would simply claim that there was no such issue; it was interpreted as 
politically reactionary, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an 
ethno-political question (Yeğen 1999: 555). There was no doubt that the Turkish 
state’s policies towards the Kurds and their region were successful, and this made the 
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formation of the Turkish state secure for decades. 
However, when the idea behind the formation of the new state became reality 
and the policy of assimilation became explicit, and when Turkey enforced its politics 
and policy on the Kurds and their region, the Kurds were swift to react. Although 
several Kurdish revolts took place against the Turkish state, it is important to give 
specific attention to three major uprisings which took place before the 1980s. In 1925 
a Kurdish religious leader, Sheikh Said, led the first major reaction against Atatürk’s 
policy, but this revolt was brutally crushed by the Turkish state.  Sheikh Said’s revolt 
was mainly based on tribal and religious allegiance, through which he succeeded in 
occupying one-third of Kurdish Anatolia; his uprising was not fully supported by 
many Kurdish nationalists, for instance, those based at Diyarbakir (Robins 1993: 
660).  Owing to both the fragile unification among the Kurds and the ruthlessness of 
the Turkish state, the revolt was suppressed and Sheikh Said and his friends were 
captured and hanged, while the rest of his tribes were deported to the west of Turkey. 
 In the 1930s there was another serious uprising, the ‘Ararat Uprising’. This 
second important uprising, unlike that of Sheikh Said, was a war of liberation, which 
was organized by a committee called Khoybun. “In October a village near Mount 
Ararat was designated the provisional capital of Kurdistan, appeals were addressed to 
the Great Powers and the League of Nations, and messages were sent to compatriots 
in Iraq and Syria asking for co-operation in liberating the homeland” (Edmonds 1971: 
91). Although the uprising had been supported by many tribal leaders, their hopes of 
an independent Kurdistan lasted only one year, and Ihsan Nuri, the leader of the 
uprising, an ex-Turkish army officer, was defeated by over 45,000 Turkish troops and 
had to seek refuge in Persia.   
 Thirdly, in 1937, the third major Kurdish uprising took place, led by another 
religious and tribal leader, Sayyid Riza, in Dersim (Tunceli). Because this uprising 
was - like the first one - mainly religious and tribal, it was soon crushed by the 
Turkish army, who hanged Sayyid Riza and his friends and deported many of his 
followers. This time, the Turkish state significantly blocked the development of 
Kurdish nationalism (Rugman & Hutchings 993:26). “The Minister of Interior, Jelal 
Bey, has announced in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies that the Kurdish problem no 
longer exists” (Elphinston 1946: 97).   
 In order to control the Kurdish region and secure Turkish authority, Turkish 
policy-makers created policies to seal the remaining problem and the existence of the 
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Kurds in Turkey. Most Turkish policies towards the Kurds had already been created; 
for instance, Turkey, at the end of its first decade as a republic (1934) created a law to 
defuse the Kurdish issue by means of a settlement. According to Yeğen (1999: 562), 
“this law enabled the government to ‘adjust’ the demographic composition of the 
country according to its own concerns. The concern of the government was manifest - 
dispersing and assimilating Kurds among Turks.” The Turkish assimilative policy 
began by creating regional boarding schools for Kurdish children and changing the 
names of their villages, cities and areas into Turkish ones, under by-law no. 1587 
(Kiliç 1998). After these three uprisings took place, the Kurdish region became the 
main focus of Turkish policy-makers’ attempts to maintain control and pursue the 
state’s assimilation policies.  For instance, in the 1960s, Cemal Gursel, the head of the 
Committee of National Unity (Milli Birlik Komitesi, CNU) and the fourth President 
of the Republic, confidently stated: ‘There are no Kurds in this country’ (Kiliç 1998). 
While the state claimed that there were no Kurds in Turkey, the Turkish state and its 
politicians continued to threaten the Kurds, whose voice had become louder. For 
instance, the leader of the 1960s military junta declared:  
 
If the Kurds run after an illusion of creating a state, their destiny will be wiped 
off the face of the earth. The Turkish race has shown the way in which it can 
treat those who covet the homeland which it has obtained at the price of its 
own blood and untold labours. It has eliminated the Armenians from this land 
in 1915 and the Greeks in 1922. (Bozarslan 1992: 80) 
 
After the crushing of Kurdish uprisings between 1925 and 1938, there was no serious 
resistance by the Kurds until the 1970s. During this period, the south-east became 
deeply isolated socially and economically from the rest of Turkey. Turkey did not 
focus on the socio-economic problems of the south-east region, and simply ignored it. 
So, while the west of Turkey developed, the Kurdish region remained underdeveloped 
(Kendal 1993). Since then, the south-east has continued to be one of the poorest parts 
of Turkey and per capita incomes are the lowest in the country. The region’s people 
did not have many avenues for economic development. 
 
3.4. South-east region: socio-economic development, Kurdish social structure 
and Turkish politics 
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The previous section pointed to two major issues that the Turkish state has faced in 
the south-east. One was the continual Kurdish uprisings against Turkish state policies 
and politics, and the other was the fact that Turkey has failed to create a concrete 
stable policy for the region, all of which has pushed the region further into under-
development. Turkey thought that it would be able to solve the situation via GAP and 
its concept of modernization. However it has become clear that region’s unsolved 
problem is not only a socio-economic one but also involves politics and the Kurdish 
socio-cultural paradigm.  
Although the Turkish state and the Turkish general public claim that there is 
no different between Kurds and Turks, this does not reflect reality. The Kurds, are 
culturally closer to the Middle East than to Turks. It could be this difference that has 
kept Kurds from being assimilated into mainstream Turkish society for decades. The 
Kurds are the only ethnic group that have not been assimilated in Turkey. When 
Atatürk’s regime wanted to provide Turkey with a European–type parliamentary 
system of government and establish the country as a member of Western civilization, 
the Kurds began their fight to create a traditional eastern/Islamic regime under the 
leadership of Sheikh Said in 1925, for instance. Although Sheikh Said fought for 
Kurds and Kurdistan, his main aim was to establish a country based on Islamic culture 
not western civilization, like the Turkish state. As McDowall (1996: 194) reveals, 
“Shaykh Said issued a manifesto in favour of a Kurdish government and the 
restoration of the caliphate”, not a western type system. In short, despite the fact that 
the majority of the Kurds live in the south-east of Turkey, they have few similarities 
with the prevailing culture of the Turkish nation. In fact they have a starkly different 
culture, and this was perceived as a problematic issue for the formation of the Turkish 
state. 
Moreover, Turkish society is mainly centred round the ‘hanafi’ Islamic sect, or 
‘school of thought, whereas the Kurds’ ‘shafi’ sect (school of thought) is considered 
to be more Middle Eastern in character. Their religious views have not been a source 
of substantial problems, but when we assess the overall culture, the lifestyle, of Turks 
and Kurds, there have always been issues which have obstructed integration, and 
which Turkey considered to be a security concern for the unity of their republican 
state. Furthermore, the Kurds, unlike the Turks, have a “language [which] is clearly 
Indo-European rather than Semitic and is related to Farsi (Parsian)” (Anderson 2000: 
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124). “It has been said that, since the Kurds have been settled in their present home 
since about 2400 BC, they have claims to racial purity and to continuity of culture 
that are stronger than those of any European nation” (Ibid: 124). All of which have 
constituted complications for Turkish state policy-making in terms of what to do with 
the south-east.  
Based on my primary and secondary readings, it is clear that the south-east has 
been isolated from the rest of Turkey from the very beginning of the republic, and that 
the region was left under the control of tribal leaders with the complicity of the state. 
For instance, it is the tribal leaders, who run sectors such as agriculture in the region, 
not the ordinary people or the state. These tribal leaders have not been seen as a major 
danger to the Turkish regime. Most of them were traditionally loyal to the Turkish 
state mainly for their own interest and so as to protect their dominant position in the 
south-east. Nevertheless, Kurdish society is largely tribal, and the Kurds are strongly 
loyal to their tribe as well as to their territory. In Kurdish society, there is also strong 
religious loyalty, and religious men such as the “sheikhs, the local leaders of religious 
brotherhoods” have had a key role to play in the society (McDowall 1985: 8). Almost 
every village or tribe had their leader who had absolute authority over their domain. 
Although after the First World War Atatürk crushed and outlawed all the religious 
orders, the Kurds’ loyalty to their sheikhs continued underground (Ibid: 8). As 
McDowall states, even now (in modern Turkey) “some Kurds who intellectually 
consider themselves ‘progressive’ can feel emotional loyalties to sheikh” or agha 
(chief) (Ibid: 8).   
Until recently everywhere in the south-east region and still in many areas of 
the Kurdish region, political power lies in the hands of aghas (chiefs) who control 
small or large groups or villages. Nobody could challenge the authority of the aghas. 
Their obligations were to make sure the agriculture, water resources and livestock 
were secured and maintained smoothly. Furthermore, “the agha alone handled 
diplomacy both with other villages and with the government” (Ibid: 9). Although 
sheikhs and the tribal leaders (aghas) were suppressed and most of them were sent to 
exile to other parts of the country by Atatürk’s government (because sheikhs and 
some aghas had risen up against the regime), they came back to their villages when 
Turkey went through its first transition from single party rule to a multi-party system 
in the 1950s.  
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In 1950, with the victory of the Democratic Party, aghas, sheikhs and many 
other landlords “acquired new importance since they could deliver votes to 
government” (McDowall 1985:13). Through the intercession of these sheikhs and 
aghas, it was much easier for Turkish politicians to obtain a huge number of votes and 
get elected. With the transition from a single party to a multi-party system, it became 
possible for the sheikhs and aghas to themselves be elected to the Turkish parliament. 
But everyone had to, and still has to, adhere to the official ideology and accept 
Atatürk’s direction: “Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk” (Rugman & 
Hutchings, 1993: 26). 
 Some Kurdish sheikhs and aghas even became ministers, which they were 
obliged to do under Turkish identity, and by following Kemalist ideology by avoiding 
any “reference to Kurds and Kurdistan” (McDowall 1985: 13). As Kendal states 
“while the Kurdish sheikhs and aghas used to fight for their national liberation, they 
gradually became an intermediary for Turkish colonialism” (1993: 79). Thus, since 
the Kurds were silent and everything was functioning well for the interests of the 
Turkish state under these sheikhs and aghas, and since there were no problems in the 
region from the Kurds living under this feudalistic and tribal society, there was no 
need for the state to worry about the development of the region.  
 So, while the west of Turkey developed, the south-east was pushed into 
further socio-economic hardship. In south-east Turkey there was almost no 
industrialization and, except in the oil industry, there were few industrial jobs. Road 
and rail were mainly created for the military purpose of enabling access to and control 
of the Kurdish villages (Short, 1975: 5). It has been argued that political factors have 
been among the reasons that the south-east was kept economically under-developed. 
According to Turkish state statistics from the 1970s, in the Kurdish provinces “the 
illiteracy rate runs at some 77% - 64% of men and 91% of women cannot read” (Short 
and McDermott, 1975: 8). One of Atatürk’s friends and his right–hand man, Fevzi 
Çakmak, said: “Setting up school in the eastern provinces would awaken the people 
of those provinces and open up pathways for separatist currents such as Kurdish 
nationalism” (Kendal 1993: 74).  
By the 1970s, the above-mentioned double standard was unacceptable to many 
Kurdish intellectuals and students, who mainly lived or studied in big Turkish cities 
and protested against such an ill-conceived idea. By the 1970s, the Revolutionary 
Cultural Society of the East (DDKD), the first legal Kurdish organization formed by 
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Kurdish intellectuals, focused on developing the Kurdish region economically and 
culturally. During the 1970s, Kurdish intellectuals, teachers and students became well 
aware that Turkish policy concerning their region was motivated by purely political 
factors, and these educated Kurds organized themselves politically in order to put an 
end to the double standard of Turkish state policy. There was hope that Turkish leftist 
leaders such as Bülent Ecevit would at least recognize Kurdish existence and culture. 
As Entessar points out, when Ecevit went to the Kurdish region in 1974, he “promised 
the Kurds that if his party […] won the election, he would address the 
underdevelopment of the Kurdish area” (1992: 91). However, when the Kurds asked 
if he would raise the issue of Kurdish autonomy, Ecevit’s reaction was tough and he 
strongly refused such a demand in the same way as all the other Turkish leaders (Ibid: 
92). In 1971, under martial law “DDKD were outlawed, their leaders and activities 
were imprisoned, and the military initiated a new round of sustained attacks on 
Kurdish villages” (Ibid: 90-1).  
1974 saw the formation of a new Kurdish students’ movement, amongst 
whom was a young student, Abdullah Öcalan, who wanted to create a Kurdish 
National Liberation Movement. Four years later, in 1978, Öcalan, with a small group 
of his friends, decided to create their party, which was called Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistan – Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) (Rugman & Hutchings, 1993: 27). The 
PKK was unlike pre-multi-party Kurdish movements. First of all, it was not a 
feudalistic based movement but was based on individual Kurdish students whose 
“original activities [not only] focused primarily on gaining official recognition for 
Kurdish language and cultural rights” but also incorporated a new ideology that could 
challenge Turkish policy in the region (Entessar 1992: 94).  
However, the 1980s’ military junta in Turkey had a forceful impact on the 
Kurdish people and the Kurdish guerrillas (PKK), who suffered severely as a result. 
The intention of the regime arising from the 1980 coup was to “demobilize [Turkish] 
society […] especially by outlawing all co-operation between political parties and 
other civil society institutions such as trade unions and professional organizations” 
(Özbudun 2000: 27), and since the Kurds represented a serious threat to the formation 
of the Turkish republic, the Kurds were the ones to suffer most.  
The junta initiated a vigorous campaign to crush all manifestations of Kurdish 
existence. Their culture, identity and mother tongue were forbidden. The regime 
which “seized power in 1980 instituted some of the most regressive and repressive 
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policies towards the Kurds, including a broadening of the language restrictions” 
(Barkey and Fuller 1997: 66). Kurdish development was not what Turkey wanted to 
see either within its border or next to its border. The rise of Kurdish nationalism 
meant a substantial threat to their national unification. The regime, in order to 
demolish the Kurdish nationalism which had arisen in the south-east in the 1980s, 
declared a state of emergency in the region, increased detention periods pending trial, 
established the State Security Courts, continued legal restrictions on the Kurdish 
language and banned Kurdish-language publications. 
The post 1980s Turkish military regime not only depressed the economy of 
the south-east region even further, it also obstructed Turkey from joining the 
European Union (EU), mainly because of its serious human rights abuses, because EU 
criteria are based on cosmopolitan democracy, allowing the citizens of the world to 
enjoy fundamental human rights (Held 1995: 96). Turkey’s stubborn resistance over 
the Kurdish issue has made it difficult for Turkey to accede to the EU, which has been 
damaging for the Turkish economy as well as to the democratization of Turkey in the 
framework of the new world order. 
However, very shortly after the 1980s’ military junta and during the 
immediate post-Cold War period, the Turkish economy became increasingly involved 
in international trade, focusing on global rather than domestic markets, investing in 
long term market relations strategies, and gearing towards technological 
developments and strategic planning for production and investment. As a result, the 
economy experienced the increasing “importance of the discourse of ‘free market’, 
the multiplication and the dissemination of economic actors, and the pluralization of 
economic organizations in Turkish society” (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005: 110-11). 
So while the Turkish economy was expanding and it was taking its place in 
the global economy, the south-east’s socio-economy was becoming somewhat 
problematic, to the economy itself and to Turkey’s position in the world. In particular, 
it was becoming an obstacle preventing Turkey’s accession to the EU, and this forced 
Turkish policy-makers to adopt the notion of a development/modernization model. In 
order to take its place in the new world order, the globalized world system which 
emerged during the post-cold war period, Turkey wanted to reshuffle its politics. For 
instance, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator, Minister Ali Babacan, pointed out that Turkey 
would be degraded to the status of "a Third World country" unless it pursued EU 
democracy and the norm of law (Today’s Zaman (newspaper) 17 December 2007). 
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The political instability in the south-east and the socio-economic issues in the region 
were starting to obstruct Turkey’s growth.    
 According to mid-1980s’ data, a comparison of the gross regional product 
(GRP) of the south-east region with the GDP of Turkey showed the level of its 
underdevelopment, as the south-east accounted for only 4% of GNP. “Per capita 
income was only 47% of the national average” (Ünver 1997: 453). Likewise, “the 
literacy rate in 1985 was 55% compared with 77% nationally, with women’s low 
literacy rates accounting for most of this disparity, 39%, compared to 71% for men” 
(Harris 2002: 749). Ownership of land was also unevenly distributed in the region; for 
instance, reference is made to the “problems of uneven land distribution, with roughly 
10% of the population owning 75% of the land, and high degrees of landlessness” 
(Ibid: 749).  
 Since the creation of modern Turkey, the south-east has been socially, 
economically, geo-politically and ethnographically a problematic issue for the 
Turkish state. To diminish the problems in the south-east and turn the region into a 
profitable area for the country’s overall interest, in particular to establish hydro-
electric production in the region, GAP, as a social development project, was thought 
to be the answer.  
We can see from the above that in order to secure its place in a globalized 
world system, Turkey adopted a development/modernization model aimed at 
diminishing the socio-economic problems (if not the political ones) of the south-east 
via GAP. The following section discusses the development/modernization model and 
proposes that the GAP ‘social development’ project needs to be analyzed in the 
context of the notion of development/modernization. 
 
3.5. An analytical approach to GAP through the lens of 
modernization/development theory  
 
As we have already emphasized, from the post-1980s the Turkish economy followed 
a neo-liberal development model, which led it towards robust positive economic 
development. However, the south-east region’s chronic socio-economic issues were 
creating migration to the big cities, unemployment, uneven economic growth, and 
unplanned for issues with urbanization and crime. So, Turkish economic policy 
makers and the state needed to focus on the issue of the south-east region’s chronic 
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underdevelopment. Based on this, the obligation was given to GAP to overcome the 
situation within the context of development. 
So, to understand the concept of GAP in relation to development, including 
global development, we need to reiterate the principle behind 
modernization/development theory. For modernization theory, “nations remain 
underdeveloped when traditional achievement and kin relations dominate” (Andersen 
and Taylor 2006: 252). Thus, it is claimed, this process “enables backward countries 
to escape from tradition, to promote and accelerate transition and finally to overcome 
underdevelopment” (Kreutzmann 1999: 256).  
Parsons argued that “societies change in distinct patterns, moving from 
traditional to modern forms” (Roberts and Hite 2000: 83).  
 
As in biological evolution, each social adaptation either supports or inhibits 
further evolution. Modern societies were seen to include bureaucratic 
organizations, money and markets, a universalistic legal system, and the 
democratic association in both public and private forms. (Roberts and Hite 
2000: 83) 
 
Parsons (1964: 83) points out that normally in the evolution of living systems, new 
developments have vastly increased the adaptive capacity of the system, so much so, 
that without them, “further major developmental steps would be blocked, though 
survival in a ‘niche’ is possible and frequent.” He states “Four features of human 
societies of the level of culture and social organization were cited as having universal 
and major significance as prerequisites for social-cultural development: technology, 
kinship, organization based on an incest taboo, communication based on languages, 
and religion.” He concludes that, “In the broadest frame of reference … we may think 
of them as together constituting the main outline of the structural foundations of 
modern society” (Ibid: 99). 
 
This approach was built around the conviction that there was a connection 
between norms, structures, and the behaviours of actors. The norms were 
created around individual interests and values; the structures were developed 
around roles, role networks and social class formation; while behaviour was 
built around motivation and perception of processes and reality. Parsons and his 
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group of structuralist-functionalists believed that these three elements developed 
together and constituted a system whereby change in one element would entail 
change in the others. They believed that the process by which modern values 
would be diffused was through education and the transfer of technology from 
the modern West to the elites in new areas where capitalism was being opened 
up. (Nabudere 1997: 205) 
 
In short, according to modernization theory, the development of a country, for 
instance, goes through a process of changes: changes in its traditional attitudes, values 
and institutions.  
For Rostow, who aimed to provide an alternative to Karl Marx’s theory of 
modern history, “[t]he key element […] was the process of capital formation, 
represented by five stages through which all countries pass in the process of economic 
growth” (Binns 2008: 84).  Rostow’s theory on modernization and development was 
that all nations passed through the same five stages of economic development: 
traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity and the 
age of high mass consumption. 
Traditional society, family and clan relations played a substantial role in social 
and political structure and organization.  For Rostow (1960: 101)  it involved “a long-
run fatalism; that is, the assumption that the range of possibilities open to one’s 
grandchildren would be just about what it had been for one’s grandparents.” More 
specifically, we can argue that his view on modernization was based on pre-
Newtonian science and technology, and the post-Newtonian world.  Rostow (1960: 
100) used the period of Newton as a symbol, a “watershed in history when men came 
widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was 
systematically capable of productive manipulation.” Thus, in his view, post-
Newtonian society was an era of change in every aspect of our political, economic 
and social structure. 
 
The preconditions for take-off were initially developed, in a clearly marked 
way, in Western Europe of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
as the insights of modern science began to be translated into new production 
functions in both agriculture and industry, in a setting of dynamism by the 
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lateral expansion of world markets and the international competition for them. 
(Ibid: 102) 
 
The take-off commenced when the economic process was possible and changes in 
economic activity spread globally; institutions for mobilizing transport and 
communications widened the scope of trade internally as well as externally. Rostow 
argued that activity could not exceed the pace set by a specific economy, so low 
productivity represented the key methods of a society still characterised “by the old 
social structure and values, and by the regionally based political institutions that 
developed in conjunction with them” (Ibid: 102).  
The take-off began with the rise of technology. Rostow argues that “in the 
more general case, the take-off awaited not only the build-up of social overhead 
capital and a surge of technological development in industry and agriculture,” but also 
depended on the surfacing of a political group who would regard the modernization of 
the economy as their central political aim (Ibid: 103). 
Rostow defines maturity as the stage in which economies indicate an ability to 
move beyond the original industries which initiated their take-off, and to absorb and 
apply a wide range of the resources of modern technology (Ibid: 104). This is the 
stage when economies prove that they have the technological and entrepreneurial 
skills to produce more or less anything they choose to produce.  
So, Turkish policy-makers believed that the south-east region required 
modernization by employing stages through which the region would pass in the 
process of socio-economic development with the assistance of GAP social 
programmes. These stages were: the diminution of traditional society, the provision of 
social stability and the enhancement of the employment capacity of the regional 
sector, the improvement of the entrepreneurial and managerial capacities of local 
businesses, influencing national and international entrepreneurs to launch new 
investments in the south-east 64  and the creation of socio-economic integration 
between the underdeveloped south-east/Kurds and the industrialized west/Turks.  
In short, as Mehmet Açikgöz, the GAP regional director, stated when I 
interviewed him in July 2011, GAP’s main objectives were to make the region rich, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See more in ‘GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı’, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 22 April 2010). 
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enhance individuals’ well-being, increase individual incomes and create social 
stability that would promote economic development and end poverty in the region, 
from which the whole nation would benefit. When I questioned whether Turkey had 
been influenced by the notion of world development, his answer was straightforward: 
“Of course, developments in the world brought a new concept of development; and 
the insight of the GAP Master Plan, in 1986 and 1989, has been created in line with 
that development in the globe.”  
So the materialization of GAP’s ‘social development’ project was formulated 
in the context of global modernization/development, which required moving from 
traditional to modern forms of society. Based on this principle, Turkey planned to 
deal with the backwardness of the south-east and move it away from its traditional 
ways of life in order to transform it into a modern society. The President of GAP, 
Sadrettin Karahocagil (personal interview, July 2011), stressed that the south-east 
region was mainly inhabited by Kurds and people from other ethnic backgrounds, 
who lived in a feudalistic society. Although in the past Turkey had tried to change the 
structure of the feudalist social formation in the region, he stated that there was still a 
lot to be done. He claimed that they would transform all this via the GAP 
development project.  
The interview with Karahocagil enlightened me about the way in which 
Turkey, since its creation, had been unable to succeed in achieving integration 
between the east (Kurds) and the west (Turks) despite all its policies, but the GAP 
project was the element through which it hoped do achieve this aim through the 
implementation of the social development policy. Karahocagil’s view on the project 
was clear: he believed that once it was completed, it would drive Kurdish people out 
of their remote villages into the big cities. GAP would evacuate poor local people 
(Kurds) from remote areas and put an end to nomadic societies in the south-east, and 
it would drive them into mainstream Turkish culture, through which they would not 
only be integrated into the Turkish Kemalist political system but also be controlled 
socially and economically.  
The state aimed, via the GAP project, to influence professional foreign 
companies to invest and run businesses in the region. Turkish policy-makers hope 
that, through the intervention of professional companies and GAP’s social project, 
Turkey will vanquish the feudalistic society of the region and destroy the collectivism 
of the Kurds (which the state regards as a problem), promoting individualism instead, 
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as Turkey believes an individualistic society would be relatively easy to control and 
manage. Nevetheless, in order to understand the modernization/development theory, it 
is important to subject the theory to a broad critical analysis, which will enlighten us 
as to the core notion behind the development plans.  
 
3.6. Critical approach to the modernization/development theory  
   
Criticism of the concept of modernization/development is substantial. The problem 
with modernization theories became clear in the aftermath of the 1960s, when 
economic development and social change did not succeed in Third World countries in 
the manner which had been predicted by the modernization theorists such as Talcott 
Parsons (1964) and Walt W. Rostow (1960). 65  Modernization as a theory of 
development (Talcott Parsons 1964) can be traced from Max Weber's theory of 
modernization and traditionalism, that is, “Weberian dichotomization of modernity 
and tradition was [argued to be] wrong because it obscured the processes of interplay 
between the two social-historical processes” (Nabudere 1997: 203).  
 Furthermore, after the 1960s, modernization theory was subjected to intense 
political and intellectual criticism by many theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank, 
from the dependency school. For instance, Frank, who was effective in exposing the 
politics of Rostow’s theory, addressed the fact that “Rostow subverted people’s 
dreams of a better future and converted them to the worship of the almighty dollar” 
(Peet and Hartwick 2009: 133). 
 The criticism of modernization theory increased. Research by one of the most 
influential post-development critique theorists, Sachs (1997: 290), revealed that “[t]he 
gap between frontrunners and stragglers has not been bridged; on the contrary, it has 
widened to the extent that it has become unimaginable that it could ever be closed.” 
With regard to modernization theory’s claim to be the only force capable of bringing 
development to the Third World, it became clear during the 1990s that the 
contribution of Third World countries, “where two-thirds of humanity live, [toward] 
the world’s GNP has shrunk to 15 per cent, while the share of the industrial countries, 
with 20 per cent of the world’s population, has risen to 80 per cent” (Ibid: 290).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The Third World countries are generally poor, underdeveloped, not industrialized and mainly 
agricultural (Andersen and Taylor 2006: 254). These countries are mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. 
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 Moreover, it is argued that whether a country develops or remains poor may 
well be the result of other countries exploiting the less powerful. It has been suggested 
that “Modernization theory does not sufficiently take into account the interplay and 
relationships between countries that can affect a country’s economic or social 
conditions” (Andersen and Taylor 2006: 252). As Nabudere (1997: 203) states: 
 
Many “development” economists and political scientists admit that despite 
tremendous achievements which have been made in this direction in a number 
of countries, the vast majority of the world population especially in Africa and 
South Asia, live in abject poverty and that the “gap” between the very rich and 
the very poor within countries and different regions of the world is widening.  
 
In the past (during the British Empire for instance) the imperialist countries exercised 
their hegemony through their physical intervention and exploitation of their colonies. 
In the modern world, the hegemonic states impose their policies and ideology through 
aid and ‘social development’ models.  
It needs to be borne in mind that poverty in Third World countries posed the 
greatest threat to US/western interests. Thus the massive development programmes 
for these poor countries had to be undertaken not only for socio-economic security but 
also for political reasons, for example, preventing the spread of Soviet Union style 
communism. For instance, during the Cold War period the United States provided 
substantial financial support to Taiwan and South Korea as part of the geopolitical 
struggle, and targeted poor Third World countries to be rescued from 
underdevelopment in order to defend against Soviet intervention. However, although 
the post-Cold War period has not much changed the notion of development, the 
typology of development has been continued using different methods.  For example, 
development aid has been used more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United 
States and other western powers in an attempt to prevent these countries from falling 
into the hands of radical Islamism.  
 It is important to note that although the conceptual framework of modernization 
theory involved developmental knowledge being transmitted from the global North to 
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the South,66 and development being seen as an effective way of vanquishing poverty,  
the general literature indicates that modernization/developmental theories were based 
on earlier European capitalist developmentalists as a strategy for controlling all the 
nations in the world. Since it was based on a false concept, demolishing poverty in the 
world was an illusion. It was an illusion because its concept when applied to Third 
World countries was to exploit their economies rather than develop them. In this 
regard, the literature claims that modernization/developmental theories, which were 
intended to be used as a strategy for world development failed because of the level of 
self-interest demonstrated by the dominant states.  
Nevertheless, “post-development theorists have argued that ‘development’ 
should be focused on what local communities want and should not be a response to a 
Northern-imposed model of what is a correct form of development” (Willis 2005: 
207). In addition, post-developmentalist critique “has been very important in 
highlighting the ways in which ‘development’ as a concept is always a product of a 
particular set of power relations at any one time” (Ibid: 207). 
Thus, the question arises as to whether the concept of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project was really formulated within modernization theory by Turkish 
policy-makers in order to create integration between the south-east and the rest of 
Turkey and bring prosperity to the region, or whether it was just aimed at 
strengthening state authority in the region and quenching the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism. 
Notwithstanding, it is evident that Turkey focused on the socio-economic 
development of the south-east in order to narrow the socio-economic gap between 
that region and the rest of the country. However, in terms of the Kurdish question, 
Turkish politics has always been uncertain. Despite the fact that few politicians were 
prepared to recognize the paradigm of the region’s political issue, some, for example 
Süleyman Demirel, Mesut Yilmaz (the former leader of the Motherland Party 
(ANAP)) and Recep T. Erdogan, indicated that they recognized the Kurdish question 
and suggested that cultural rights could be granted to the Kurds.67 The Turkish state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The North is considered to comprise the dominant and powerful industrialized nations, essentially 
western countries which are the dominating and controlling economic entity. These are generally 
considered to be the United States, Japan and the European Union (EU), which possess most of the 
world’s capital and technology (Kendall 2009: 300). The South is considered to comprise the three 
continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Sau 1975).  
67 Regarding the Kurdish question from the perspective of Turkish politicians, see (Yılmaz'dan Kürt 
	   83	  
overall has maintained its traditional approach, that is, the issue of the south-east is to 
be treated as an economic problem rather than a political issue. For instance, both the 
nationalist right-wing and the statist left in Turkey claimed that the essence of the 
Kurdish question was economical rather then political and historical. Former Prime 
Minister, Bulent Ecevit, claimed that “if the region’s underdevelopment and feudal 
structure could be resolved, the Kurdish insurrection would simply disappear” 
(Kalpakian 2004: 120). Moreover, according to a report by Ecevit’s Democratic Left 
Party, Demokratik Sol Partisi (DSP) in relation to the Kurdish question, there was no 
ethnic problem in the south-east, but the region’s backwardness and the feudal system 
in the region had complicated the matter.68 In order to overcome the region’s 
problems, it is critical that the issues raised above are effectively tackled.  
However, despite the fact that Turkish government and the leader of Turkish 
mainstream political leaders have argued that the socio-economic situation of the 
south-east should have been resolved, the statements did not come to reality and the 
situation of the region has continued to be the same.  
As already stated, land ownership is just one example of uneven distribution in 
the region, with roughly 10% of the population owning 75% of the land, and high 
degrees of landlessness (Harris 2002). The majority of the land in the south-east is 
owned by aghas, who have been supported by the Turkish mainstream in order to 
collect votes, and the state also used this semi-feudal system for internal security; for 
instance, the village guards (köy korucular)69 were employed to fight against the PKK 
with the support of the local chieftains or aghas in the region (van Bruinessen 1992). 
However, as Çarkoglu stated (personal interview, June 2011): 
 
The idea is to have investments which reignite the region, creating some kind 
of export bases for agricultural products, and then creating some kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sorununda özeleştiri) Hürriyet, hurarsiv.Hürriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id; Kürt realitesi - Milliyet, 
www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/08/17/yazar/bila.html (accessed 20 June 2014). 
68See Türkiye'nin kürt sorunu hafızası - SETA arsiv.setav.org/public/indir.aspx? Bulent Ecevit’in 
TBMM Konusmasi, 26 Aralik 1991 | 261. 3.7.6 Güneydogu Sorunu – Ekonomik Boyutu Raporu, 1996 
| 365 (accessed 20 June 2014).  
69 “The Village Guard system soon became embroiled in the tribalism of the region. With the PKK 
using violence as an instrument of terror against members of the militia and their families, those 
attracted to membership of the Village Guard have often been clans who are traditionally loyal to the 
state” (Robins 2003: 663); regarding köy kurucular, see also van Bruinessen, Kurdish society, 
ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems. In Kreyenbroek, P. G. and Sperl, S. (eds.) (1992), The 
Kurds: a contemporary overview. 
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regional industrial base to help the region develop on its own; but my 
understanding is that this is almost an impossible dream at this point.  
 
Çarkoglu pointed out that all the Turkish state cared about was throwing money at the 
region and hoping to stop people (Kurds) from asking for cultural recognition. 
 What has become obvious is that there is a paradox here in that, on the one 
hand, the Turkish state wanted to modernize the region, which I argue was mainly to 
get rid of poverty because it was becoming a danger to the authority of the state, while 
on the other hand, Turkey did not do much about getting rid of the traditional 
elements or the semi-feudal characteristics of society in the region.  
 
 3.7. Concluding remarks  
 
To conclude, this chapter has stated that since the creation of the Turkish republic, the 
state has left traditional Turkish society behind and created secularity, rationality and 
a modern industrial economy; it “invested heavily in the industrialization of western 
Turkey during the initial five-years plan,” for instance (Nestor 1996: 34). However, 
the socio-development of the south-east has not been the main focus of the Turkish 
policy-makers. The region’s condition became worse, aggravated by a chronically 
high rate of unemployment and the fact that half the populace was not literate.  
  
Eventually, the Kurdish region became problematic and a critical issue for 
Turkish policy-makers. On the one hand, Turkey was a winner at the Lausanne 
summit (after the First World War) at which the land of the Kurds (Kurdistan) was 
divided into between five countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia, Turkey; 
Turkey naturally claimed the region as part of its republic. On the other hand, it 
neglected the region, if not deliberately pushed it into the hands of the feudal patrons, 
or aghas and sheikhs, some of whom assisted Turkish politicians at the time by 
gathering electoral votes. Although Atatürk’s Turkey was a republic and rejected the 
religious or feudalistic led state, it turned a blind eye to such a society in the Kurdish 
region in order to make control of the Kurds easier via these leaders.  
  However, by the mid-1980s, in the context of the political changes in 
the world, the region of South-eastern Anatolia, with its poverty, unemployment, 
socio-economic issues, increasingly unhealthy population and poor industry, was 
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creating a threat to Turkish authority. Along with the above issues and associated 
instability, the Kurdish movement in the south-east was gathering momentum. By the 
late 1980s, Turkish policy-makers and the ruling elite believed that, in order to 
diminish the problems in the south-east, the socio-economic issues would have to be 
tackled. They believed that socio-economic development would eventually overcome 
all other issues, such as the Kurdish question, and that if resolved, it would fill the gap 
between the region and the rest of Turkey, which would create integration. Thus, 
GAP, which originated to utilize Euphrates and Tigris river water for irrigation and 
(mainly) hydroelectric production, was considered to be the first serious ‘social 
development’ scheme in the south-east region since the creation of the Turkish 
republic. 
Ultimately, I suggest that it is the combination of the Turkish development 
strategy and factors within the concept of the development framework which have 
enabled the GAP ‘social development’ project to materialize. The question remains as 
to how successful the GAP ‘social development’ project has been so far, how 
sustainable it is, and whether it can be regarded as a solution for the entire region. The 
following chapters will analyze the overall progress of GAP in terms of social 
development for the south-east region. Most importantly it will be assessing whether 
the idea of sustainable development was taken into account. However, in order to 
fully understand the GAP project, we need to look at the overall literature on it to see 
what it makes of the ‘social development’ aspect of the project. Therefore, the 
following chapter mainly focuses on an overall assessment of the literature on GAP, 
which provides a variety of perspectives. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
An overview on the literature on GAP and its ‘social development’ project 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The GAP project has been on the international agenda, bringing with it widespread 
criticism that the project reduces water flow for downstream countries such as Syria 
and Iraq, and raising issues related to the protection of historical sites and the 
environment which still occupy domestic and international attention. There are also 
criticisms regarding the lack of completion of the project, which have raised 
scepticism as to whether it has, by any measure, succeeded in providing prosperity to 
the region. However, all the literature on GAP concerns the infrastructure of the 
project, and mainly accepts the position that GAP was designed as an integrated 
regional development programme aimed at increasing regional socio-economic 
development in the disadvantaged south-east, a politically disputed territory (Öktem 
2002; Kolars and Mitchell 1991; Kliot 1994; Unver 1997; Harris 2002; Gündogan 
2005).   
 Broadly speaking, GAP is held to be a ‘social development’ scheme that 
would create economic, social and spatial changes aimıng to end the chronic poverty 
of the south-east/Kurdish region by raising locals’ income levels and living standards, 
providing social stability and economic growth by enhancing the employment 
capacity of the regional sector, and creating socio-economic integration between the 
underdeveloped south-east/Kurds and the industrialized west/Turks.  
This chapter, outlining the literature on the GAP ‘social development’ 
programmes, will clarify what is meant by the project, enabling us to broaden our 
understanding of the nature of the project and its overall programmes through 
different lenses. I firstly present the overall literature on the GAP project and attempt 
to grasp what this literature makes of the ‘social development’ aspect of it. Secondly, 
I outline the literature in relation to GAP’s political implications. I examine the 
politicization of the project and its possible impact in terms of future insecurity and 
instability in the region if not throughout the Middle East, but mainly concentrate on 
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the fact that GAP may be being used by the Turkish state in order to address the 
Kurdish question via social development programmes. Finally, the chapter will go 
through the literature on the lack of completion of the GAP ‘social development’ 
project. The works of Carkoglu and Eder (2005), Ercin (2006), Altinbilek and 
Tortajada (2012), Varsamidis (2010) and Beleli (2005) will also be examined to 
clarify the condition and the results of the project. Having shown that GAP has 
struggled to reach its main objectives regarding regional development, this study will 
enlighten us as to why the ‘social development’ project has not reached its targets.  
 
4.2. An analytical approach to the literature on the social development dimension 
of GAP 
 
There have been a considerable number of works on GAP, regarding it as an 
alternative socio-economic formula for dealing with the backwardness of the south-
east through the ‘social development’ programmes, an ambitious modernization 
strategy supported by the highest level of the Turkish state, Turkish ruling elite and by 
the mainstream political parties. Thus, despite the fact that I examine GAP, 
investigate its progress and most importantly seek to establish whether it has achieved 
its key aim through analyzing empirical and theoretical data, I also suggest looking at 
the most relevant literature on GAP in order to do the subject justice.  
 In order to understand the GAP ‘social development’ project and its target of 
sustainable human development, the following literature appears significant. John F. 
Kolars and William A. Mitchell’s The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project (1991) was one of the first and most important textbooks 
introducing the aims and objectives of the GAP ‘social development’ project. They 
examine the project in detail in their book, and also emphasize its impact on 
downstream riparian states such as Syria and Iraq. Despite the fact that the focus of 
this study is GAP’s domestic front, the writers were concerned about the rise in the 
population levels and increasing aspirations for economic development in the Middle 
East, which would lead to demand for more water, and could present a significant 
problem. The agriculture of Syria and Iraq has been dependent on the flow of 
Euphrates and Tigris river water for thousands of years. The building of dams in the 
context of the GAP project puts Syria and Iraq in a “strategically and materially 
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disadvantageous position, and therefore threatens their national security” (Rohr 1999: 
3). 
In particular, since the population of both Syria and Iraq is increasing 
substantially, food consumption and future food security are major problems for these 
countries. The issue of providing sufficient food is now becoming a global issue too, 
and it will be harder for countries such as Syria and Iraq to provide sufficient food if 
Turkey reduces the flow of water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In recent 
years, despite a worldwide effort to provide sufficient food for the increasing global 
population through the use of advanced technology, it is becoming an increasingly 
serious problem. As McDonald (2010: 1) demonstrates, in recent decades, 
“Agricultural and food production activities have been recognized as key drivers of 
environmental and climate changes [but] […] food production could face significant 
and widespread impacts from these changes in coming decades.”  
Continuing population growth, rapid urbanization and rising energy demand, 
the water-food-energy nexus, and most importantly the impact of climate change and 
increasing constraints on natural resources, have made global food and nutrition 
security more difficult to achieve. In particular food production has come to be of 
central concern to the Middle East community, and to the world in general. By 2050, 
when the global population is projected to surpass 9 billion people, the demand for 
agricultural products will double (World Economic Forum 2012).  
The fact that in order to resolve the future food issue, Syria and Iraq 
desperately need the flow of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and that Turkey is 
committed to building huge dams, particularly on the Euphrates, means that water 
scarcity will be a serious enough issue to lead to security concerns and complex 
problems. The water issue in the Middle East is undoubtedly crucial. 
Having indicated that, if this thesis aimed to study water in relation to trans-
boundary issues, or in relation to the issue of water scarcity in the Middle East, Kolars 
and Mitchell’s book would be very significant. However, for the purposes of this 
study, one needs to concentrate on analyzing their discussion of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project. Kolars and Mitchell emphasize that Turkey’s efforts with GAP 
comprise an integrated development plan, encompassing a wide array of physical, 
social and economic infrastructures. While they outline how the project would 
provide a substantial proportion of Turkish hydroelectric power needs and would be 
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capable of irrigating almost two million hectares of land, the aim of the project goes 
beyond irrigation and hydroelectric power plant schemes.   
 The infrastructure of GAP was not only established for the purpose of 
increasing hydroelectric power plants, irrigation schemes and supporting agriculture, 
but also for socio-economic and quality-of-life improvements, including 
transportation developments, non-farm employment opportunities, and education and 
health services in the south-east region. Once the project was completed, it would 
create significant economic, social and spatial changes in the region.  
 Although GAP costs over $30 billion US dollars, when the project is fulfilled 
it would contribute annually around $933 million to the Turkish economy. The 
Turkish state’s aim was to introduce a profitable farming system by bringing massive 
amounts of land under irrigation in the GAP region, making the GAP project an 
important element in Turkey’s national water and energy development programmes 
(Kolars and Mitchell 1991: 17). GAP policy-makers70 strongly stress that the project 
has to be successfully completed, because they believe that the future power supply, 
growth in the national economy, and the development of south-eastern Turkey’s 
economy in particular, depend on its success. The GAP policy-makers and economic 
planners were very optimistic about the project. According to Kolars and Mitchell 
(Ibid: 23) “they believe[d] the complex of hydroelectric dams and irrigation canals 
[would] greatly improve the economic and social life of the nation.”   
 Kolars and Mitchell’s book is essential in facilitating the understanding of the 
physical, social and economic infrastructure of the GAP project. They provide the 
necessary material to investigate it further, and they also offer a broad analysis of the 
geopolitical dimensions of the ambitions of water-development schemes in the region. 
However, their book was published in 1991, when the social development aspects of 
the GAP project were at the conceptual stage. Therefore their book is more about the 
promises offered by the Turkish state with regard to GAP and the socio-economy of 
the south-east than about outcomes. In this respect, the book is vitally useful for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Regarding GAP-policymakers’ names, intentions, and their views on the project, see the work of 
Olcay Ünver (1997), who worked for GAP for 13 years as president, the current president of GAP, 
Sadrettin Karahocagil, who I interviewed in July 2011 at  GAP Headquarters in Ankara, and the 
regional director, Mehmet Acikgöz. Researchers should also search the statements in relation to the 
GAP project of the ninth president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, as well as Turgut Özal, who also 
became president during the relevant period.  
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understanding the original GAP development plan, but it does not help us to see 
whether the project has succeeded in implementing its aims at a socio-economic level. 
Nevertheless, like Kolars and Mitchell, Nurit Kliot’s book, Water Resources 
and Conflict in the Middle East (1994), which is also significant for understanding the 
overall conception of GAP, states that there will be water shortages in the Middle East 
when Turkey completes its GAP project on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. She 
points out; “when Turkey completes its GAP plan, Syria could lose 40 per cent of its 
Euphrates waters” (Ibid: 143). According to Kliot, “When Syria completes its plans 
for water withdrawals from the Euphrates, as much as 30 per cent of the Euphrates 
flow will be reduced” (Ibid: 143).  Kliot’s concern is not only the shortages of water 
in the region but also the complexity of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which are 
international rivers shared by Turkey, Syria and Iraq.  Because of the complexity of 
the international river system, which creates complications in legal, political, 
economic and social terms, Kliot argues that “within the Tigris-Euphrates basin 
Turkish plans for water usage are going to reduce the amount of water available to its 
co-riparians significantly” (Ibid: 137); this may create a conflict in the Middle East.  
In fact, the Syrian government made a clear statement to the international 
community that the GAP project would eventually “lead to something paramount to 
an environmental, social and cultural disaster for the Syrian state” (Knudsen 2003: 
208). Turkey stated that once the dams were full, they would release the water flow. 
However, Syria’s complaint was not only about quantity of water but also about the 
quality of water. “The series of dams built by Turkey upstream on the Euphrates 
means that the water reaching Syria has been used several times for irrigation, thus 
increasing salinity and harming crops, as well as causing erosion on the banks since it 
runs faster after being deprived of silt” (Darwish 1998). 
So, Syria states that access to the Euphrates and Tigris’ waters are based on 
ancient use, and therefore Syria has a historic right to use them for their own needs. 
Syria also claims that the Euphrates and the Tigris are international rivers. Iraq, which 
is downstream of both Syria and Turkey, also claims that it has historical rights to use 
the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. However, Turkey rejects the claims of 
Syria and Iraq, regarding the international “character of these two rivers and only 
speaks of the rational utilization of trans-boundary waters” (El-Fadel et al 2002: 103). 
  Syrian-Turkish relations got worse when, in 1988, President Turgut Özal said: 
“we don't tell Arabs what to do with their oil, so we don’t accept any suggestion from 
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them about what to do with our water” (Darwish 1998). Özal’s intention was clearly 
to use water as a weapon against the Syrians, if Syria was going to continue to create 
a base for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
In 1980, just before the military coup in Turkey, PKK leaders left the country 
and moved to the Syrian-controlled Beqa’ Valley, where militants first trained. In the 
Beqa’ Valley, in a very short time, many young women and men had joined the PKK 
(Marcus 1993). Syria’s support for the PKK was a significant threat to Turkey, and 
the Turkish state knew that the Syrian authorities supported the leader of the PKK, 
who had long resided in Damascus. Syria obviously wanted to use the PKK to put 
pressure on Turkey to “balance out the advantage held by Turkey over Syria in 
relation to control of the Euphrates water flows” (Yildiz 2005: 58). Every time 
Turkey demanded Syria close all the PKK training camps and stop logistical and 
financial support for the guerrillas, Syria denied Turkish “accusations of being a key 
source of support for the PKK” (El-Fadel et al 2002: 102-3). 
Kliot’s book, like Kolars and Mitchell’s, is very significant with regard to 
water issues in relation to Syria and Turkey, and with regard to the issue of water 
security in the Middle East more generally. However, Kliot also reveals some aspects 
of the political significance of GAP in Turkey, with which we are more directly 
concerned here.  For Kliot, the implementation of GAP in Turkey is a prestigious 
endeavour with a symbolic value for the Turkish state. GAP policy-makers predict 
that irrigation in the GAP region would bring 3.5 million new jobs and “the region 
[could] grow 4.1 million tons of beets, 1.3 million tons of oil-seeds, 117,900 tons of 
corn, 3.5 million tons of vegetables, 1.1 million tons of grapes, 685,000 tons of 
pistachio nuts and 660,000 tons of fruit” (Kliot 1994: 125). Thus, irrigation would 
contribute about 8% to the state's annual economic growth. So, the GAP project, as a 
scheme of national importance and symbolic value, has become the highest priority 
for the Turkish authorities, and this explains why Turkey was ambitious to complete 
the project on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. 
There is no doubt that the project has attained symbolic value for the Turkish 
state and, according to my research, particularly for political party leaders, who used 
the project in their own interests, such as for collecting electoral votes in the south-
east region. Nevertheless, Kliot’s book was also written at the very beginning of the 
GAP project, and is therefore mainly based on the contextual framework of the 
project. According to Kliot, GAP would create millions of new jobs and provide a 
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million tons of beets, oil-seeds, corn, vegetables, grapes, pistachio nuts and fruit.  This 
thesis, in Chapter Five, will explore to what extent these predictions have been 
realized.  
In understanding the aims and objectives of GAP, it is also worth reviewing 
the work of Olcay Ünver (1997). He stresses that, despite the fact that the animal 
stock was substantial in the south-east, its productivity was limited. Moreover, 
manufacturing industry in the region produced only 2% of Turkey’s total.  The 
proportion of the region’s labour force engaged in industrial employment was 5% as 
compared with 16% for Turkey. However, Ünver (Ibid) argues that the region is very 
rich in water and land resources. The water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
represent more than 28% of Turkey’s water supply, and in terms of the economically 
irrigable areas in the GAP region, make up to 20% of those for the whole of Turkey.  
 Ünver also asserts that, with the completion of the GAP project, the region’s 
ratio of irrigated land would boost production from 2.9% to 22.8% while that for rain-
fed agriculture would decrease from 34.3% to 10.7%.  So he claims that in the end, 
with the introduction of irrigation, agricultural production and crop variety would be 
significantly boosted. For instance, cropping intensity would be boosted from 89% to 
134%. The most important shift would be for land used for cotton cultivation, which 
would be boosted from 2.8% to 25%. As a direct result, the project would increase 
agricultural production and thereby contribute to the development of infrastructure as 
well as boosting economic activities, which would speed up the development of agro-
industry and other agricultural services activities.  
Moreover, Ünver claims that the GAP region would be opened up to the 
outside world, which would attract additional investments. He argued in 1997 that 
there would be a massive increase in the population of the region, which would reach 
10 million by 2005, over half of whom would live in cities. There would be increased 
urbanization in the region, and rural migration would slow down. Employment 
opportunities would be created for approximately 4 million people in a variety of 
sectors. The situation of education and health services would improve substantially in 
the region.  
 In short, according to Ünver, GAP, as an integrated regional development 
project, which “comprise[s] not only the multipurpose dams and irrigation systems 
but also modernization and investments in all development-related sectors such as 
agriculture, energy, transportation, telecommunications, health care, education, urban 
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and rural infrastructure development” (Ibid: 194) would improve the living standards 
of 6 million local people by mobilizing the natural resources of the region for 
integrated regional development.  
 The GAP project, as the most comprehensive, integrated regional development 
scheme ever attempted in Turkey, aimed to remove the socio-economic development 
‘gap’ between the south-east area and more advanced, developed regions in Turkey. 
The project would offer sustainable modernization/development, which would defend 
and regenerate the environment and protect options for future generations. He 
concluded that “[e]quitable development, participation, protection of the environment, 
the creation of employment opportunities, improvement of the living standards of 
local people, promotion of land-use planning and the integrated provision of 
infrastructure are the main strategies of the GAP approach” (Ibid: 482). The project 
was offered as a form of sustainable development.  
Ünver, who worked for 13 years as the president of the GAP Regional 
Development Administration71 and claimed that GAP would be complete by the year 
2010, provides important reading in relation to GAP’s overall objectives.  Whilst I 
found Ünver’s work, as a former President of GAP, useful regarding the project’s 
objectives and programmes, not only for the south-east but also for the entire country, 
he does not distinguish between the region’s cultural, social and political conditions 
and those of the rest of the country. His work is simply based on an explanation of the 
project, without reference to the historical and current reality of the south-east, which 
is what concerns me.  
 To conclude, the above literature regarding the implementation of the GAP 
‘social development’ project provides an important framework for grasping the 
project’s objectives and aims, and provides significant factual perspectives on the 
project. Having said that, it does not tell us much about the manifestation of the 
project and the factors that forced Turkey to consider such a project in the south-east, 
a region which Turkey had neglected socially and economically for decades. Of 
course, there are many reasons why Turkey came to the conclusion, in the late 1980s, 
that utilizing the water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for economic growth in the 
south-east would be beneficial. However, the concept of modernization/development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See more about Olcay Ünver’s biography as the Coordinator of  GAP in 
www.un.org/ga/president/64/thematic/water/OlcayUnver.pdf; and Gap kalkınma idaresi başkanı olcay 
ünver: "gap'ın yüzde 50, www.porttakal.com/ Haber Arşivi/ Mart 1999 (accessed 28 March 2014). 
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was employed by Turkish policy-makers in order to get rid of traditional society in 
the region, something which Turkey saw as a threat, mainly because it could not 
impose its authority there as it did in the past, and thus they were attempting to 
instigate a modern form of society in the region. The following section discusses 
literature that points out the political agenda behind the GAP ‘social development’ 
project.  
 
4.3. Politicization of the GAP ‘social development’ project  
 
There are numerous studies focusing on political aspects of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project and on the role of the Euphrates and the Tigris river waters in 
the region. Before I analyze the literature in relation to the politicization of the 
project, it is crucial to briefly outline the significant role of these waters, which 
Turkey wanted to use not only for its domestic needs but also for its external politics.  
For instance, Arab states, under the umbrella of Pan-Arabic ideology, 
established a regional economic and political regime, in order to co-operate for 
common goals and the unity of Arab nations.72 However, when it came to the issue of 
water, the case was complicated by the fact that they rely on external water, mainly 
from Israel and Turkey.  Despite the fact that the Arab states are nearer to Israeli 
water, because of their ongoing conflict they will not negotiate or co-operate with 
Israel.  Thus, the only state that Arabs can co-operate with is upstream Turkey. 
Turkish religious and historical relations with Arabs make such co-operation possible.  
Since Turkey has been aware of the possibilities of its unique position 
enabling it to be the hydro-hegemonic power in the Middle East, it has propagated the 
pipelines as “peace pipelines”. Schulz (1995: 117-18) observed that the Turkish state 
uses most of the water for itself, and she put forward a proposal for  water pipelines 
which would take water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers and send it through one 
‘western pipeline’ and one ‘Gulf pipeline’, thus pacifying Arab states. While the 
western pipeline was intended to take water to Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the 
second pipeline would pass through Iraq to the Gulf states and finally reach Oman, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 These are as follows: “The League of Arab States, the Council for Arab Economic Unity, the Arab 
Common Market, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, and Arab Monetary Fund” (Schulz 1995: 97). 
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and it was considered that these “would transport 2.5 million cubic metres per day” 
(Ibid: 117-18).  
In 1991, at the water summit in Turkey (which was perhaps the first step in 
discussions over the pipeline), there were 24 Middle Eastern states present and 
representatives from the United States, as well as representatives from  Africa, Europe 
and Japan.  As Schulz (Ibid: 119) comments, “the peace pipeline seems to provide a 
reason for every state in the region to consider the probable potential benefits.” The 
idea of Turkey introducing two water pipelines was not only to regain its dominant 
role in the Middle East but also for the purpose of its national security. It has been 
stated that Turkey is well aware that the scarcity of water in the Middle East may 
destabilize the region and this would never be good for Turkey.  
However, despite the efforts of the Turkish state, the “peace pipelines” project 
never became reality. This was mainly because of Syria’s negative approach. In 1992, 
Syria told the Arab League that the Turkish Peace Pipeline suggestion was a plot to 
deliver substantial quantities of water to Israel. Also some Arab countries were 
sceptical about the control and expense of the project (Gruen 2000). In fact Turkey 
wanted to become a powerful state via its water. It was in the process of attempting to 
establish regional hydro-hegemony by virtue of its upstream location; it was hoping 
not only to ensure regional security for the south-east, but also, through hydro-
hegemony, to gain a strategic position over Syria and Iraq, which would enhance its 
internal as well as external security and would contribute “to the long-term military-
political goal of macro-regional hegemony” (Warner 2004: 19). However, since my 
main purpose here is to study the literature on the GAP ‘social development’ project 
and its politicization, I will leave further investigation of the subject to students 
concerned with Turkish international politics in the Middle East region in relation to 
the water project, a significant issue that needs further study. 
 For Shiva (2002), the main purpose of the GAP project was clear; in order to 
control the population and sever people’s relations with the PKK, the state’s aim was 
to drive Kurdish people out of their small villages into the big cities, thus making it 
easier to crush uprisings.  Shiva touches on a crucial point, one which was raised by 
many of my interviewees in the south-east, the fact that Turkey wants to use GAP as a 
political tool to control the Kurds; and one should consider further investigation 
regarding the political implications of the project. As I indicated in Chapter Three, 
Turkey had introduced policies intended to crush the very existence of the Kurds. The 
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question arises whether the GAP project was conceived for a similar purpose. It is 
argued that, once the Turkish state became aware that the PKK was turning into its 
most serious internal challenge, it began to change its policy on the Kurdish region. 
Instead of fighting physically, the Turkish state began to implement a different 
strategy. On the one hand, the state carried out tough measures against those who 
asserted their ethnic identity, and on the other hand, it began to appease the Kurdish 
population by directing economic aid to the region, focusing mainly on agriculture, in 
particular through the huge Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) (Entessar 1992: 98). 
Turgut Özal, who was the chief economic planner from 1980 to 1983, was 
“given wide leeway to restructure the Kurdish economy for the purpose of integrating 
it into the international capitalist market” (Ibid: 95). The idea was to control the Kurds 
by integrating them into international capitalist society. This was one of the main 
reasons that the GAP project became reality. In this respect, Shiva’s theory points to a 
crucial aspect of Turkey’s GAP policy. 
 In order to understand the GAP ‘social development’ project and its 
sustainable human development targets, including its political framework, the work of 
Leila Harris is also important. While Harris (2002) indicates that the GAP project 
might lead to future insecurity and instability in the Middle East, her main concern 
goes beyond conceptualization of water and conflict in the region. Instead she situates 
and reveals the ‘social development’ project in the context of the ongoing conflict 
between the Kurdish guerillas and the Turkish state. To be more specific, she argues 
that GAP must be understood “within the context of disputes related to the history of 
Kurdish separatism, and related to population, military, and rebel movements 
throughout the border regions with Syria and Iraq” (Ibid: 749).   
 The Kurdish question has always been a complex and sensitive subject in 
Turkey, “exacerbated by its trans state nature and complications related to identity 
politics and ethnic associations that may be pluralistic in character” (Ibid: 749). The 
concept and policies of the GAP ‘social development’ project should be perceived 
and assessed in relation to the long history of Turkish-Kurdish relations, and it needs 
to be examined in relation to aggressive Turkish state policies toward the region. 
According to my research there is still a lack of work revealing the significance of 
Kurdish politics in relation to GAP. Understanding the idea of the GAP project as 
central to the future of the Kurdish dispute, according to Harris, implies that there are 
significant connections between water development and the dispute that remain 
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underexplored. It can be argued that the GAP ‘social development’ project serves as 
the integrating resource that has the ability to resolve long-standing disputes in the 
south-east “and to connect state economic, resource, political, economic, and security 
interests” (Ibid: 752). She adds that the concept of ‘social development’ in the GAP 
project would offer a limited “economic response to some of the larger legitimacy and 
territorial concerns in the region with the possibility that improvement of living 
standards in the southeast may undermine bases for Kurdish separatism and enhance 
legitimacy of the Turkish state” (Ibid: 752).  
 However, Harris argues that the development of GAP could have positive 
outcomes for the Kurds. She claims that GAP could potentially improve living 
standards in the region and also encourage urban and industrial development in those 
areas. Such improvements could possibly lead to a reduction in the Kurdish demand 
for self-determination or collective rights.  
 Harris (Ibid) concludes that Turkey’s efforts to be accepted by the European 
Union meant that conflict in the south-east was likely to accelerate. Acceptance by the 
EU was dependent on Turkey overcoming its negative reputation regarding human 
rights and providing reassurance that economic progress was on target in the south-
east. While GAP could be approved of for pursuing valid socio-economic 
development goals in the region, such a venture could not resolve more complex 
issues relating to “social, political, economic and ecological relations inherent in 
shifting water and conflict geographies” (Ibid: 757). Harris provides significant 
insight in terms of the implications of historical relations between the Turkish state 
and the Kurds in the context of the role of GAP development in the region. Harris 
informs us of some critical approaches towards the notion of the GAP project, but 
does not discuss how the project emerged, or to what extent it was influenced by the 
idea of ‘modernization/development’ in the world. Having raised this important factor 
regarding GAP, she does not explore the contribution of the project in practice, and 
there is no clear evidence that GAP has played a role in achieving any of the benefits 
she refers to. What is crucial to my work is that GAP has been influenced by the 
modernization/development concept but struggles to reach its socio-economic targets 
because of unpredictable obstacles in the south-east, which this study is going to 
explore.    
 For Nilay Özok-Gündogan (2005), the GAP ‘social development’ project is 
based on two interrelated issues. She asserts that, first, both the idea and practice of 
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development shifted in accordance with the requirements of world capitalism. In this 
framework, the idea of ‘social development’ came to mean something different from 
what it had meant in the post-World War II period. So the discourse of global 
development “was transformed in the 1980s under the neo-liberal restructuring of 
world economy and politics” (Ibid: 93). She suggests that the idea of ‘development’ 
has functioned as a globally hegemonizing discourse used by state authorities to 
control the populations within their borders. In the second edition of her work, she 
argues that the practices of the GAP ‘social development’ project “are appropriations 
of a global discourse within a particular spatial and temporal context” (Ibid: 93). 
Özok-Gündogan’s work raises some crucial issues in terms of understanding GAP 
‘social development’ in relation to the discourse of global development which has 
persisted under neo-liberalism. She points out that the core concept of the ‘social 
development’ project is a process, which was formed “in accordance with historically 
specific governmental rationalities rather than an abstract idea that works everywhere 
in the same way and for the same ends” (Ibid: 109). Her work is also important when 
it comes to understanding parts of the abstract policy of the Turkish state in the GAP 
region since the 1980s, in particular during the 1990s. It indicates that, in the late 
1980s, the transformation of GAP from a land/water resources scheme into an 
integrated social development project was the consequence of the state’s policy in 
dealing with the war between Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish state authorities in the 
south-east region. It was hoped that the transformation of GAP into a rigorous social 
development programme would provide a gradual solution to the Kurdish question.  
 Özok-Gündogan argues that the social development aspects of the GAP 
project developed as a result of the increasing conflict within the region during the 
1990s. It became clear to the Turkish authorities that resistance to Turkish dominance 
was stronger than had been anticipated and could not therefore be resolved by military 
measures alone. Thus, there was an urgent need to improve social and economic 
conditions within the region via GAP in order to attempt to resolve the problem. 
However, in relation to the concept of the GAP ‘social development’ project, I 
suggest that we should look at what GAP and modernization/development  have in 
common rather than stating that Turkey employed the discourse of global 
development to control the population of the south-east.   
Nevertheless, Okmen’s work (2002) regarding the 'social functioning’ of the 
GAP project and the ways in which it caused large scale displacement of the local 
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population needs to be taken into consideration. In particular, he assesses the dams in 
the south-east, in particular comparing the Keban Dam (completed in 1964) with the 
current South-east Anatolia project, and reveals “the driving forces behind it and the 
continuities of state policy and social performance of hydro-project based 
development and, as its consequence, development - induced displacement in 
Turkey.”  He argues that “in comparing the Keban Dam and the GAP project, a great 
deal of continuity might be inferred in Turkey's energy policy and its implicit policy 
of dispersal of Kurdish villagers.” He concludes that there has been no real change in 
government policy since the construction of the Keban Dam in terms of procedures 
and legislation relating to compensation and resettlement planning.  The GAP project 
stayed within strategic state policies devised during the Keban project or before.  
The above literature reviews have not only provided me with excellent 
material concerning GAP and its ‘social development’ project but also about the 
approach of the Turkish state and its polices in the south-east regarding the project. 
However, the main question which arises is: has GAP reached its social development 
goal? The above works do not broadly assess the current condition of GAP ‘social 
development’ with which this study is mainly concerned.  
 
4.4. Obstacles to the progress of the GAP ‘social development’ project 
 
 Despite books and articles addressing the implementation of GAP, the literature does 
not take a sufficiently broad view of the empirical and theoretical implications of the 
incompleteness of the GAP ‘social development’ project. Apparently, since the 
project officially exists on blue paper and Turkey claims it is progressing, almost no 
scholars directly discuss the main obstacles that have delayed the implementation of 
GAP modernization/development programmes.  There are some limited works on the 
progress of the project, though they do not provide satisfactory and convincing 
reasons as to why it has not yet enriched the region. There follows an examination of 
the most relevant literature on the progress of the project.  
According to Çarkoglu and Eder, the unfinished nature of the GAP project 
may be to do with the absence of local participation and “the top-down 
implementation of the project and ‘high modernisation’ strategy by the state” (2005: 
168); or the issue of mutual distrust between the locals/Kurds and Turkish state 
authority in the region, which may all have resulted in its failure to reach its main 
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targets. Or, is this just another typical case of the failure of developmentalism that we 
have witnessed elsewhere in the world, which many scholars consider to be a weakly 
implemented, politically unjustifiable and highly unworkable strategy “that 
‘succeeded’ in certain instrumental goals but is doomed for failure given its isolation 
from the region’s population” (Ibid: 171). 
During my fieldwork in the south-east, many of my interviewees 
acknowledged that GAP was implemented from the ‘top-down’, so many locals were 
not even aware of what GAP meant.  Chapter Five will focus on ‘top-down’ issues in 
more detail, mainly by revealing the views of interviewees, in the context of an 
examination of whether there are any hidden Turkish state politics involved in the 
project. What Carkoglu and Eder fail to state is that the approach of the Turkish state 
towards the ‘social development’ project has been fragmented by regional and 
international political factors, upon which this study is going to focus.  
Additionally, Ercin states that the “high population growth rate, incomplete 
realization and delay in investments due to insufficient public and private 
investments, regression of Turkish economy, ethnic and security problems” (2006: 
235) may be the main issues negatively impacting on the project. However, the main 
factor emerging from the literature related to this study is that, despite important 
progress with the project in the energy sector, the concept of the integrated regional 
development project is far behind in its objectives and targets.  
 Altinbilek and Tortajada (2012) claim that some gains have been made by 
GAP; per capita income had grown from 47% of average national income in 1985 to 
55% by 2001; the region’s hydroelectric power plants provided 74% of all energy at 
the national level by 2005. However, they argue that, despite such significant 
achievements, the GAP project as an integrated regional development scheme is far 
behind in achieving the objectives and goals set out in the Master Plan. For Altinbilek 
and Tortajada (Ibid), not enough funding has been allocated by the government to 
GAP, and they consider this to be a key reason for the lack of implementation of the 
social development project.  
 Notwithstanding, the literature informs us that GAP was transformed from a 
water/land resource project into a multi-sector integrated regional development 
project for the underdeveloped south-east, an ambitious modernization strategy by the 
highest level of the Turkish state and supported by the Turkish ruling elite (Kolars 
and Michell 1991; Ozok-Gundogan 2005; Carkoglu and Eder 2005). The strategies of 
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the state and “policies related to regional development have stayed largely 
unimproved” (Okmen 2002).  
 The literature shows that, since the creation of the republic, Turkish policy-
makers have not taken the development of the agricultural sector seriously. The 
question arises as to whether it isn’t paradoxical to anticipate that the GAP project 
“will boost agricultural production in order to contribute to nationwide goals of 
economic development, given the diminishing trend of the sector” (Varsamidis 2010). 
Despite the fact that the project has made some positive achievements regarding its 
targets with regard to industry, education (in Turkish, not in the locals’ own 
languages, including Kurdish, Arabic or those of other ethnic groups in the region), 
health, migration, communication and public services, Varsamidis comments that “the 
GAP project does not seem to have improved the economic dimension of 
sustainability and the economic well-being of the people in the region” (Ibid: 86). 
Notwithstanding, it is argued that one of the reasons that GAP has not reached its 
target is because it faced a lack of administrative capacity and “the structural 
challenges posed by the institutional framework of public investments without 
reforming the entire public administration structure” (Beleli 2005).  
Another issue impacting on GAP may be the attacks by environmentalists and 
international news agencies, who claimed that it would not meet international 
standards (for instance, the Ilisu Dam did not meet international standards in terms of 
environmental protection, resettlement and archaeological sites (KHRP 21 August 
2007)).73 Hence, while the literature provides questions as to whether the GAP project 
has progressed in meeting its objectives and targets for the socio-economic 
development of the region, it also includes the EU criteria on regional stability, 
environmental issues and human rights - including the issue of displaced people in the 
region, and Syria and Iraq’s dependence on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for the 
agriculture sector and food security. More specifically, the literature establishes that 
the project has not only struggled in meeting its targets and objectives, but has also 
been ineffective in protecting the environment, as well as raising “more obstacles for 
Turkey’s full membership to the EU” (Varsamidis 2010: 86). 
Based on the most relevant literature reviews that I have provided, and also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The campaign by environmentalists, and also by Syria and Iraq, who once managed to block 
international financial assistance for completing the project; and broad overall criticism of the 
objectives of the GAP project (Warner 2011).   
	   102	  
empirical work in the region, it appears that the project has delivered some of its 
promises, in particular for Turkish energy needs, but not for the socio-economic 
development of the south-east. The evidence indicates that the project has not yet 
played a role in changing the region’s long-standing socio-economic 
underdevelopment and it continues to be the poorest part of Turkey.  
Having assessed the overall literature on the GAP and its ‘social development 
project, my work does not expand on most of the issues raised above, but the 
literature discussed is significant for understanding overall features of the GAP 
project and some significant factors relating to its current condition. In relation to the 
above views, in order to understand the GAP ‘social development’ project and 
analyze obstacles preventing its realization, there is an inter-related course of analysis 
of theoretical and empirical data presented across the whole study. In order to 
understand what were and are the main obstacles preventing the project’s realization, 
I argue that there are four factors that should be examined: (1) the rise of the Kurdish 
national movement; (2) shifting balance of political power; (3) the failure of the 
Turkish state to provide a perpetual peace process with the Kurdish movement in the 
region; (4) the approach of the Turkish state towards cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
 
I have stressed that most public discourse and that of the Turkish government 
regarding GAP hold the project to be a ‘social development’ scheme that would create 
economic, social and spatial changes, aimed at ending the chronic poverty of the 
south-east/Kurdish region by raising locals’ income levels and living standards, 
providing social stability and economic growth by enhancing the employment 
capacity of the regional sector, and creating socio-economic integration between the 
underdeveloped south-east/Kurds and the industrialized west/Turks. 
 This chapter has provided an outline summary of literature on the GAP ‘social 
development’ project and its constituent programmes, which were supposed to 
improve the south-east region’s socio-economy. The chapter has also looked at 
literature that indicates that GAP has become politicized and may be being used by 
the Turkish state to ameliorate the Kurdish question through the ‘social development’ 
programmes. Finally, the incompletion of the ‘social development’ project has been 
alluded to by most of the relevant literature which takes a sufficiently broad view of 
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the implications of GAP and its current situation in relation to the ‘social 
development’ project. However, in order to grasp the core concept of GAP, it is 
necessary to go beyond the overall literature, investigate GAP’s progress as a 
sustainable regional development project, and find out whether there are hidden 
policies driving it. Thus the following chapter, which is mainly based on my primary 
data, will discuss the policies of the Turkish state regarding the GAP ‘social 
development’ project and views on the progress of GAP.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The progress and political tone of the GAP ‘social development’ project 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Since the GAP ‘social development’ project is involved with regional politics, it 
needs a broad examination to make it comprehensible. The previous three chapters 
have examined the background of the project. While Chapter Two mainly focused on 
the formation of the project and its historical background, Chapter Three scrutinized  
Turkish modernization overall from the very beginning of the republic, and assessed 
the unequal social development between the south-east and the rest of the country. In 
order to narrow the gap between the socio-economic situation in the south-east and 
the developed regions of Turkey, policy-makers transformed the GAP project, which 
was based entirely on water/land resources, into a ‘social development’ project, 
involving the regional socio-economic and socio-political, if not geo-political, factors. 
In this context, Chapter Four assessed the literature on the project, which enlightens 
us regarding the ways in which it has been involved with regional politics.  
So, along with the empirical data, this chapter assesses the GAP ‘social 
development’ project and investigates whether it has made any positive progress 
towards enabling sustainable development of the region. Apart from analyzing GAP 
in relation to the region’s socio-economic development, the chapter mainly focuses on 
the interviewees’ views on the project in an attempt to explore its results. Firstly the 
progress of GAP, including its strategies and plans, is analyzed, mainly through 
examining the data published by the Turkish state74 in relation to GAP, independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının (DPT)), in Ulusal Sanayici ve 
İşadamları Derneği (USİAD) GAP Raporu, GAP’ta ne Oldu! Bölgede Ekonomik, Stratejik ve Siyasal 
Gelişmeler Editör: Dursun Yildiz Hazırlayan: ADA Strateji, 2008, Istanbul; Illerin ve Bölgelerin 
Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelismislik Siralamasi Arastirmasi (SEGE-2011), T.C.Kalkinma Bakanligi, Bilgi ve 
Belge Yönetimi Dairesi Baskanli, Ankara 2013, www.cnnturk.com/2012/ekonomi/.../662420.0/ 
(accessed 25.05.2012); GAP Action Plan Investigation and Assessment Report (Gap Eylem Planı 
İnceleme ve Değerlendirme Raporu) 2008-2012, May 2008, in GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 
GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx; GAP, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP 
Bölge Kalkinma Baskanligi, Bölgesel Kalkinmanin Can Suyu: GAP, Karsilastirmali  Sosyal  ve 
Ekonomik Yapi Arastirmasi, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi ve sosyoloji 
Dernegi, 2010, Ankara; GAP Nedir - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, 
www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 6 May 2014). 
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resources75 and my empirical work, which together provide an outline of where the 
project stands in relation to the region’s socio-economic development. These data will 
clarify to what extent GAP has made progress. Secondly, I examine my interviewees’ 
perspectives on GAP and analyze to what extent the project has been used as a 
political tool in the region. So the chapter is divided into a ‘Critical Analysis on GAP 
as a Social Development Project: Unsustainable Programme, Strategies and Plan’ and 
‘GAP: ‘Top-Down’ Project, Strengthening State Authority and Hidden Politics’.   
 
5.2. Critical analysis of GAP as a social development project: unsustainable 
programme, strategies and plan 
 
Chapter Four outlined the overall literature on GAP and examined the politicization 
of the project, explaining how it has been conditioned by certain factors.  Later in this 
thesis, I will describe some concrete factors regarding the conditions of the social 
development scheme, and provide the reasons as to why the project has been trapped 
in an unworkable situation. However, it is important to begin by scrutinizing the 
current socio-economic conditions in the south-east region, to see whether GAP has 
been beneficial for the region’s economic growth and to what extent it has provided 
social development there. The data that I have collected shows that no serious attempt 
to achieve GAP’s stated objective in relation to ‘social development’ has taken place. 
This research and also independent surveys on the social and economic 
structure of the south-east region undertaken by various institutions such as the 
National Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Ulusal Sanayici ve Isamalari 
Dernegi (USİAD)) and the Sociological Association (Sosyoloji Dernegi), have 
addressed the fact that GAP as a ‘social development’ project lags far behind the 
target of the GAP-Master Plan (see more regarding independent surveys in note 2 
above). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ulusal Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (USİAD) GAP Raporu, GAP’ta ne Oldu! Bölgede Ekonomik, 
Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler Editör: Dursun YILDIZ Hazırlayan: ADA Strateji, 2008, Istanbul; 
CNNTurk.com.webarchive/ 25.05.2012, web archive of Turkish national news channel CNN Turk; bir 
bölgesel dönüşüm projesi olarak gap - Sosyoloji Derneği, 
www.sosyolojidernegi.org.tr/.../Gokce_birsen.pdf; gap eylem planı inceleme ve değerlendirme raporu - 
emo www.emo.org.tr/.../d73f5b6b5d8b428_ek.pdf?tipi...; Türk Mühendis Ve Mimar Odaları Birliği 
(TMMOB) Diyarbakir Il Koordinasyon Kurulu [GAP Action Plan and Review Report, criticism and 
recommendations by Turkey Architecture, Engineering and Coordination Centre, Chamber, Diyarbakir 
Coordination Board]; Kurdish Human Rights Project: KHRP, www.khrp.org, GAP publication 
(accessed 6 May 2014).  
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The plan stated that employment in the region’s industry should increase from 
16% to 24% of total employment, and the services sector from 44% to 53%, and the 
Gross Regional Development Index should increase 4.5 times by 2005. The region’s 
population was expected to reach over 9 million during the same period and GAP was 
supposed to provide 3.5 million jobs (USİAD 2008). However, this study indicates 
that none of these targets have been achieved. 
According to USİAD report, people in 1995 in the GAP region emigrated 
from the provinces as a result of poverty as follows: Adıyaman 70.2%, Diyarbakır 
40%, Mardin 67%, Siirt 75.1%, Şanlıurfa 38.9%, Batman 45.2%, Kilis 38.9%. In 
Gaziantep, only 3% emigrated, because it was comparatively developed in relation to 
the other eight provinces, and, contrastingly, 21.8% migrated to the nearby town of 
Sirnak, because many local villages had been evacuated or burnt down by Turkish 
state security (as part of the war between Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish army). 
While overall the GAP region absorbed only 9,449 inhabitants (mainly state 
employed workers such as teachers and the security force), a total of 219,339 people 
emigrated from the region to the cities. It is true that many locals have had to migrate 
because of the war between Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish army, particularly in 
the 1990s, but poverty was and still is the main trigger for people to leave their 
villages and homes seeking a new life in the west of Turkey.76 GAP was supposed to 
create integration between the south-east/Kurdish region and the rest of Turkey. My 
research reveals that this has not occurred.  
Moreover, according to the State Planning Organization (SPO) research,77 
there has not been any considerable socio-economic development in the nine 
provinces of the GAP region except Gaziantep.  Between 1996 and 2003, according to 
this research, all other provinces in the region were the least developed areas in 
Turkey (USİAD 2008), and this is still the case. 
While Adiyaman city was 61st, in 1996, in terms of socio-economic growth, 
by 2003 it had declined to 65th. Diyarbakir was 57th - it declined to 63rd. Mardin was 
66th - it declined to 72nd. Siirt was 68th - it declined to 73rd. Although Sanliurfa was 
irrigated at the very beginning of the project, in 1996 it was 59th, but by 2003, it had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76See Batı'ya Kürt Göçü ve G.Doğu'yu KalKınDırma Söylemi…1, 
www.iktisatvetoplum.com/.../mustafa-sonmez-batiya (accessed April 2015).  
77 State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının (DPT)), in, Ulusal Sanayici ve İşadamları 
Derneği (USİAD) GAP Raporu, GAP’ta ne Oldu! Bölgede Ekonomik, Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler 
Editör: Dursun Yildiz Hazırlayan: ADA Strateji, 2008, Istanbul.  
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fallen to 68th.  Batman was 65th and went down to 70th, Sirnak was 75th and fell to 
78th. Kilis was 54th in 2003, and its place in the Turkish economy remained the same 
because it was affiliated to the industrialized city of Gaziantep.78 The overall situation 
in terms of socio-economic development in the region has not changed much since the 
project plan was unveiled. People from the region have continued to seek jobs in other 
parts of the country and, the predominance of seasonal workers are evidence that 
GAP has not been beneficial to the region.79   
According to the statistical data for the year 2004 (Ibid), the overall 
unemployment rate is 10.6%, and the non-agricultural unemployment rate is 16% in 
the region. The overall literacy rate is 73.22% in the region, and 60% of women are 
illiterate (Ibid). Socio-economic underdevelopment in the region has not only created 
migration to the big cities, but has also brought other problems such as unemployment 
in those cities, uneven economic growth, unplanned urbanization, crime and 
smuggling.80 According to the surveys,81 the majority of people in the region did not 
have an income sufficient for living. 75% of the population has not got the jobs..The 
surveys indicated that for the previous three years the unemployment figure for heads 
of household reached 85.2% in the region. The province of Diyarbakir contained one 
of the highest unemployment figures, and in the province of Mardin, for instance, 
according to 2010 data, 85.7% of people had not had a job in the previous three years.  
There is no doubt that GAP has made some significant progress in irrigation 
(see Chapter Six), in particular with regard to power production, providing almost 
50% of Turkey’s energy consumption.82 President, Karahocagil (personal interview, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See more: Ulusal Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (USİAD) (2008), GAP Raporu, GAP’ta ne Oldu! 
Bölgede Ekonomik, Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler. See also Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının (DPT) [State 
Planning Organization] in the same work. 
79 See more detail regarding seasonal workers from the south-east in the following: BBC Türkçe, 
HDP'den baraja karşı mevsimlik işçi atağı, www.bbc.com/.../150531_mevsimlik_isciler; Yüz binlerce 
mevsimlik işçi her yıl ülkeyi tarla tarla dolaşıyorlar, www.bugun.com.tr/.../yuz...mevsimlik isci; 
Mevsimlik işçiler güneydoğudan batıya trenlerle göç ediyor, www.cihan.com.tr/.../mevsimlik-isciler-
guneydogudan; Mevsimlik işçiler Güneydoğu'dan Batı'ya trenlerle göç ediyor, 
haber.stargundem.com/Ekonomi (5 June 2015).  
80 See GAP, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma Baskanligi, Bölgesel Kalkinmanin Can Suyu: 
GAP, Karsilastirmali Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapi Arastirmasi, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma 
Idaresi Baskanligi ve sosyoloji Dernegi, 2010, Ankara.  
81 See GAP, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma Baskanligi, Bölgesel Kalkinmanin Can Suyu: 
GAP, Karsilastirmali Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapi Arastirmasi, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma 
Idaresi Baskanligi ve sosyoloji Dernegi, 2010, Ankara. 
82  See GAP'ta Son Durum - TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_ta_son_durum.aspx (accessed 7 July 2015).  
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July 2011) said during my interview with him:  
 
Although the state could not guarantee all social development projects would 
work perfectly, it stressed that whatever happens with the project, all dams 
will be completed. Until now, we have spent 20 billion Turkish lira on the 
project and the recent statement shows that we made 18 billion out of energy 
production. This is enough in itself. The project is self-profitable. 
 
 Moreover, my interview with the regional director, Mr Mehmet Acikgoz (personal 
interview, July 2011), produced another significant factor in terms of energy: 
 
28% of the surface waters of Turkey comprise the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, 
and Turkey wants to utilize this water for its energy production. So, one thing 
that we should know is that even if ‘social development’ does not work 
properly, Turkey will still have gained high energy production anyway. 
 
Although the above statements indicate that Turkey has benefited from energy 
production, the following statements and data show that GAP has not been beneficial 
in terms of regional socio-economic growth. According to SEGE’s 2011 research,83 as 
is evident from the following table, the region has not improved socio-economically, 
but gone backwards. The table indicates the economic development of Turkish 
provinces.  
 
Socio-Economic Development Ranking of Provinces 
İstanbul   1 Karabük  28 Aksaray    55 
Ankara   2 Zonguldak  29 Niğde 56 
İzmir  3 Gaziantep 30 Tokat    57 
Kocaeli 4 Trabzon              31 Tunceli    58 
Antalya  5 Karaman            32 Erzurum 59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See more in Illerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelismislik Siralamasi Arastirmasi (SEGE-2011), 
T.C.Kalkinma Bakanligi, Bilgi ve Belge Yönetimi Dairesi Baskanli, Ankara 2013, 
www.cnnturk.com/2012/ekonomi/.../662420.0/ (accessed 25 May 2012). 
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Bursa     6 Samsun  33 Kahramanmaraş 60 
Eskişehir   7 Rize 34 Ordu 61 
Muğla    8 Düzce  35 Gümüşhane 62 
Tekirdağ  9 Nevşehir  36 Kilis 63 
Denizli              10 Amasya            37 Bayburt 64 
 Bolu                  11 Kütahya  38 Yozgat 65 
Edirne      12 Elazığ  39 Adıyaman 66 
Yalova   13 Kırşehir 40 Diyarbakır 67 
Çanakkale  14 Kırıkkale         41 Kars 68 
Kırklareli  15 Malatya 42 Iğdır 69 
Adana    16 Afyon 43 Batman 70 
Kayseri   17 Artvin 44 Ardahan 71 
Sakarya   18 Erzincan 45 Bingöl 72 
Aydın  19 Hatay 46 Şanlıurfa 73 
Konya   20 Kastamonu 47 Mardin 74 
Isparta   21 Bartın 48 Van 75 
Balıkesir 22 Sivas 49 Bitlis 76 
Manisa   23 Çorum 50 Siirt 77 
Mersin   24 Sinop 51 Şırnak 78 
Uşak                 25 Giresun 52 Ağrı 79 
Burdur              26 Osmaniye 53 Hakkari 80 
Bilecik   27 Çankırı 54 Muş 81 
www.ab.gov.tr/files/.../tckb_sege_2013.pdf (Accessed 4 May 2015). 
 
As is indicated in bold, the above table shows that apart from Gaziantep, which is 
Turkish-Kurdish populated and industrialized, and Kilis, the provinces are the lowest 
areas in terms of economic and social development, other than Kurdish cities 
elsewhere such as Mus, Hakkari, Agri, Bitlis, Van, Bingol, Ardahan, Igdir and Kars, 
which are not located in the GAP region but in the east of Turkey. So while the 
project was supposed to create prosperity for the south-east, the region has continued 
to plunge further into a difficult situation. 
Altan Tan, local MP and member of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP)) (personal interview, June, 2011), argued 
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that the idea that the GAP ‘social development’ project would create massive jobs and 
opportunities and bring about the end of poverty in the south-east, was merely a mask. 
He declared: 
 
If this was not a mask, then irrigation would have already taken place. 85% of 
the dams project is completed but only 15-17% of irrigation canals are 
completed, though some of these dams were completed 10 years ago. There is 
water in the dams but no water in the fields. 
 
Tan claimed that while water has been transferred to the province of Sanliurfa, or 
Urfa, which is mainly populated by Arabs, who are supporters of the Turkish state, 
provinces such as Diyarbakir, populated mainly by Kurds, only received 5% of the 
water transfer. The towns of Harran and Suruç in the province of Urfa were critical in 
evaluating how the ‘social development’ project has been functioning in different 
ways. Both towns have equally profitable land for irrigation, however they have been 
affected differently by the project. 
Harran’s plain has been one of the Turkish government’s most successful 
propaganda tools. Irrigation has transformed the dry Plain of Harran, turning it into a 
massive area of fertile land, and the people of the town have consequently benefited 
from the Atatürk Dam. During my visit to Harran in June 2011, people gave thanks to 
the government for the way their land had been made profitable by the dam’s 26.4 km 
long tunnels of water. My participants’ answers from this pro-Turkish, mainly Arab 
inhabited town confirmed how useful it had been to have the water transferred from 
the Atatürk Dam to their lands, and were full of thanks and happiness that they could 
irrigate their land. One participant (who declined to give his name) said, “Since we 
received water for irrigation, we now have everything we need and almost everyone 
has their private car. This was never the case before.” 
However, despite Suruç being one of the most productive lands in the south-
east region, in contrast with the Harran Plain,84 and one that has been promised water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  See more regarding Suruç’s productivity in Dünyanın en iyi narı Suruç a yetişiyor haberi, 
www.internethaber.com/dunyanin-en-iyi-nari-Suruça; Suruç Narı Dünyanın En iyi Nar Çeşitleri 
Arasında - Urfa ..., www.urfahaber.net/.../Suruç-nari-dunyanin-en-iyi-nar (accessed 8 April 2015).  
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from the Atatürk Dam, this water has not yet been transferred. 85  One of the 
participants from Suruç (personal interview, name not given, June 2011)86 said: “We 
are being punished by the Turkish state for being Kurds.” My participants from Suruç 
complained that during national elections, almost every political leader or their 
representatives would go there to promise them that they would transfer water, but 
once the elections were over, all they were left with were a few water pipes near the 
town. One of the participants commented: “This is all politics.” Another participant 
(no name given) said:  
 
I well remember, after the 1980s military coup, when Kenan Evren87 came 
here, he promised us that the government would transfer water to our land. But 
because we have been pro-Kurdish in our attitudes, we have not received 
water since then; and this was a decision taken by the Turkish Security 
Council.   
 
In recent years, despite efforts to provide sufficient food for the increasing global 
population using developed technology, food scarcity is becoming an increasingly 
serious problem. As Bryan McDonald (2010: 1) demonstrates, in recent decades, 
“Agricultural and food production activities have been recognized as key drivers of 
environmental and climate changes […] food production could face significant and 
widespread impacts from these changes in coming decades.” So the decrease in food 
security concerns many states which are unable to avoid problems related to health, 
environment, human, national and international security.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Before I went to Suruç, I knew two things about the town: it was well known for its pomegranates 
and the town was very pro-Kurdish, many Kurdish guerillas coming from the town. Although the land 
belonging to the town is part of GAP’s project plan for irrigation and is near the Atatürk Dam, the 
water has not yet been transferred, despite Suruç being among the most productive lands in the region. 
The whole Suruç plain was now a dry desert, despite the popularity of its pomegranates, which enjoyed 
local irrigation from the spring water around the town. When I interviewed people from the town, I was 
told that since the Birecik and Atatürk dams were built, the water has now mysteriously disappeared. 
The people from Suruç believed that they were being punished by the state for being pro-Kurds, in that 
water was not being supplied to them yet. The group of people I interviewed from Suruç told me that 
while Suruç used to export pomegranates, it was clearly unable to do so now, and they believed that the 
water-lines underground have been blocked by engineers in order to fill the Atatürk dam.  
86 Because Suruç town is very pro-Kurdish and many Kurdish guerillas come from the town, many of 
my participants were concerned that they should remain anonymous. 
87 Kenan Evren, former chief of staff, who was a leading commander in the 1980 coup and was later 
installed as President of Turkey, delivered “the right to veto constitutional amendments and appoint 
constitutional court judges” (Jacoby 2005: 647).  
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The Turkish state’s failure to complete the canals in Suruç raises many 
questions which need to be investigated in further research. One of the participants 
from Suruç (no name given, June 2011) said, “even if the state decided to complete 
the water pipes to irrigate Suruç land, it would not be for the socio-economy of Suruç 
but to serve Turkish multi-purpose interests.” Such strong statements from Suruç 
participants reveal a historical mistrust for the Turkish state.  
Altan Tan, local MP (personal interview, June, 2011), argued that GAP has 
not made a significant contribution to the region overall, but instead destroyed the life 
of the locals: 
 
Locals who have been affected by the GAP project may well have received 
financial compensation, but these locals went to big cities with big dreams to 
create new lives but were disappointed and became poorer, because they could 
not adapt to city life. The only people to benefit in this regard were in fact 
western Turkish engineers, who earned high salaries, and the Turkish state in 
terms of hydroelectricity, but the benefits did not extend to the region itself.  
 
So, the research shows that the project, which was going to reform the negative 
aspects of the region has not yet been seen to do so. As Tan states, GAP did not fulfil 
its commitment everywhere in the region equally. Professor Ahmet Ozer (personal 
interview, June, 2011), who has carried out important research on the GAP project 
and argued that Turkey created GAP because, on the one hand, it could receive tax 
from the Kurdish region while, on the other hand, it aimed to create integration 
between the east and west of Turkey, points to this inequality: 
 
The GAP ‘social development’ programme indicates that the project is geared 
towards remote areas and infrastucturing cities.  However, when we look at it 
closely, with the exception of Sanliurfa, cities like Siirt have not benefited 
from the project at all. While there are some signs of development in the 
cities, these are not apparent in most rural areas or remote villages.    
 
Özer claimed that the GAP project was purely political and argued that the Turkish 
state fails to acknowledge the distinctive identity and cultural aspects of the region, 
and he emphasized the inequality between the region and other regions of Turkey: 
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There is a need to increase the literacy ratio to Turkey’s standard. Of course, 
when we say bring the literacy ratio up to Turkey’s standard, we need to 
respect local culture and identity; otherwise the idea of social sustainability 
does not make sense and cannot work.   
 
The table below shows 2010 literacy ratios in the GAP Region.  
Educational Attainment by Gender 
Education situation  Number/% Women Men Total (N=3690) * 
Never went to school Number 981 285 12266 
 % 49.7 17 34.7 
Primary School Number 525 634 1159 
 % 26.6 27.8 31.7 
Secondary School Number 215 327 542 
 % 10.9 19.5 14.8 
High School Number 204 316 520 
 % 10.3 18.8 14.2 
University  Number 34 97 131 
 % 1.7 5.8 3.6 
Other Number 14 20 34 
 % 0.7 1.2 0.9 
Total Number 1973 1679 3652 
 % 100 100 100 
         P<0.05           * 38 unknown 
Can Suyu: GAP 201088 
 
Although I am not analyzing the region’s literacy situation in detail, the above tables 
themselves provide evidence that GAP has failed to advance the region not only in 
social and economic terms but also in terms of literacy. According to the GAP-Master 
Plan,89 the level of education, especially for girls, is demonstrably low, and so far 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See GAP, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma Baskanligi, Bölgesel Kalkinmanin Can Suyu: 
GAP, Karsilastirmali Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapi Arastirmasi, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma 
Idaresi Baskanligi ve sosyoloji Dernegi, 2010, Ankara.  
89 TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP (1989), GAP Master Planı, www.gap.gov.tr/site.../gap_master_plani 
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GAP has failed in its stated aims to ensure equal educational opportunities in all 
sections of the population, promote literacy, support vocational and technical training, 
and raise the social and educational profile of women, who remain marginalized.  
Research (Can Suyu: GAP 2010; USİAD 2008) indicates the following, based 
on 3,690 people: 1,266 people never went to school, while the female illiteracy ratio 
is 49.7% and the male illiteracy ratio is 17%. It indicates that 26.6% of women and 
27.8% of men went to primary school. For secondary school, this number decreases; 
for women, attendance is 10.9% whereas men’s attendance is 19.5%. In high school 
and university, literacy ratios for both women and men are decreasing, though men’s 
literacy ratio is higher. Despite the fact that in big cities there are some improvements 
in the ratios, overall they are far behind that of the west of Turkey, as is overall 
improvement in literacy - 30% of men in the region are illiterate, and 45% of women. 
Müsvet Çakar (personal interview, June 2011), president of an NGO, the 
Environmental Ecology and Support Ecology Association (Çevre Ekoloji ve Yasatma 
Destekleme Dernegini), declares that the state authorities or institutions do not tell the 
truth about the region: “We know that this city, Mardin, is the fourth from the bottom 
in Turkey related to literacy; but when you ask the government office in charge of 
literacy, they tell you that the city’s literacy has been increased to 20%, which is not 
true.”  
Çakar also points out that when you examine GAP offical documents they 
show the region benefitting substantially from the project in terms of socio-economic 
development.  However, the independent surveys do not reflect what the goverment 
claims. He indicates that while a small group of people in the region get economic 
benefits from the project, the positive economic outcome does not extend to all the 
inhabitants, who are mainly peasants. According to Çakar: 
 
GAP serves a certain and specific group of people.90 External individuals are 
involved for their own sake rather than for the interest of the local people and 
region. The project has in fact created an unequal and unbalanced income for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(accessed 10 February 2011). 
90 The specific group is mainly considered to be the landlords in the region, who own the majority of 
the land (“roughly 10% of the population owning 75% of the land, and high degrees of landlessness” 
(Harris 2002: 749)). 
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individuals in the region. In fact, it has destroyed many people’s lives and 
created serious displacement. 
 
Mehmet Çelik (personal interview, July 2011), a local textile businessman  from 
Samsat town, which is one of the oldest in the region, stated that GAP did not create 
job opportunities for the local people, and that many young people are unemployed. 
The priority of the Turkish state has been to complete the Atatürk Dam in the town, 
Çelik argued, but the state did not consider the young people’s future. He alleged that 
they now have to go to farm elsewhere every April. They are still seasonal peasants 
and GAP has worsened their economic conditions: 
 
Before Samsat was flooded by the Atatürk Dam, the people of Samsat town 
had the opportunity to raise livestock because they had enough land; but now 
we are left with nothing but to leave our homes for job opportunities in the big 
cities of Turkey. So, the majority of local people are seasonal peasants. They, 
the locals, go to other parts of the country to find seasonal work and when the 
work is finished, they wait more than six to eight months for work to resume.  
 
According to Çelik, at present 80% of people from Samsat are working in other parts 
of the country. People have to send their children to their grandmothers and fathers, in 
order to find seasonal jobs far away. This was not the situation in the old Samsat, 
where people never had to leave their families to find jobs. Çelik explained: “The idea 
of modernising the region destroyed the ordinary lives that we used to have in a 
peaceful community, where we all cared for each other.” He also claimed that they 
did not get fair value for their lands. The lands they lost were a more valuable and 
sustaintable source of income than the sum of money they got in return: “When we 
first received compensation in cash, it seemed like a lot of money. But now, when we 
think of our fertile land, the compensation we have received was nothing”. He 
continued: 
 
Supposing you gave 20 milyar (billion) Turkish Lira to a very young person, 
this person would not know what to do with the money, because he would not 
have enough knowledge about how to handle such a large sum of cash. So, we 
were put in that situation! 
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Locals did not have a chance to rationally consider what was in their best interests for 
their future. Thus, when the Turkish state came up with the proposal to develop the 
region via the GAP project, many signed and accepted without appreciating what 
might happen to them. They believed that the state would compensate them 
appropriately, so they would be able to lead a better life. However, the GAP policy-
makers did not offer any information regarding the impact of the project and did not 
properly acknowledge to the locals the ways in which their lives were going to differ 
from their experiences of village life. 
“We were told that the government would give us agricultural land, tractors 
and animals for a better life,” said a man from Yenicagla village in Batman city 
(group interview, June 2011). But unfortunately they learnt much later that the state 
had undervalued their properties and not compensated them appropriately. So, like 
many other people in the GAP region, they became victims of the project. 
In the same group interview in the newly resettled village of Yenicagla, which 
was one of ten which had been flooded and relocated when the Batman dam was 
built, I was told that the government should have given them agricultural land, 
tractors and animals. But instead, villagers complained that the government had 
thrown them into an isolated place, where they were surrounded by private landlords, 
so that they could not move around or keep their own animals. As one of the villagers 
said: “OK, we have been given a concrete house, but how about our children over 18 
who may soon like to have a family? In our village, we could have built a house for 
them, but now there is no such opportunity.” 
When the state forced the locals to leave the houses in their old villages, only 
married ones were given houses but young single ones were not given 
accommodation, so many of them had to leave the region in order to find work. 
Despite the fact that the state built the new village, it did not meet the basic needs of 
the people. An interviewee called Mustafa Seven stated at the group interview in 
Yenicagla that there was a contradiction in the GAP policy-makers’ stated aim:  
 
This project was supposed to be a sustainable project, yet despite the fact that 
the state built a new village, Yenicagla, it did not meet people’s basic needs. 
Most of this village does not have proper roads and we cannot get fresh water. 
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There were two issues, which came up during my fieldwork in the region with the 
people who had been affected by the project. The first was that the majority of the 
people did not like the new resettlement location. Almost all of my interviewees 
complained about being isolated, because the new resettlements were too far, not only 
from the water basin where they had lived all their lives, but also from their original 
territories. The second issue was that the houses the government provided (known as 
the Mass Housing Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı (TOKİ)), 
organized by the Turkish state) were valued more highly than their original houses, so 
people had to take out mortgages. These people, who had lost their lands and 
livelihood, now had to struggle to pay their mortgages; so from this point of view, the 
state rather than the local people benefitted from the project. Mesut, a resistant of 
Hasankeyf, pointed out: 
TOKI sells state houses and, if you want to buy one of these newly built 
blocks, you must borrow money from the state bank, ‘Halk Bankasi’. The flats 
that TOKI sell are 70,000 Turkish Lira but the state compensates us 40,000 
Lira for our houses. So, the state makes good business from us. 
Hence, the majority of the locals preferred to live in the city or rural areas through 
their own initiatives. Firat, from Hasankeyf town (personal interview, June, 2011), 
indicated that the word ‘modern’ for the state meant concrete buildings that were built 
by the state, and which were like being in a modern cage. While they had 
opportunities to produce their own needs in their villages, living in these modern 
buildings forced them to buy all their needs. Firat declared: “This is what the state 
means by modernization!” A participant from Ilisu vallge (June 2011) said:  
 
First, all villagers were in favour of the dam. We thought that the state would 
help us to create a new and good life style, provide new roads and end poverty 
as well as create work for us. But as you can see, all we have now is some 
concrete buildings that cannot give us anything and only take from us! 
 
The above statements indicate that many locals have not been satisfied with the 
project. According to an NGO staff member from the Keep Hasankeyf Alive Initiative 
Activists (Hasankeyfi yaşatma girişiminde activist), Serhat Öz (personal interview, 
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June, 2011), where the water was transferred, the GAP project worked for landlords 
not for ordinary people, who did not have land. The uneven land distribution situation 
has been one of the most serious issues which the state has been unable to resolve. 
The highly hierarchical clan structured system in the region, whereby the clan owns 
the majority of the land, has benefitted from GAP. Thus, in this respect Öz argued 
that he did not believe that GAP would reach its social development goal.   
Ömer Faruk Paköz, chairman of Keep Hasankeyf and Tigris Dicle River Life 
Association (Hasankeyf ve Dicle Nehri Yaşatma Derneği başkanı) (personal 
interview, June 2011), outlined how the Turkish government, instead of focusing on 
modernizing the agricultural sectors, concentrates on expanding hydroelectric sectors. 
In addition, he pointed out there were many companies in the region which have 
mainly come from the west of Turkey, and which were making money instead of the 
locals.  
Sebaha Tuncel, independent MP in Istanbul (personal interview, June, 2011), 
indicated that the project had destroyed many people’s hopes, people who been 
waiting for years for GAP to bring prosperity to their region. She commented, “of 
course some locals have benefitted, but if we think of GAP as a regional development 
project, it has been a disappointing development for many.”  
Issues relating to the sustainability of the ‘social development’ project became 
clearer when I interviewed the assistant to the mayor of Surici/Diyarbakir, Gülbahar 
Ölmek91 (personal interview, July, 2011). She stated that every day 20 to 30 people, 
mainly women, would come to the town hall asking for bread: 
 
The state promised to develop our region with the GAP project, but up to now 
it has only produced electricity on our land and transferred it to the west of 
Turkey for its industrialization. And now our people are in need of bread; the 
poverty which GAP was supposed to decrease, has increased. […] If the 
project had really been intended to develop the region, wouldn’t the benefits to 
the whole region be obvious by now? This is not a sustainable project but a 
false hope or dream that has been offered. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 I wanted to interview Gülbahar Ölmek because I was informed that she was highly knowledgeable 
about the GAP project, and her statement regarding the GAP proposal was significant not only because 
of her knowledge of agricultural engineering but also because of her proximity to the mayor.  
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From this point of view, the GAP project reminds us of the work of Post-
Developmentalist, Eduardo Galeano (1997), who has critically observed work on 
development in Third World countries by industrialized Western countries. He 
claimed that “[t]he Third World will become like the First World – rich, cultivated 
and happy if it behaves and does what it is told, without saying anything or 
complaining” (Eduardo Galeano 1997: 214). However, these countries and their 
people have listened and made a conscious effort to hear good news for years, but it 
has never arrived. Should we see the GAP ‘social development’ project in this 
framework? The idea that GAP would modernize the region and would bring higher 
living standards has failed to convince the locals. 
Nedim Tüzün (personal interview, July 2011), chairman of the electrical 
engineering committee in Diyarbakir (Diyarbakır şubesinin enerji komisyonu 
başkanlığını), approaches the project critically.  Despite the fact that GAP has been 
introduced as a multi-sector regional development project based on the concept of 
sustainable development for the south-east region, he did not see it as a viable 
proposition but rather as an unsustainable development project. He too pointed out 
that the south-east continued to be one of the least developed areas in Turkey, “While 
there has been significant development in hydroelectric production, in the irrigation 
sector, this has not taken place. Therefore, the concept of multi-sector integrated 
regional development project based on the idea of sustainability has not been 
successful.” 
When the first GAP Social Action Plan was not successful in creating a 
springboard for social and human development activities and integration at the local, 
national and international levels, in 2008 the Turkish policy makers launched another 
GAP Action Plan to remedy the economic and social shortcomings of the former 
plan.92 This time the targets were to compensate for the shortcomings and failure of 
the past project and were to be completed by 2012.  
When former prime minister Recep T. Erdoğan presented the GAP Action 
Plan in 2008, he claimed that “factors such as resource limitations, economic crises, 
terrorist activities striking the region and the unstable environment reigning in the 
Gulf Area as well as some technical defects kept this project behind the desired level 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  GAP Action Plan Investigation and Assessment Report (Gap Eylem Planı İnceleme ve 
Değerlendirme Raporu) 2008-2012, in TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı (2008), GAP 
Nedir, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 6 May 2015).  
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of success” (www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 22 March 2013).  
The 2008 plan was “designed and set forth in the context of the GAP Project, 
aiming mainly at irrigation, and covering basic infrastructure needs and accelerating 
economic development and social progress in the region” (Ibid). However, although 
Erdogan stated that the project would be completed in four to five years, he did not 
specify any concrete social-economic plan and budget sources. He said: 
 
 Our basic objective in the GAP Action Plan is to ensure economic growth, 
social development and employment creation in the south-east so as to 
enhance the level of welfare, peace and happiness of our citizens living in the 
region. In line with our determination to fully complete the project, the focus 
is on meeting basic infrastructure needs including irrigation in the first place 
and accelerating economic and social development in the region. With a 
productive economy and new social capital that it will unleash in the region, 
the GAP Action Plan will also contribute to nationwide targets of economic 
growth and development and social stability. 
 
However, Nedim Tüzün (personal interview, July 2011) stated in the context of the 
2008 Action Plan that the project did not go forwards but backwards. Development of 
the energy sector has increased, but irrigation and the overall GAP ‘social 
development’ programme, which had been promised to the region’s inhabitants for 
years by Turkish governments, has not reached its targets. Prime Minister Erdogan’s 
statement has not made much difference, as the previous leaders of Turkey also 
visited the region and promised that they would complete GAP’s social programmes.  
Therefore questions arise as to why the GAP ‘social development’ project has 
not yet been completed, and why it still exists on GAP official documents, despite its 
ineffectiveness. The evidence indicates that Turkey has no intention of giving it up. 
Arguably, this is because it is state policy and because Turkey gets almost 50% of its 
electricity from the project. The state has focused on technical issues, neglecting the 
‘social development’ programme, ignoring the potential benefits to local people and 
doing nothing to ensure its sustainability. The development of the energy sector has 
been pursued actively in the region, but this has been used, not on behalf of the 
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region, but for the west of Turkey’s energy needs for industrialization.93 The question 
arises, therefore, as to whether Turkey has not in reality changed its traditional view 
of GAP, but continues to regard it purely as a hydroelectric project.  
We know that Turkey is desperate for energy production. In order to 
understand why this is the case, we need to look at the historical background of 
Turkish energy production for its industrialization as a developing country. Since the 
end of the First World War, we can see how the Euphrates and Tigris river waters 
have been significant as the main sources for power generation. Crucially, while 
overall Turkish energy use went up by 30% in the period 1975 to 1982, it produced 
only 24% of its energy from its own sources (Kolars 1986). Obviously the situation 
was getting worse, since the population was increasing. Importing energy was costing 
the country billions of dollars. During the 1980s, Turkey imported 2.763 million tons 
of petroleum products and crude oil from Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. By 1983, Turkey’s energy imports from the same region had risen by 40% 
to 3.873 million tons (Kolars 1986).  
It is evident that Turkey anticipates a more significant role for electricity in its 
energy base. Annual consumption of electricity is approximately 29 billion Kwh and 
is predicted to increase more than six times to 200 billion Kwh over the next ten 
years. According to Kolars, in order to import this energy, Turkey has had to borrow 
huge loans. However, the Turkish “geographical situation has endowed it with rainfall 
and mountain catchment areas and good hydropower potential” (Ibid: 62). In these 
circumstances, it is vitally important that Turkey's hydroelectrical resources be 
developed as swiftly as possible in order for it to supply its own needs. So, hydro-
electric development became a crucial aspect of Turkish planning. Thus, based on 
estimates, domestic hydroelectric potential was assumed to be around 100 billion 
Kwh, of which 45% was planned to come from the Euphrates River. Turkey knew 
that if the water resources of the region were fully developed, there would be multiple 
benefits. Certainly, the first dam, the Keban on the Euphrates, followed by Karakay 
and later Atatürk dams, were built specifically to cater for increasing Turkish energy 
demands.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93  See gap eylem planı inceleme ve değerlendirme raporu - emo, 
www.emo.org.tr/.../d73f5b6b5d8b428_ek.pdf?tipi (Türk Mühendis Ve Mimar Odaları Birliği 
(TMMOB)) Diyarbakir Il Koordinasyon Kurulu [GAP Action Plan and Review Report: criticism and 
recommendations by Turkey Architecture, Engineering and Coordination Centre, Chamber, Diyarbakir 
Coordination Board] (accessed 8 June 2015).  
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In relation to the Turkish energy issue, Kaygusuz (1999) addressed the 
importance of the south-east region’s water potential, and he showed that all Turkish 
oil reserves were also in the GAP region. So, in terms of energy, the geography of the 
south-east is crucial. For instance, in 1995 the Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
produced 2.6 million tons of crude oil from the region. Nevertheless, hydroelectricity, 
is the most effective option because of the zero emissions involved. More 
importantly, it is a domestic energy source, which gives Turkey huge benefits. 
Debatably, its rich natural resources, particularly in terms of energy potential, made 
the south-east the most attractive region for Turkish policy-makers.  
Since the 1980s, the Turkish economy was transformed into a neo-liberal 
model, which led it towards robust positive socio-economic development. By the 
1990s, Turkey became increasingly involved in international trade, focused on global 
rather than domestic markets, invested in long term market relations strategies, and 
geared towards technological developments and strategic planning for production and 
investment. “As a result, in the last decade, we have seen the increasing importance of 
the discourse of the ‘free market’, the multiplication and the dissemination of 
economic actors, and the pluralization of economic organizations in Turkish society” 
(Keyman 2005: 110-11). 
There is no doubt that Turkey, which has enjoyed rapid economic growth 
since the 1980s, appears to be or preparing to be one of the main actors in Middle 
Eastern geo-politics. For instance, Turkey is now not only the world’s 16th largest 
economy, but expected to be among the world’s ten leading economic states by 2023. 
In order to increase its economy further, energy is the most important factor for 
Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey wants to take its place in the European Union (EU) and 
“applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in April 1987 
as the ultimate step in Turkey's search for ‘recognition’ as part of the ‘European 
family’” (Aral 2001). In December 2002, in Copenhagen, the European leaders set out 
plans for negotiations with Turkey over its accession. The Copenhagen Council 
established that if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, there would be 
no delay in negotiations for accession into the EU (Lejour and de Mooij 2005).  
Turkey knows that the EU is mainly about economic and market expansion, 
and countries such as Turkey have a potentially key role to play in European Union 
expansion. For instance, Istanbul is a key centre for the Middle East, North Africa, the 
Balkans and, most importantly, the Black Sea region (Ergener, 2002: 120-1). Turkey 
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is located in an important strategic region, which would enable greater access to the 
economies of Asia. Moreover, as Gunter (2007) points out, Turkey’s geostrategic 
access to the gas and oil supplies of the Middle East and Central Asia would make it 
invaluable for the EU’s future energy needs as well as providing alternative energy 
routes to Europe. Thus, since the signing in 1963 of the Association Agreement with 
the European Economic Community (EEC), there has been a growing interest among 
European decision makers in greater economic integration with Turkey (Gunay and 
Karatekelioglu 2005). So, once Turkey is in the EU, with the large and growing 
Turkish population, expected to be the largest in the EU by 2020, it would obtain a 
vital role in EU decision-making, and, with its current and rapidly growing economy, 
would become one of the most powerful states in the region.  
However, to be in such a position Turkey knows that it is desperate for energy 
generation to meet its growing needs. Therefore, utilizing the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers for power production represented treasure which could not be neglected by 
Turkish policy-makers. As the president of GAP, Sadrettin Karahocagil, stated, 
despite the fact that the Turkish state could not guarantee that all social programmes 
would be offered, he stressed that the state would complete all dams for future power 
production.  
For instance, dams such as the Karakaya Dam and Atatürk Dam, and soon the 
Illisu Dam, will be major energy providers for GAP. The Karakaya Dam, completed 
by 1988, is the second most important dam on the Euphrates River. The total install 
capacity of the dam is 1,800 MW and its power generation is 7,354 GWh annually 
(www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 22 May 2014). The Karakaya Dam was given the go-
ahead before the establishment of the GAP project, and was built for energy 
production only. The Karakaya Dam could not benefit the region’s development in 
terms of irrigation, but it provides energy production for the whole country via an 
interconnected system.  
The Atatürk Dam is considered to be the fifth largest dam in the world after 
Syncrude Tailings Dam Mildred MLSB and Syncrude Tailings Dam Mildred SWSS 
in Canada, Tarbela Dam in Pakistan and Port Peck Dam in the United States. This 
ambitious project is one of the largest in GAP, as Kliot (1994: 126) puts it, the ‘Jewel 
in the Crown’, its main purpose being irrigation and electricity production in the GAP 
region. The dam’s power production capacity is 2,450 MW and is the largest of a 
series of 19 power plants belonging to GAP. It produces 8,900 GWh power annually.  
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The Ilisu Dam, Turkey’s latest $1.5 billion (US) project, one of the largest 
after the Atatürk Dam, is located on the Tigris River. The Ilisu Dam is only 
considered to be a hydro-power project, has the capacity of a 1,200MW power 
station, and is expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually 
(Bosshard 1998). The dam is expected to produce 3.2% of total (42,359 MW) Turkish 
energy. Writers such as Aydin (2000: 9) state that the Ilisu Dam as an energy project 
is “vitally important to Turkey in its struggle to become a modern economy in a 
responsibly short period of time.” So the Turkish state’s determination to complete 
the Ilisu Dam and all the other dams is mainly because of its energy requirements.  
The table below shows 19 hydroelectric power plants which are part of the 
GAP project and their current status. Once the project is fully completed, these plants 
will supply the majority of Turkey’s energy on the basis of anticipated nationwide 
power consumption, and it is believed to be one of the biggest hydroelectric power 
projects in the world. 
 
 Hydroelectric Power Plants (HEPPs)  
Name  Inst Capacity 
(MW) 
Energy Prod. 
(GWh/yr) 
Status  
Karakay Dam & 
HEPP 
1,800 7,354 In operation since 
1987  
Atatürk  Dam & 
HEPP 
2,400 8,776 In operation since 
1993 
Birecik Dam & 
HEPP 
672 2,516 In operation since 
2000 
Karkamis Dam & 
HEPP 
180 652 In operation since 
1999 
Kocali Dam & 
HEPP 
40 120 Master Plan 
Sirimtas Dam & 
HEPP 
28 87 Master Plan 
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Buyukcay Dam & 
HEPP 
30 84 Master Plan 
Kahta Dam & 
HEPP 
75 171 Master Plan 
Sanliurfa & HEPP 50 124 In operation 2005 
Erkenek & HEPP 7 43 In operation 2010 
Fatobasa &HEPP 22 47 Master Plan 
Euphrates Basin 5,304 19,974  
Kralkizi Dam & 
HEPP 
94 146 In operation since 
1998 
Dicle Dam & 
HEPP 
110 296 In operation since 
1999 
Batman Dam & 
HEPP 
198 483 In operation since 
2003 
Ilisu Dam & HEPP 1,200 3,833 Under construction 
Silvan Dam & 
HEPP 
150 623 Master Plan 
Kayser Dam & 
HEPP 
90 341 Master Plan 
Garzan Dam & 
HEPP 
90 315 Prelim Study  
Cizre Dam & 
HEPP 
240 1,208 Programmed  
Tigris Basin 2,172 7,245  
Total 7,526 27,343  
DSI General Directory 2011/gap.gov.tr (Accessed 5 May 2011).  
 
As the table indicates, there are eleven HEPPs on the Euphrates River. Six of these 
are now in operation and five still remain in the Master Plan. The HEPPs completed 
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on the Euphrates generate 19,465 GWh energy annually with install capacity of 5,109 
MW, whereas of the eight HEPPs planned for the Tigris River, only three are in 
operation. These three are generating 925 GWh annually and the install capacity is 
402 MW.  
So it is apparent that energy for Turkish national development has been the 
priority of Turkish policy-makers rather than the socio-economic development of the 
south-east. As Altinbilek and Tortajada (2012: 195) indicate,  
 
Investments for energy development in the region have more than paid off, 
since the total value of the energy generated from investments in the GAP 
region is higher than the total investments into the energy sector in the GAP 
project.  
 
To be more specific, according to GAP’s official website, the project was intended to 
irrigate 1.8 million hectares of land, but it has so far only achieved 18.7% irrigation, 
while its hydroelectric power programme (comprising 19 hydroelectric power plants 
and anticipated to generate over 27 billion GWh of electricity annually) has already 
achieved over 74% of the country’s energy production.94  
 According to Altan Tan, local MP (personal interview, June, 2011), “Turkey is 
not honest about the GAP social development project. All it does is deceive the 
people of the region in order to gain its energy needs from the dams.” He argued that 
GAP has been hugely beneficial to the Turkish state in terms of hydro-electrics, but 
not to the region itself. For Dr Gaye Yilmaz from the University of Bogazici (personal 
interview, June, 2011): 
  
Turkey is not like fifty years ago. İt is developing. Turkey’s national income 
per capita is increasing. While overall poverty in Turkey has fallen, poverty in 
the east and southeast of Turkey has increased. This is evidence shown 
recently, when the last government distributed some urgent social aid in 
Diyarbakir and Tunceli. If the state has not filled the social development gap 
between the west and east of Turkey by now, it is unbelievable that it will ever 
do so. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 www.DSI General Directory 2011/gap.gov.tr (accessed 5 May 2011). 
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An officially elected head of village, Mahsun Kepti, from Suceken village in Batman 
province, said: 
 
I personally do not trust that the state will develop the region via GAP. There 
seem to be many words but no actual work. To me this project is a political 
project rather than a social development project. If the state was genuine about 
the modernization of the region, it could build three dams which work for the 
region - not lots of dams, which are for Turkish interest (personal interview, 
June 2011). 
 
This research reveals that people of the region do not believe in GAP’s socio-
economic development, and the idea that GAP will modernize the region and bring 
higher living standards was not convincing to people. Rather the project has been 
seen, as Professor Ahmet Özer (personal interview, June 2011) stated, as 
advantageous for Turkish national interests rather than for the south-east region. This 
study shows that, despite the fact that the GAP ‘social development’ project has not 
yet reached it aim of creating sustainable development in the region, and there is a 
very little hope that it will do so in the context of ongoing regional political 
instability, the state continues to claim that the project will bring prosperity to the 
south-east. However, all we can see is that the state is still prepared to pump money 
into GAP without concrete positive progress in terms of diminishing the region’s 
poverty.  
Ali Carkoglu (personal interview, June 2011), an academic from Sabanci 
University who has visited the region and carried out work on GAP, stated that all the 
state cared about was throwing money at the region and hoping to stop people (Kurds, 
for instance) from asking for their cultural recognition. He concluded: 
 
We went to Mardin maybe 15 years ago now, and in Mardin we met with 
some administrators working on provisional health matters and asked them 
what their priorities were. They said their first priority was actually to prevent 
a huge population increase. I said, ‘why is that a problem?’ They said there 
were too many babies around. They basically did not have many health 
concerns, but rather they saw it as a problem for the region that it had such a 
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high population. Then, of course, when we started to talk to people on the 
street, nobody mentioned population growth as one of the problems. This kind 
of mentality shows how GAP ‘social development’ is actually operating in the 
policy makers’ interest. 
 
So based on my review of the most relevant literature and also on my empirical data, 
it is evident that the project has achieved some of its goals, in particular for Turkish 
energy needs, but the evidence indicates that it has not reached its main target of 
overcoming the region’s long-historical socio-economic underdevelopment; the 
region still continues to be the poorest part of Turkey.  
One of the participants in the group that I intervewed in Hasankeyf (personal 
interview, name not given, June 2011) said:  
 
The state has never cared about our region’s socio-economy. We have always 
been second-class in our own land, as far as the Turkish state is concerned.  
So, the state does not care what we want and what we think about the project. 
The state could have easily opened up the city of Hasankeyf for tourism and 
that would have been more beneficial rather than destroying its historical 
heritage and our livelihoods.  
 
This section indicates that the living standards of most inhabitants in the GAP region 
have not increased. The region, according to the GAP policy-makers, was supposed to 
become open to the outside world and thus attract additional investment. However, 
the majority of my interviewees held similar views to Müsvet Çakar (personal 
interview, June 2011), who argued that the project has nothing to do with social 
development but with degeneration and assimilation: “GAP has not saved its position 
from being the Turkish state’s hidden political tool in the region as a means of 
assimilation and it did not become a regional project but a centralized one or ‘top-
down’ project.” 
Thus, the following section will be analyzing to what extent GAP comprised a 
new form of Turkish politics, which was implemented from above, as decisions 
regarding the project were decided centrally in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, 
rather than in the south-east. 
 
	   129	  
5.3. GAP: ‘Top-down’ project, strengthening state authority, and hidden politics 
 
My research indicates that when the Turkish policy-makers prepared the GAP Master 
Plan, they never considered human factors and human contributions. Bureaucrats 
drew up the project in Ankara and did not discuss the concept with the people in the 
region. For instance, when I tried to interview the director of the State Water Works 
(Devlet Su Isleri (DSI)) in Diyarbakir (June 2011) regarding Turkish water policy, he 
said: “We received a statement from Ankara instructing that no one should give any 
statement.” This demonstrates the secretive nature of Turkish policy in the region.  
 Serhat Öz from the Keep Hasankeyf Alive Initiative Activists (Hasankeyfi 
yaşatma girişiminde activist) (personal interview, June 2011) stressed that the 
regional development plan should have been discussed with the locals. He indicated 
that all the politics and policies of the state have to be crystal clear regarding the GAP 
project: “The state says I know best and I make the decision.”  Öz believes that such 
an idea of modernization/development cannot work and will not be in the interests of 
the locals, but only for the state. He stated that because GAP has been a state 
development project and was not discussed with the locals, the majority of the locals 
have very limited knowledge about the overall ‘social development’ project.  
For example, a Turkish government research survey was undertaken in the 
GAP region in 2004, 95  and research was carried out in 54 villages by the 
Agriculturists Association of Turkey and the GAP Regional Development 
Administration. The research showed that 50.5% of householders reported that they 
had heard about GAP on television or from other sources. Only 5.7% of the people in 
the region were aware that GAP was a project for the socio-economic development of 
the south-east. The majority of people, according to the survey, believed that GAP 
existed only for irrigation purposes - the Atatürk Dam and the Harran Plain. So they 
did not have sufficient knowledge of what GAP means and, based on my research, 
this remains the case. 
When I interviewed an officially elected head of the village called Nail 
Ayberk, from Halfeti in Sanliurfa province (July 2011), one of the most affected 
towns in the region as thousands of residents had become landless and homeless, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 GAP, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma Baskanligi, Bölgesel Kalkinmanin Can Suyu: GAP, 
Karsilastirmali  Sosyal  ve Ekonomik Yapi Arastirmasi, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bölge Kalkinma 
Idaresi Baskanligi ve sosyoloji Dernegi, 2010, Ankara.  
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told me that the majority of them did not have enough information about GAP. He 
said: “we knew that the state employees were holding meetings with the governor of 
Halfeti and councillors in the town, but we did not knew much of what was going 
on.” 
The group interview as well as individual interviews in Halfeti revealed that 
the state had not only made all the decisions about the GAP project from above, but 
also that little attention had been paid to local opinions. In this regard, it is important 
to note that the GAP project has been created through ‘top-down’ decision making. 96  
However, most Turkish people have not had any real problem accepting such 
a process, since the decisions were made by the state, and the state has been seen as 
sacred. The state/military complex in Turkish society and culture has been perceived 
as a untouchable and sacred actor. It may be the only nation in the world which refers 
to the state as the ‘Father state’ (Devlet baba) alongside the concept of ‘Motherland’ 
(Anavatan). So, as I stressed earlier in this research, since the creation of the state, 
Turkish modernization has been led by the traditional state structure.  
However, the south-east region cannot be assessed by the same formulation, 
because the authority of the state is not widely recognized there. The region is mainly 
populated by Kurds, whose social base is largely tribal, that is, the political power lies 
in the hands of local leaders, who control small or large groups or villages. For 
instance, agriculture, water resources and livestock were secured and maintained by 
the local leaders (McDowall 1992). Thus, the study shows that Turkey has continued 
its traditional state structure in the south-east region without reference to the social 
structure and, most importantly, it has not attempted to open paths to enable the locals 
to think freely about their own region’s socio-economic development, but instead 
made the decisions for them, imposing its own social formula on the south-east.  
Altan Tan, local MP (personal inteview June 2011), outlined how GAP led to 
the forced migration of the Kurdish population to other big cities, a phenomenon 
which was considered to be one of the strategies to deal with the Kurdish question in 
the region:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  ‘Top-down’ decision making is not new in Turkey. It goes back to the very early days of the 
republic, if we do not consider the Ottoman Empire as a state structure.  The ‘top-down’ decision 
making process undertaken by the Turkish state and bureaucrats was informed by their belief that the 
ordinary people of Turkey did not have the political maturity to modernize the country, therefore it 
need be ruled from ‘above’. Obviously, behind the ‘top-down’ process were hidden politics of a state 
that wanted to make Turkey a ‘civilized’ and ‘advanced’ modern society and strengthen Atatürk’s 
ideology (see Chapter Two regarding Turkish policy).  
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As a result of the GAP project and Turkish policy in the Kurdish region, 
thousands of displaced Kurds became refugees, of whom more than two 
million moved to the west of Turkey. Migration of many Kurds in the west of 
Turkey reduced substantially Turkish state elite fear that the Kurds might ask 
for their independence.  
 
Professor Ahmet Ozer (personal interview, June 2011) stated that, through GAP, the 
state aimed to assimilate the Kurdish population and disperse them in the name of 
integration: 
 
The Turkish state policy-makers have always had a thought in their minds as 
to how to change the demography of the south-east. So, through GAP, the 
state policy-makers wanted to achieve that result by evacuating many villages, 
sending the local people to the west of Turkey, by which it hoped to assimilate 
the Kurds. 
 
The mayor’s assistant from Surici/Diyarbakir, Gülbahar Ölmek (personal interview), 
also asserted that the disappearance of Kurdish villages and towns as a result of the 
dams suited the Turkish policy makers. It suits policy-makers because it is easier to 
apply their policy and makes it easier to integrate if not assimilate the Kurds in big 
cities. As we already know from history, Turkey has attempted to restructure the 
region’s demography for its national security. For instance, “[f]rom 1984 as a result of 
the armed conflict between the Turkish State and Kurdish guerrillas an estimated over 
4,000 villages were destroyed and approximately three million people were forced to 
flee their homes” (Ronayne 2005: 9-10). In this respect, the GAP project can be 
perceived as the Turkish state intentionally undertaking a hidden political move by 
making Kurdish villages disappear and forcing the Kurds to live in big cities, so that 
assimilation can be effected through “their forced inclusion into mainstream Turkish 
society and culture” (Ibid: 36).  
Professor Ahmet Özer (personal interview, June 2011) believes that one of the 
hidden purposes of GAP is also to destroy Kurdish civilization in the region: “GAP 
also could be considered as a disposal of Kurdish civilization in the south-east.” For 
instance, the construction of the dams has already buried many archaeological sites 
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such as Zeugma, or Belkis (its modern name), and Nevali Çori, and it is clear that the 
project will vanquish the ancient city of Hasankeyf soon, which will destroy 
significant cultural heritage. Despite the Turkish Article 63 stating that Turkey should 
be responsible for protecting the value of culture and natural history, and despite the 
Turkish state registering Hasankeyf in 1981 “as a first degree protected archaeological 
site, listing twenty-two monuments or sites of importance” (Morvaridi 2004: 714), at 
present, the Turkish government ignores the Article and its promises when it comes to 
dam construction, such as in the case of the Ilisu Dam. Clearly the flooding of 
historical sites such as Hasankeyf is disastrous not only because of the continuing 
destruction of the rich endemic species of plants, animals, fish and birds, the profound 
damage to the environment, ecosystem and human resources, it is also disastrous for 
local history and the world’s cultural heritage (Warner 2011). 
What I grasped through the view of an NGO staff member, Ömer Faruk 
Paköz, chairman of Keep Hasankeyf and Tigris Dicle River Life Association 
(Hasankeyf ve Dicle Nehri Yaşatma Derneği başkanı) (personal interview, June 
2011), is that Turkey has never been concerned about the historical sites in the region. 
It is important to note that not all the relevant historical sites are of Turkish origin, 
most of them were part of ancient Greece or ancient Mesopotamia (which the Kurds 
believe is their historical heritage): “building huge dams in the region has never been 
the concern of Turkish policy-makers in terms of destroying cultural heritage,” Paköz 
said (see more on the negative aspects of GAP in Chapter Six). 
Professor Ahmet Ozer thinks that GAP also leads to the empowering of the 
authority of the state over the resources of Kurdistan: “Turkey wants to control all the 
Kurdish water reserves.”  When I had a chance to interview a group from a village 
and a family from the town of Hasankeyf (July 2011) on the bank of the Tigris River, 
one of the interviewees said, “this must be politics - not development. Turkey wants 
to use the dams on the Tigris River, for instance Ilisu and Cizre dams, for future 
security.” The Ilisu and Cizre dams are very close together, which reflects the state’s 
desire to create what would amount to a water border with the aid of the dams on the 
Tigris. Thus, the dams will not only be used for hydroelectricity and as a strategic tool 
for blocking the crossroads for the locals and Kurdish guerillas, but also for storing 
water for future demands, which would be a major problem for the Middle East. 
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Turkey is now also in the process of completing 11 dams in the provinces of 
Hakkari and Sirnak close to the Iraqi-Turkish border.97 According to the State 
Hydraulic Works’ 2007 report on water, the construction of these dams close to the 
junction of the Turkish border with Iran and Iraq were for the purpose of border 
security (www. DSI.gov.tr Accessed 8 March 2011).  
Despite the fact that the Turkish government claimed that these 11 dams 
would also be for hydroelectricity and the transfer of water for the cities and towns, 
they are not designed for the development of the region’s socio-economy but mainly 
for security purposes. The purpose, my research reveals, is to block PKK militants 
and to thereby deny them connection with local people (Yeni Ozgur Politika 25 May 
2011). When these dams are fully completed, they will fill many caves and valleys 
which have been used by PKK guerillas, and will deter militants from the Haftanin 
Camp, which is one of the strongholds of the PKK in the region (Milliyet newspaper; 
Hurriyet newspaper 25 May 2011).  
When these dams are fully completed, they will also have a negative impact 
on the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. There will be a new border made from lakes, which 
will cut off peoples’ contact routes and will destroy many people’s livelihoods in the 
region.  As Fırat Argun (personal interview, June 2011), pointed out, the National 
Security Council made a statement claiming that building the dams was favourable to 
the Turkish state. So GAP in Turkish politics and policy has not been based only on a 
single concept but has multiple dimensions encompassing authority, security and 
energy production. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that GAP has created some positive progress 
for locals, for instance, in the form of social community centres. I will discuss these in 
more detail when I assess the positive impacts of GAP in the following chapter. 
However, the problem arises when such a social activity is used for a particular 
interest, in this case that of Turkish state policies in the region. For instance, although 
the idea of Multi-Purpose Community Centres (Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri 
(CATOM)) sounds holistic and humane, its programmes are offered only in Turkish, 
not in local languages, though most women cannot speak any Turkish. So, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 These are: Şırnak-silopi Dam Project, Şırnak Dam Project, Şırnak-Uludere Dam Project, Şırnak-Ballı 
Dam Project, Şırnak-Kavşaktepe Dam Project, Şırnak-Musatepe Dam Project, Şırnak-Çetintepe Dam 
Project, Şırnak-Çocuktepe Dam Project, Hakkari-Gölgeliyamaç Dam Project, Hakkari-Beyyurdu Dam 
Project, Hakkari-Aslandağı Dam Project.  
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perspective of the local people is that the CATOMs draw disadvantaged Kurdish 
women and young girls into development programmes as another way to assimilate 
the women, who have migrated from villages and have had no choice other than to 
accept such services. CATOM, as part of social development policy in the region, is 
regarded as a front for a hidden policy of assimilation.  
In this respect, CATOM offers wider scope to Turkish policy-makers. On the 
one hand, the centres assist in their plan to integrate those poor people who have been 
affected by the dams project into the Turkish system by providing health care and 
educating and assisting women and young girls with social programmes which 
include training courses such as literacy (in Turkish), mother/child health, birth 
control, general health and so on. On the other hand, CATOMs not only offer such 
social programmes, they also offer social activities for people who were forced to 
leave their villages when the clash between the PKK and Turkish army took place. 
So, from this contextual framework it can be seen that the GAP project has a broader 
objective within the region.  
The concept of the CATOMs was initiated in Ankara, and therefore the people 
of the region did not trust any claims to regional social development made on their 
behalf.  I have talked to many people on the streets of Diyarbakir and other Kurdish 
cities in the GAP region and asked them what they made of CATOM. The answer 
was always the same: “If the state provides something, it must be for the interest of 
Turkey, not for the locals.” So, it seems that there is a large gap between the locals 
and the state in terms of trust.  
The majority of my interviewees perceive the main aim of the CATOMs 
project to be to ensure that young people are busy and engaged with social activities. 
My research and observations illustrate that since the 1980s many young Kurds have 
joined the Kurdish National Liberation Movement or the PKK. In order to crush this 
new movement, Turkey began to implement a number of strategies. One of these was 
and is to provide social activities for young people to stop them from joining the 
Kurdish movement.  
I witnessed the fact that the state provides a wide range of social activities, 
including courses in musical instruments, theatre, dancing and photography. During 
my visit to a GAP ‘Youth House Centre’ in Mardin in June 2011, I met some young 
people who told me that they came here because the government provided for all their 
needs.  However, one participant said,  
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Many naïve young girls, who migrated from villages, attend these centres but 
are not aware of Turkish policymakers’ aims. The underlying purpose is to 
draw these young people into different activities, so they can be controlled by 
the state via these activities. 
 
When I asked one of my participants, Erdal Balsak98 (personal interview, June 2011), 
what he thought about the CATOMs as a member of Derik’s municipal staff, he 
replied,  
 
CATOMs opened in the region during the 1990s to initiate birth control and 
other health services. We might think this is good, but CATOMs were part of 
Turkish policy in the region; their main aim was to teach Turkish to those who 
came from Kurdish villages as the result of resettlement in order to instil them 
with a Turkish identity. 
  
It is important to register at this point that Turkey has been blocked several times by 
the EU criteria for accession to the European Community. Turkey has been 
unsuccessful in negotiating with the European Union over its accession primarily due 
to its failure to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for membership (Müftüler-Bac 
1999: 240-5). A key reason why EU countries were opposed to Turkish accession was 
the failure to recognize the individual and collective rights of minority groups. In 
1993, the Copenhagen summit required a candidate country to have “achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities” (Lejour and de Mooij 2005).  Specifically, 
the European Council outlined the following criteria for EU membership: (i) stable 
institutions governing democracy; (ii) the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy and the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure; and (iii) the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the principles of political, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 I interviewed Erdal Balsak in Istanbul. He was a member of staff at the Derik Town Hall (in the 
south-east) and was attending a conference called Mesopotamia Social Form (Mezopotamya Sosyal 
Formu) on behalf of Derik municipality, as a speaker.  
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economic and monetary union. (Müftüler-Bac 1999: 241). Thus, Erkin99 (personal 
interview June 2011) said, 
 
The CATOMs were obliged to promote social services, as part of Turkey’s 
obligation to fulfil EU criteria to develop the region. Turkey has made sure of 
that, by offering such developmental organizations. However, none of the state 
projects fitted the EU criteria, in particular in terms of human rights. 
 
Nevertheless, during my visit to CATOM in Mardin, I was curious about its teaching 
methods. “We first teach them Turkish and then begin with courses,” remarked a 
CATOM staff member, Leyla Gün (personal interview, June 2011). In addition, one 
of my interviewees (June 2011) told me that they asked the governor of Diyarbakir 
for funding to produce a play. But because the play was based on a theme connected 
with people who had recently had to migrate to a city, the governor said: “Why don’t 
you do something for children which they can enjoy?” That interviewee commented: 
“the state will only fund a play, written in Turkish, that focuses on drawing Kurdish 
children into mainstream society, but not exploring any moral or contemporary 
issues.”  
Thus, my research shows that the state policy-makers had not devised or 
planned a proper social foundation for the locals, and the possibility of GAP fulfilling 
its stated aim of closing the economic gap between the west and south-east of Turkey 
via its ‘social development’ project is very much in doubt.  Erkin (personal interview 
June 2011) argued that there is no sign that GAP would be of any benefit to the south-
east,  
The Turkish state’s approach towards the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is 
strategic; Turkey wants to build dams for it electric demands and wants to 
control water for geo-security. Therefore, I do not believe that GAP has been 
created for the region’s people but for security matters. 
 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
 
The chapter reveals that the GAP project, via its ‘social development’ plan, was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Erkin is a board member of the Association for Social Change (Sosyal Değişim Derneğinde yönetim 
kurulu üyesi). He is also a member of the water rights campaign in the south-east. 
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supposed to create socio-economic integration and aimed to remove the socio-
economic development ‘gap’ between the south-east area and more developed regions 
in Turkey as well as offer sustainable development for the region, including the 
creation of employment opportunities and improvement of living standards for local 
people. However, this chapter indicates that these plans and strategies have not been 
sufficiently effective. GAP’s concept of offering sustainable development is far 
behind target and may never be realized. 
This chapter has attempted to provide evidence as to how GAP fits into the 
wider policy objectives of the Turkish government. More specifically, by examining 
the ‘social development’ element of the project, the chapter analyzed how GAP 
became politicized, and how it has become a key feature of Turkish policy in relation 
to multiple aspects of securitization.  It is evident that GAP policy-makers have 
ignored the region’s socio-economic development but instead focused on two issues: 
one being the social centres such as CATOM and GAP Youth House Centre, in order 
to teach locals Turkish language and culture; and two, hydroelectric power plants and 
using the dams as forms of internal security. 
The critical question, however, is whether the GAP project was really 
designed for the social development of the region or for matters of security vis-a-vis 
the Kurdish problem and energy production. In terms of development, the region still 
continues to be the poorest in Turkey. Despite the fact that Turkey still claims that 
GAP will bring prosperity to the region, the project has, in fact, been totally ignored 
by the Turkish authorities in terms of socio-economic development, apart from power 
production for Turkish industrial needs. The socio-economic objectives for the region 
have become a fiction. 
The following chapter will address the positive and negative impact of the 
GAP project. The chapter will also compare GAP with the Aswan project in Egypt 
and analyze the positive and destructive effects of both on people’s lives, examining 
issues related to displacement, historical sites and the environment as well as 
exploring the core concept of policy-makers’ mind-sets on both projects regarding 
social development. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The impact of GAP on the south-east region 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Through detailed investigation of the GAP ‘social development’ project in the south-
east, this research has demonstrated that the project has not fulfilled its promised 
socio-economic development target. In particular, Chapter Five has shown this by 
analyzing government and independent data together with my empirical work in the 
region. It has not succeeded in removing the socio-economic development ‘gap’ 
between the south-east region and more developed regions in Turkey, nor has it 
offered a sustainable development programme for the region in relation to 
employment of opportunities or improvement of living standards there. However, 
GAP has made some considerable progress, which will be discussed here.  
In the light of the above information, this chapter is divided into two sections. 
Firstly, it focuses on the positive impact of the GAP ‘social development’ project and 
points to some progress achieved by GAP in the region. Projects such as Multi-
Purpose Community Centres (Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM)), GAP 
Youth House Centres and Children’s Development Centres are among the practical 
results of the project. Improvement in land productivity through irrigation and 
improvement in industrial sectors are also positive outcomes of GAP. The most 
important positive impact on the area is, without doubt, energy production.  
The chapter then focuses on the negative impact of the GAP project. 
Specifically, the chapter outlines the ways in which the dams have had a huge 
negative impact on the environment, archaeological sites, historical towns, 
settlements and cultures, and have created ecological problems in the region.  
Moreover, the issue of displacement is one of the major problems associated with the 
project.  
In order to ascertain whether other such projects have failed to keep their 
promises in terms of social development, and have had a negative impact on human 
life, the environment, cultural heritage and archeological sites, I have examined the 
Aswan High Dam on the Nile River in Egypt as a comparative study, and the second 
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part of the chapter discusses this. While the chapter discusses the historical 
background of the dam, its main aim is to examine the Aswan project in relation to 
GAP, evaluating GAP and Aswan in an attempt to provide a comparative analysis of 
the outcomes and impacts of the two projects.  
 
6.2. The positive impact of the GAP project: a path to socio-economic progress  
 
The Multi-Purpose Community Centres (Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri 
(ÇATOM))100  constitute a practical result of GAP’s ‘social development’ effort 
within the framework of the development strategy. These centres have mainly focused 
on providing services specifically geared towards women and children; in particular, 
they have been designed to improve the status of girls over the age of 14 and local 
women, as measured by specific socio-economic development indicators 
(www.gap.gov  26 May 2011). The services that the project has offered have included 
“literacy courses, health education, nutritional and housekeeping courses, maternal 
education, knitting and weaving courses, as well as poly-clinical services” (Carkoglu 
and Eder 2005: 178-9). Moreover, ÇATOMs have provided social programmes for 
women who were affected most by poverty, the dams, and the war between the PKK 
and Turkish security forces.  
Views on the function of ÇATOM differ from one interviewee to another. 
While many of my interviewees, including NGO employees in the region and local 
residents, claimed that the only advantage of the ÇATOMs has been for the people 
who work for them rather than for the locals, Leyla Gün (personal interview, July 
2011), the representative of ÇATOM in Mardin, argued that ÇATOMs have played a 
major role in locals’ lives and have contributed to the participants’ well-being in 
economic terms. As she outlines: 
 
We have workshops for women on such activities as tailoring, kilim-weaving 
and handcrafts. Most women sell their handicrafts and make some money for 
their domestic expenses. For instance, last year we had 21 women attending 
the course, and they made 25,000 Turkish lira in two and a half months. We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx; 
GAP ÇATOM, www.gapcatom.org (accessed 2 June 2013). 
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may think this money is not much, but we know most of their husbands have 
no jobs, so this money is important for their weekly domestic expenses.   
 
From Leyla Gün’s point of view, even if the ÇATOMs have not provided services to 
everyone, the organization has enabled many disadvantaged women to participate in 
public life, women who had migrated from villages to the suburbs of cities, who had 
never had a chance to access the services provided by the state and who had been 
previously socially and economically neglected.  
According to my interviewees, particularly local NGO employees, ÇATOMs 
were set up in pursuit of the Turkish policy-makers’ policies; that is, through such 
services, they attempt to assimilate the locals by integrating them into the Turkish 
system and educating them in Turkish, not in their own languages. For example, the 
disadvantaged Kurdish women and girls who had migrated from small villages did 
not have any choice but to accept the services of the ÇATOMs. However, the 
ÇATOMs to some extent represent an opportunity for self-improvement for the 
region’s disadvantaged women and girls, who may otherwise never have had the 
chance to read or write.  
If we look at the 2014 ÇATOM annual report, we can see some significant 
social improvements that GAP has provided via ÇATOM. For instance, the report 
indicates that on average more than 15,000 local people, in particular girls and 
women, participate in ÇATOM programmes per year. According to the report, over 
60, 000 people are benefiting from ÇATOM activities and social services. Through 
ÇATOMs’ services and activities, from 1995 to 2014, the government has managed to 
be in contact with 272,556 people in the region.  
During 2014, for example, 76 social programmes were held by ÇATOM and 
30,398 people succeeded in completing them. During this period, products made and 
sold by the local women made 524,096 Turkish lira profit. 440 people who 
participated in ÇATOM courses subsequently found jobs, and 69 participants 
established their own businesses. They set up businesses or took jobs in fields such as 
hairdressing, textiles, nannying, secretarial work and other similar areas of 
employment. 
In 2014, ÇATOMs offered education or social activities to 2,518 people in the 
region. These social activities include trips, picnics, and visits to concerts and the 
theatre. Moreover, celebrations of Mother’s Day, Teacher’s Day and similar national 
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celebrations have been offered via ÇATOM’s services to the local people. ÇATOMs 
have also offered education in areas such as health, women’s rights, product design, 
legal education and family counselling. These services have aimed to create goodwill 
based on forming good relations with all participants. Furthermore, ÇATOMs in 
Midyat and Dargeçit have exerted their influence to obtain funds from international 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN) for local women who live in rural areas 
to get basic education in such areas as health, hygiene and schooling.   
Moreover, GAP Youth House Centres (GAP Gençlik Evleri’)101 have also 
played a role in providing services to many young people. According to GAP Youth 
House, in 2011 services including provision of support for young people pre-
university, and lessons on information technology, writing, reading, English, German, 
music, theatre and folk dance, all took place in the GAP region, with 9,337 young 
people benefitting from the project.102 Moreover, during my visit to one of these 
centres, in Mardin city, I also witnessed GAP providing similar social activities, from 
teaching musical instruments to theatre, dancing and photography courses. These 
activities were welcomed by many young people in the city, according to my 
interviewees. 
“This centre gives us opportunities to learn instruments, understand theatre, 
learn different kinds of dancing and photography,” an employee called Kurt from 
GAP Youth House in Mardin stated (personal interview, June 2011). Also a group of 
young people, during my informal interview in the centre, explained that they came to 
the centre because the GAP Youth House would provide all they needed in terms of 
social activities. 
In order to develop this service, the state has organised actions in various 
fields and helped these young people to be active members of their communities. 
GAP staff have a close relationship with organizations such as the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the European Union had provided a 47 million euros fund for the 
development of social activities in the region (Adalet H. Akbas (coordinator of the 
GAP – ÇATOMs), personal interview, June 2011). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See GAP-Genclik evleri in TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 2 June 2013). 
102  See more GAP Gençlik Evleri - STGM, panel.stgm.org.tr/.../gap-genclik-evleri-e-bulten.pdf 
(accessed 2 June 2013). 
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Also, the Turkish state has provided Children’s Development Centres in less 
developed areas such as Adiyaman city and its district Gölbasi, Batman city, 
Diyarbakir and its district Silvan, Kilis, Mardin and its district Kiziltepe, Nusaybin 
and Ömerli, Siirt city, Sanliurfa city and its district Hilvan. As I indicated in Chapter 
Two, the aim of these centres is to provide social activities for younger children aged 
from 4 to 6 and 7 to 14. These activities mainly consist of lessons for pre-school 
education, Turkish language and mathematics, reading and writing, technology and 
the arts (including cinema and theatre, and folk dance). Children’s Development 
Centres are significant for socially and economically disadvantaged parents who are 
not in a position to support their children. Since the creation of the centres in 2003, 
28,500 children have benefited.103 
Furthermore, Harran Plain in Sanliurfa province, which used to be dry land 
unprofitable, with the transferred water from the Atatürk Dam, has offered good 
productivity in the form of pulses, vegetables and fruit, cereals and cotton 
(www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 5 June 2011). Despite the fact that Harran, and most 
importantly the entire province of Sanliurfa, has still continued to be one of the 
poorest area in the country, most people are happy that they have received water for 
their lands. From irrigation opportunities to improvements in education and health 
services, GAP has created significant changes here. Thus, if one asks how successful 
the social development project has been, Harran can be provided as a perfect example. 
In this regard, when I interviewed Sadrettin Karahocagil (July 2011), the president of 
GAP, he confidently stated that GAP has now had a substantial result in terms of 
agricultural productivity, which had fed into the aim of the project, which was to 
develop socio-economic stability. 
There are also some significant improvements in industrial production in the 
south-east. There are 25 small industry sectors operating in the region, and 1,739 
work places, where 73,601 people work; the project has increased the region’s added 
value share to the country’s industry from 2% to 4%. There have been some 
improvements in textile production in the south-east (TUSIAD 2008).104 In terms of 
import and export, the region accounts for 3% of the national total, and Gaziantep is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See more in Milliyet.com.tr (accessed in 6 May 2015). 
104  See more in GAP Raporu - USiAD, www.usiad.net/index.php?option=com...gap-
raporu...raporlar...GAP'TA NE OLDU! Bölgede Ekonomik, Stratejik ve Siyasal Gelişmeler (accessed 7 
May 2015).  
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the most active centre of production, accounting for 80% of productivity (Ibid).  
GAP overall increased per capita income “from 47% of average national 
income in 1985 to 55% by 2001” (Altinbilek and Tortajada 2012: 173). In 2001, 
exports from the GAP region amounted to 708 million dollars (US), but by 2004 this 
had substantially increased, according to the TUSIAD GAP report (2008), to 1.5 
billion dollars. In 2005, this increased to 2.212 billion dollars, and in 2006 to 2.413 
billion dollars (TUSIAD 2008). Clearly these statistics indicate significant economic 
growth in the south-east as a result of the GAP project. 
More importantly, at present, GAP provides over 74% of the country’s energy 
production (DSI General Directory, www.gap.gov.tr (accessed 11 June 2011)), and 
half of Turkish energy comes from GAP hydroelectric production now. In 2005 alone, 
“the electricity generated in the region was to the order of 253 billion kWh, equivalent 
to $15.1 billion (1 kWh = 6 cents) and accounting for 47.2% or $1.1 billion of total 
production at the national level” (Altinbilek and Tortajada 2012: 173). Turkey mainly 
receives hydroelectric energy from Karakaya, Atatürk, Dilce, Kralkizi Birecik, 
Karkamis and Batman dams in the GAP Region. At present, Turkey has increased its 
hydroelectricity output substantially from the project, to 355 billion kWh, equivalent 
to $21.3 billion (www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 11 June 2011).  
During my fieldwork I found that GAP has had a hugely beneficial positive 
impact for the Turkish state’s hydroelectric production. According to the official GAP 
website, the 74% energy production referred to above is achieved by 19 hydroelectric 
power plants, which are anticipated to generate over 27 billion GWh of electricity 
annually, (Ibid). In short, GAP has had significant positive impact. Irrigation, even 
though it is limited, has provided some positive economic impact, and, most 
importantly, energy generation has had a highly significant positive impact for the 
country’s developing industry. The project has also had a positive regional socio-
economic impact, particularly through ÇATOM centres and GAP Youth House 
Centre. 
However, there has been serious criticism that the Turkish state has not 
focused on irrigation but rather on developments that help the Turkish state integrate, 
if not assimilate, Kurdish children into mainstream Turkish society through the 
establishment of Turkish education. In this regard, one of my interviewees (name not 
given, group interview, June 2011) claimed: 
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One must ask a question as to why the Turkish state is not teaching the local, 
Kurdish, language and providing local education, but instead Turkish culture 
and education. We do not believe this is just social development, but a hidden 
policy of the Turkish state involved with the project, which wants to control us 
and assimilate our children via such a project. 
  
I heard this argument many times during my fieldwork in the region. It was mainly 
coming from politicized Kurds, not from poor people who lived in rural areas. People 
living in the rural areas are desperate to educate their children in whatever way is 
available for them. For instance, I witnessed that when politicized Kurds, such as the 
pro-Kurdish party or PKK, announced that Kurdish children must boycott Turkish 
schools and not attend for one or two days, this wasn’t very successful.  
When I asked one of my interviewees (personal interview with a medical 
doctor, name not given, June 2011) as to why politicized Kurds are so sceptical about 
the social development centres for children, the answer was thoughtful: 
  
The Turkish state has imposed education in Turkish on Kurdish children. 
Since the creation of the Turkish republic it has taken Turkish policy-makers a 
long time to introduce the Turkish education system into the region. For 
instance, one or two decades ago, almost all Kurdish children would speak 
Kurdish with their parents, but now this is not the case. The large majority of 
Kurdish children only speak Turkish at home. Most of these children cannot 
speak Kurdish at all. For instance, I have four children, none of them 
understand Kurdish. This is what the Turkish state has wanted to see for ages. 
So, while many politicized Kurds want to keep the Kurdish language alive, 
Turkish policy makers, via the GAP social development project such as 
Children’s Development Centres, want every child to get Turkish education to 
not claim their own language. This is the power struggle which is going on. 
 
Although in Chapter Seven I will provide four issues, three internal and one external, 
that have got in the way of the GAP ‘social development’ project being realized, the 
above interviewee’s statement reveals a critical factor in the way the project has 
become 
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a political tool, which needs to be further investigated - whether the failure of the 
project to reach its promised goal is to do with the power struggle between the 
politicized Kurds and the Turkish policy-makers, who are enforcing Turkish 
education and Turkish authority in the region.    
 So has GAP achieved its key aim of revolutionizing the historically backward 
socio-economy of the south-east? Based on this research, the answer is a simple ‘no’. 
Before investigating what obstacles have got in the way of the project (see Chapter 
Seven), it is necessary to elaborate on its negative impact.  
 
6.3. The negative impact of the GAP project: inevitable destruction 
 
Despite the fact that not all the dams comprising the GAP project have been fully 
completed, those that have been are already impacting seriously on the environment, 
ecology, archaeological sites, historical towns, settlements and cultures in the region. 
Thus it is of concern to many that the completion of GAP will have further similar 
negative effects. Based on experience so far, many of my local interviewees, 
especially NGO employees, think that millions of inhabitants will be the main victims 
of these developments. These people stand not only to lose their homes, land and 
means of economic survival, but also risk being affected psychologically, especially 
as a consequence of the breakdown of their communities and families. 
It should be borne in mind that when Turkey first began to draw up the GAP 
project the policy-makers either did not think of environmental issues or had little 
knowledge of them, and did not want to take on board the long-term environmental 
impact on the GAP region. One NGO representative, Ömer Faruk Paköz (chairman of 
the Association to Keep Hasankeyf and Tigris River Alive (Hasankeyf ve Dicle Nehri 
Yaşatma Derneği başkanı), personal interview, June 2011), states: “in the Euphrates 
we used to have a certain kind of turtle, which could only be found here, but as a 
result of the Atatürk Dam, they have now vanished.” He also referred more generally 
to the fact that since the dams have been built, species of birds and wild animals have 
been lost, and many other species would soon die out.   
Furthermore, local people made the point that, despite the fact that the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers receive water from rainfall and mountain streams, the 
snow on the mountains is the most important resource. In summer, the rivers receive 
their water from the melted snow on the mountains. But the presence of the dams has 
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led to changes in the micro-climate which have resulted in reduced snowfall and in 
the snow no longer staying on the mountains long enough to provide underground 
water. These changes in the eco-system also affect every aspect of the local 
inhabitants’ lives. The local NGOs’ main concern, for instance, was that the changes 
in the micro-climate would cause environmental damage and produce diseases.  
In order to analyze in further detail how the dams have caused damage to the 
region, it is appropriate to start with those on the Euphrates River, as these have been 
the most destructive in terms of their impact on the environment, historical sites and 
human development, after which I will discuss those on the Tigris River. The Keban, 
Atatürk, Karakaya and Birecik dams have been the most disruptive ones, displacing 
thousands of residents, forcing them to move from their lands and homes. The 
construction of the Keban Dam required 25,000 people to be resettled, Karakaya 
15,000, the Atatürk 30,000 (Kliot 1994: 125) and the Birecik around 30,000.  
Despite the fact that all the dams have had some negative impact on the locals 
and on historical sites, the impact of the Atatürk Dam has been substantially the 
worst. When the construction of the Atatürk Dam began, it created serious tension 
between Turkey and Syria. The Euphrates’ water is the most important source of 
Syria’s water for domestic consumption, industry and agriculture. The sharp rise in 
the Syrian population, which was “34[%] per annum and one of the highest in the 
world”, created a serious problem with regard to the provision of sufficient fresh 
water for all the country’s needs (Schulz 1995: 100). However, Turkey rejects the 
claims of Syria and Iraq regarding the international “character of these two rivers and 
only speaks of the rational utilization of trans-boundary waters” (El-Fadel et al 2002: 
103). Although this study does not focus on trans-boundary water conflicts between 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, I suggest that there is a need to re-examine the Turkish policy 
beyond the GAP ‘social development’ project and investigate the debate on trans-
boundary water conflicts between these three countries in future.  
The displacement of over 30,000 people was not the only negative 
consequence of the completion of the Atatürk Dam. The dam flooded many historical 
villages and towns, such as Samsat or ‘Samosata’, which is believed to be the capital 
of the ancient Commagene kingdom. It drowned archaeological sites such as the 
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‘Nevali Çori’ site,105 which is believed to be the one of the oldest settlements of the 
earliest inhabitants of upper Mesopotamia.  
For many years, it was believed that civilization began in Egypt and Sumeria 
around 3000 B.C. However, in 1993, under the supervision of archeologist Professor 
Harald Hauptmann from the University of Heidelberg in Germany, the discovery was 
made that ‘Nevali Çori’ was where the earliest inhabitants lived, during the early 
Neolithic period. The work of archeologists shows that the economy of villages 
around Nevali Çori was at the time based on hunting animals such as gazelles and 
deer, which would later lead to agriculture and farming (Sidharth 1999).  
Earlier evidence had revealed that Nevali Çori dates back to at least 7,500 
B.C., but more recent excavations show it to have been several centuries older. With 
its beautiful limestone buildings, sculptures and other artistic features, Nevali Çori 
represents one of the first civilizations in the world and is “unique in that it represents 
an already developed civilization with Megalithic elements and meticulous 
architecture and planning” (Sidharth 1999).    
However, the early Neolithic settlements, including the world’s most ancient 
temples and monumental sculptures, were lost when the Atatürk Dam flooded Nevali 
Çori. During my visit to Urfa in June 2011, I learned that, together with numerous 
other sites in the vicinity, this site was now underwater and no longer visible. 
(Various remains, including the monolith are now on display in the nearby ‘Urfa’ 
museum.) Like Nevali Çori, historic settlements such as Samsat also vanished under 
the waters of the Euphrates basin.  
Samsat, or ‘Samosata’ in ancient Greek, is an historical town located in the 
Adiyaman province. It is one of the most ancient towns in the world and was one of 
the strategic stations used as a crossing point on the river’s east-west trade route.106 
Having flooded historic Samsat with the Atatürk Dam, the Turkish state built a new 
Samsat beside the new waterline for displaced people from the old town, but they 
faced major problems such as finding themselves landless. Problems also increased 
with the confiscation and compensation payments for those who preferred to self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See http://nemrutadiyaman.catalogturkey.com/2010/09/28/samsat-adiyaman/; 
http://www.ime.gr/chronos/01/en/intro/nevalicori.html; http://www.ancient-
wisdom.co.uk/turkeynevali.htm (accessed 7 May 2015). 
106 See the book published by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2007), The Ascending 
Place of Light, GAP Southeast Anatolia Region; Adiyaman - Coğrafya Dünyası, 
www.cografya.gen.tr/tr/adiyaman/ (accessed 3 April 2014). 
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relocate. Many people had problems with the misrepresentation of the value of their 
old houses. So those families with less compensation moved, mainly to the west of 
Turkey or the big cities, but could not cope with the new life, and this led to families 
breaking down and being cut off from their communities (Mehme Çelik, personal 
interview, July 2011). 
What I learnt from Samsat interviewees was that people were not used to 
having such large amounts of money as they received in compensation and, because 
most of their lives had been spent in villages and small towns, they did not know how 
to use it. One of the interviewees said that he knew people who spent their cash on 
gambling, women and cars. Some put their money in a savings bank, but the Turkish 
lira inflated and the money became useless, while some invested in the wrong 
markets. I also learnt that many old people who had to move to big cities in the west 
of Turkey were now suffering from psychological problems because of their torn 
community and the difficulty they were having coping with big city life. I heard the 
same story in other towns and villages which I visited. Mehmet Çelik, a local textile 
shop owner from newly built Samsat, told me that the state gave some money to the 
individuals who had to migrate as they lost their land, but these people could not 
make use of the money efficiently. According to him, they were peasants who did not 
have any commercial or trading experience and who did not know how to survive in 
urban areas: 
 
People in Samsat did not have the experience to have the sum of money the state 
gave as compensation. When the locals received a sum of money as compensation, 
they did not know what to do with it. Some bought a new car and some put the 
money under the pillow at home without thinking about the yearly inflation in 
Turkey, which meant that most of them had their money undervalued. 
 
Çelik stressed that the state did not have any concrete strategy or plan for the future of 
these displaced people apart from constructing properties for them in the new Samsat: 
“The state did not tell us how to make use of the money, it built new houses in new 
Samsat and went off and it left people in these concrete houses but with nothing else.” 
He said that some local people could not use the money they got efficiently as they 
were unable to form long term concrete plans as to what to do with it. Although locals 
had been offered a new area in which to live, they were suffering because of 
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unemployment and the lack of job opportunities. Thus the demography and routines 
of the local people had been affected very negatively.  
Çelik said that the state authorities did not provide functional support for local 
people:  
 
When we were in old Samsat, things were better and there were functioning local 
businesses, which regulated themselves. But when Samsat flooded, we lost all 
connection with other local businesses. We used to have our vegetable growing 
area, which we were selling to other part of the region, but now we have to buy 
from grocery shops. 
 
Çelik also mentioned that inhabitants’ lives had been affected by all the various 
aspects  of GAP:  
 
Now, when young people marry, they have to move out of their region due to 
lack of housing and employment. [...] Due to lack of economic and social 
opportunities in the region, even those who have lands prefer to sell them and 
migrate to bigger cities.  
 
After the flooding, only a tiny percentage of local land remained, clearly insufficient 
to meet the needs of the remaining inhabitants.  Celik commented: 
 
[80%] of the land flooded and, since there is an increase in the population, there is 
not enough land left to allow us to survive. When we were in the old Samsat, we 
did not have any problems, but now we have to find jobs elsewhere in the region.  
 
Çelik also indicated that the psychology of elderly people who had to migrate has 
been affected very badly due to isolation, loneliness and detachment from their own 
ancestral lands: “Elderly people, who had to move to big cities like Adana, Antep and 
the west of Turkey either died earlier or suffered psychological problems.”  
Çelik stated that people’s sentimental bonds with their lands had also been 
destroyed and harmed, an aspect of the social and psychological outcomes of the 
project. He observed:  
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Our town is the most affected one compared with other parts of the GAP region. At 
least 18 villages have been flooded by the Atatürk Dam. Because of the destruction 
of the flood, we have no story to tell our children regarding the area where we have 
grown up.  
 
Çelik memorized the past in a nostalgic way, demonstrating how the expelled 
villagers associate their region before the intervention of GAP with heaven, “to us, 
old Samsat was paradise.” It is important to note that “according to the legislation in 
force, compensation for those who want to be resettled by the state has to be kept in a 
resettlement fund” (www.gap-­‐gov.tr/gap, accessed 22 June 2014).  
The Birecik Dam affected 44 settlements and had a serious negative impact on 
30,000 people’s lives. When the flooding began, nine villages were destroyed; 
“impoundment also had its partial effects in 3 more villages and a part of the town of 
Halfeti. The dam also affected farmlands of 31 more villages while leaving the 
settlements intact” (www.gap-­‐gov.tr, accessed 22 June 2014). Halfeti is another of 
the most affected towns in the region, where thousands of residents have been made 
landless and homeless by the Birecik Dam, which led to the flooding of more than 
75% of the town.  
Like Samsat, the state has also built a new Halfeti for resettlement, 10 miles 
away, far from the river. During the group interview in New Halfeti, I asked why the 
state had chosen this location. I was told that the lands near the river were too 
expensive and that the state did not want to build anything for them near the water. 
Although the resettled residents had been in New Halfeti for years now, I was told 
that they felt as if they were homeless and spent their time in the local coffee shop - 
waiting for some miracle to happen so they could have their fruitful lands returned to 
them. Ahmet Gökçek, a local man, (personal interview, July 2011) said: “We used to 
have gardens, full of all different kinds of fruit and vegetables, but now we have 
nothing. The state gave some money – that’s all.” He also commented:  
 
The locals who had land and houses have been compensated but I know many 
that did not have much land but could live in the town. These people, who did 
not have land or valuable houses, did not receive any compensation. 
 
Abdurrahman Karaman, another local resident (personal interview, July 2011), stated 
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that the Birecik Dam had deeply affected his life and that he had lost his private farm:  
 
The state did not compensate us, when my farm and land were flooded by the dam; 
I received compensation, though the state undervalued my property, five whole 
years later, by which time the money had already lost its value, because of the high 
inflation in Turkey. 
   
The locally elected head of the village in Halfeti, Nail Ayberk (personal interview 
July 2011), said:  
 
We were very happy in the old Halfeti. The Birecik Dam took our happiness 
from us. This is why I speak of the negative impact of the GAP project. I have 
already said in an interview that, whatever the state were to offer us, it can 
never compensate us for what we have lost. We used to have our own things 
that belonged to us but now we have to work for someone else in order to buy 
bread for our children. 
 
Another resident of Halfeti (no name given, personal interview, July 2011) pointed 
out that although most people agreed that the GAP project had brought an irrigation 
system and some level of development to parts of the region, they believed that none 
of these projects fitted the global environmental criteria. Turkey had never considered 
the long-term environmental prospects for the region, or how GAP would affect the 
region’s ecology and environment and impact negatively on the ecosystem and 
natural life in the region.  
Furthermore, the 3,000 year old Greco-Roman city of ‘Zeugma’ disappeared 
with its valley under the Birecik Dam. Despite the fact that the dam impacted so badly 
on thousands of people’s lives and generated protests from “archeologists and 
historians, who claim[ed] that it has caused damage to the region’s rich archeological 
heritage” (Sheerhan 2004: 49), the Turkish state proceeded with it and used this 
strategically engineered project for power production and irrigation.  
Another archaeological site destroyed by the construction of the dams is 
Zeugma.  Zeugma is a city of Greco-Roman origin, approximately 3,000 years old, on 
the bank of the Euphrates. Zeugma (meaning ‘bridge’) is believed to have been 
founded by one of Alexander the Great’s generals, Seleucia Nicator, and flourished 
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under later Roman rule. It was one of the most significant cities of the Roman eastern 
frontier with a garrison of over 6,000 soldiers.107 
Zeugma was important as a crossing point on the river during the period, and 
was a significant location for trade routes to the east. The city was in the most 
critically strategic region between west and east. Today most of Zeugma, famous for 
its mosaics and other artefacts, has been flooded by the Birecik Dam (completed in 
2002). Archaeologists such as Pierre Leriche and Catherine Abadie-Reynal 
discovered a preserved ancient Greek city, the remains of a Roman villa across the 
river, and, of particular significance, a beautiful Roman mosaic floor (Ibid). The 
flooding of Zeugma was a tragedy for 30,000 people. They lost their homes and 
villages, and became refugees in their own country. The flooding caused an 
international outcry and hit the headlines across the world before the dam was 
finished (Ibid). Clearly the flooding was disastrous not only for local history but also 
for the world’s cultural heritage (Warner 2011: 95). 
While Samsat, Nevali Çori and Zeugma contained vital clues to the history of 
the region and its cultural heritage, the destruction of the archeological and historical 
sites by the Tigris Dams is also of great concern. The ancient city of Hasankeyf will 
soon be buried under the Ilisu Dam. Hasankeyf hosted a number of civilizations and 
was a capital of many “medieval cultures such as the Artukids, and has links to the 
Romans, the Artuklu, the Eyyubi, the Safavids and the Ottomans” (Morvaridi 2004: 
714). Hasankeyf is a rich treasure of religions and medieval beliefs, both Christian 
and Islamic. It is well known that the ancient city was captured by Ayyubids 
(descendants of Saladin, or Selah'edînê Eyubi in Kurdish) in 1232, and it was they 
who built the mosques that made the town a significant Islamic centre. So the town 
“is known as the Efes (the Ephesus of the New Testament) of the East” (Warner 2011: 
93). Hasankeyf has medieval caves where people used to live, the highest stone bridge 
of the Middle Ages, an historical palace built by the Ayyubids, and the town is lined 
with the tombs of many spiritual men (Ibid). 
Hasankeyf was strategically positioned to control the trade route from 
Diyarbakir to Mosul city and the Silk Road. The strategic position and the importance 
of the town for trade made it coveted by outsiders. At present, it is under attack from 
its own water and violated by outsiders in the form of GAP policy-makers. In the near 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/2000/zeugma.shtml. 
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future the Ilisu Dam will violate this spectacular ancient city, which the Kurds believe 
represents the heritage of their ancestors. Sooner or later Hasankeyf will disappear 
under the waters of the Tigris (Morvaridi 2004; KHRP 21 August 2007).  
Hasankeyf is crucial for historians and archaeologists, who have observed that 
“the reservoirs will flood valuable archaeological sites dating back more than 10,000 
years, including all of the town of Hasankeyf, which features a treasure trove of 
architecture from ancient eras” (Hillstrom and Hillstrom 2003: 138). But when the 
historical treasure disappears under the reservoir, not only will the mystical 
associations of the Tigris valley dissolve, but thousands of people will face 
displacement.  
In addition, the reservoir of the Ilisu Dam, like others, is highly likely to infest 
the region with waterborne diseases, which will then become the concern of health 
education programmes, but, “[t]he experience with other reservoir projects indicates 
that such mitigating measures will not protect the affected people from the new 
waterborne diseases” (Bosshard 1998). Langer (2009: 8) argues that “negative effects 
of the (…) project fall into four categories: environmental damage, health hazards, 
consequences for cultural preservation, and domestic politics.” There is also a danger 
that the reservoir may reduce the natural ability of the Tigris to cleanse itself of waste 
and city borne wastewater as well as importing waterborne diseases such as malaria. 
It has been predicted that “[e]ven those that stay behind may find the newly irrigated 
land unworkable because of salinisation and erosion caused by the dam, or 
uninhabitable because of diseases such as malaria” (KHRP 21 August 2007).  
Despite Turkey’s Article 63 stating that the state should be responsible for 
protecting the value of culture and natural history, and despite the Turkish state 
registering Hasankeyf (in 1981) “as a first degree protected archaeological site, listing 
twenty-two monuments or sites of importance” (Morvaridi 2004: 714), the Turkish 
government is currently ignoring the Article and its promises when it comes to dam 
construction, including the Ilisu Dam hydroelectric power project, which also deeply 
damages the environment, ecosystem and human resources in the region. The dams 
are continuing to kill the rich endemic species of plants, animals, fish and birds in the 
region.  
It must be stressed that many dams in the region do not meet international 
standards relating to archaeological preservation. It is clear that the project, for 
instance, will diminish the mystical associations of the Tigris valley, of which the 
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10,000 year-old Hasankeyf city is the chief historical treasure, as stressed by 
Ronayne: “The Ilısu dam on the River Tigris achieved international notoriety from 
2000 to 2002 because of the severe economic, social, environmental and cultural 
impacts it would have, potentially displacing up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people and 
destroying significant cultural heritage” (Ronayne 2005: 9). My study demonstrates 
that in their eagerness to build huge dams in the region, Turkish policy makers have 
shown no concern for cultural heritage in terms of destroying historical sites, or about 
creating changes in the eco-system and long-term environmental damage.  
Müsvet Çakar (personal interview, June 2011), President of the Environmental 
Ecology and Ecological Support Association (Çevre Ekoloji ve Yasatma Destekleme 
Dernegini), stated: “When we consider the GAP programme overall, it has not been 
for social development but has destroyed the nature of the region.” Çakar argued that 
the project had not improved the agricultural patterns of the region and also had a 
negative effect on economic activities: “GAP is not a positive opportunity for the 
development of the region.  In contrast, it has resulted in a great range of negative 
ecological and environmental impact on the south-east region.” He stated that the 
project, due to misapplied irrigation, destroys the soil, affecting farming: “The 
majority of the locals did not have enough knowledge in terms of irrigation, for 
instance in the Harran Plain. Therefore, a very high percentage of the land has been 
salinated mainly because of wrong irrigation methods.” He thinks that GAP has 
negatively affected the main source of income for the inhabitants by harming farming 
and stockbreeding.  
The dams have a negative impact on riparian wildlife; for instance the flood 
creates physical barriers to fish migration, which obstruct them from reproducing, 
unsettling the natural balance of the ecosystem and leading to lack of biodiversity. As 
Ahdieh (1997: 115) argues, “it also floods fertile valleys and creates more man-made 
boundaries to land open for terrestrial wildlife.” He also points out that with the 
completion of the GAP project, many historical towns, villages, archaeological sites 
and cultures will be destroyed through flooding. 
The most serious issue was and is displacement, which has been causing 
disruption and losses in terms of “landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalization, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common 
property and social disarticulation” (Morvaridi 2004: 714). The displacement caused 
by the dams has not only resulted in loss of livelihoods, but also loss of land rights 
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and housing, and loss of social networks between the locals. In short, the 
displacement in south-east Turkey has deeply disrupted and affected the lives of local 
people, particularly those of women and children, because women and adult children 
who resided on family land were not entitled to compensation as individuals (Ibid).  
Although “Article 46 states that land cannot be taken without giving 
compensation in cash, and that this must be given in advance” (Altinbilek 2000: 32), 
“compensation is linked to land rights, meaning that nothing has been arranged for the 
countless landless” (Warner 2004: 15). For instance, GAP reservoirs such as Atatürk 
or Karakaya have so far led to the involuntarily displacement of over 100,000 people. 
Compensation has usually been tied to the property of land or houses. Since most land 
in South-East Anatolia is concentrated in the hands of large landowners, many 
landless families were not compensated at all. Instead, they quietly moved to the 
slums of big cities such as Diyarbakir or Istanbul (Bosshard 1998). 
Although displaced inhabitants were promised cash compensation or opted for 
self–resettlement, the inadequately conceptualized resettlement has resulted in more 
poverty and social disruption. In short, this research indicates that the negative impact 
of the GAP project is substantial; the environment and ecology, archaeological sites, 
historical towns, local people and cultural aspects of the region have been seriously 
damaged by the large dams. 
 However, in order to understand whether dams in general have created such a 
negative impact, the following section will examine the Aswan High Dam project on 
the Nile River, built by Egypt. Of course there are other dam projects than the Aswan 
High Dam project which could be considered, for instance, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) 108  in the United States. However, I have decided to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established in 1933 by President Franklin Roosevelt on 
the Tennessee River for the purpose of energy and economic development. “The TVA was one of the 
most high profile products of Roosevelt’s New Deal program which was developed to manage the 
impacts of the Great Depression, one of the most devastating economic collapses of the twentieth 
century.” The TVA was not only intended to generate hydropower and economic development but also 
to achieve flood control and advance navigation by linking to the Ohio-Mississippi River system.   
Nevertheless, TVA was an ambitious project for improving “agricultural and industrial development 
programs that transformed the lives of millions of people in the seven states”, and it was hoped that it 
would be a model “that could be used elsewhere in the USA and, later, in the many parts of the world 
which similarly had powerful rivers and large populations of poor people”. See “Global Water Forum | 
The Tennessee Valley Authority: Catchment ... www.globalwaterforum.org/.../international-water-
politics-the-tennessee-...20 Mar 2013 and, TVA - Home https://www.tva.gov”. (Accessed 20 August 
2016). See more: Richard A. Colignon (1997), Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalism of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority; Walter L. Creese (1990), TVA's Public Planning: The Vision, the 
Reality. U. of Tennessee Press  (which stresses its utopian goals); Tim Culvahouse, ed. (2007), The 
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comparison with the Aswan dam not only because of its geographical proximity, but 
also because I want to weaken the focus on the GAP. Nevertheless, I will also 
compare Aswan with the GAP project, not only in terms of negative and positive 
impact but also by analyzing the socio-economic aspects of the two projects, and their 
differences and similarities, including the politics involved. 
 
6.4. What is the Aswan High Dam Project? 
 
It is important to begin with the historical background of the Aswan High Dam, so 
this section concentrates on the nature and formation of the dam, but to do so we need 
first to consider the water potential of the Nile River and then focus on the definition 
of the dam project, bearing in mind that, as defined by Anderson (2000), the Nile is 
one of the most significant liquid resources (together with oil) in the Middle East.   
 
Physically, economically, socially and particularly geopolitically, the Middle East 
is dominated by two liquids:  both are extracted from specific geological structures 
and both in different ways are vital to the development of the human society in 
much of the region. They therefore provide an appropriate link between the 
physical and the human geography of the Middle East. Water is highly significant 
as a result of society within the region whereas with oil the major deficiency is 
outside the region. Both are therefore considered strategic resources (Anderson 
2000: 72). 
 
The Nile, unlike the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, “is maintained almost entirely by 
rainfall from outside the region in Ethiopia and East Africa” (Anderson 2000: 74). 
The 7,000 km long Nile River, the longest in the world, passes through the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Burundi, South Sudan, North Sudan and Egypt en route to the Mediterranean Sea.  
Nearly 80% of the discharge of the Nile occurs between July and August 
during the rainy season in the highlands of Ethiopia. This discharge is subject to 
variation. “Year-to-year variation fluctuates highly and has done so since records 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tennessee Valley Authority: Design and Persuasion. Princeton Architectural Press; Erwin C. Hargrove 
and Paul H. Conkin, eds. (1983), TVA Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy. 
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were first kept during ancient times” (Monsef, Smith and Darwish 2015). Nearly 85% 
of this annual discharge comes from Ethiopia, and 15% from the Lake Plateau in 
Central Africa, which “rises from the White Nile, which is the main source of water to 
the Nile Valley during the low flow period of the summer” (Abu Zeid 1989: 147). 
The Nile, in fact, consists initially of two main rivers, the White Nile and the Blue 
Nile. “The White Nile, from Lake Victoria in Uganda, and the Blue Nile, from Lake 
Tana in Ethiopia, merge in Sudan to form the Nile” (Nixon 2004: 158).  
It is evident that throughout history, the great civilizations have benefitted 
from the Nile’s water and grown alongside the banks of this impressive river. The 
survival and religious beliefs of the ancient Egyptians revolved around the inundation, 
or flooding, of the Nile. Each year the Pharaoh’s high priests would await the 
appearance of the star Sirius to announce the coming flood season. They believed that 
the sacred event of the annual inundation was caused by the tears of the mother 
goddess Isis crying for her murdered husband, the god Osiris. Known as the sepdet, 
this flooding from August to October would restart the Egyptian calendar and bring 
either abundance or scarcity to the Pharaoh’s people. A year’s worth of crops could be 
eradicated with a high flood, while drought and famine would plague the years of a 
low flood. These effects were devastating and weighed heavily upon the pharaoh; 
therefore, many religious rituals were aimed at appeasing Hapy, the deity of the Nile 
flood (http://jpkc.ecnu.edu.cn, accessed 3 March 2015).  
Each year, during the late summer period, the high waters of the Nile River 
would bring with them natural nutrients and minerals which enriched the fertile soil 
along the floodplain and the river, and this is what made the Nile valley ideal for 
farming. This annual pattern alongside the Nile has continued since ancient times, 
with Egyptian farmers still being highly dependent on the river’s water.  
However, with the population of Egypt increasing, and both high and low 
water at times creating havoc with crops or creating drought and famine, the 
government decided to build dams, not only to prevent floods but also to store water. 
In order to control the floods, the government decided to build a dam at a settlement 
called Aswan (Nixon 2004: 158).  
The history of the construction of Aswan goes back to 1899, under the British 
government, when the first dam on the Nile was built there. The first dam was 
completed in 1902, but a larger dam was needed in order to avoid floods. Thus, 
“construction teams raised the height of the dam in a project that lasted from 1907 till 
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1912, and then again from 1929 through 1933” (Ibid: 158). “Despite these efforts, the 
flood of 1946 nearly breached the structure. Instead of making the dam even higher, 
engineers decided to build a new, larger dam upriver” (Ibid: 158), the construction of 
which began in 1960. This huge rock fill dam, situated to the south of Aswan city in 
south Egypt and located north of the border between Egypt and Northern Sudan, has 
become known as the Aswan High Dam. The rising water of the Aswan High Dam 
created a lake called Lake Nasser in Egypt, named after Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
president of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, and Lake Nubia in Northern Sudan. The dam, 
completed in 1970, “stretched 3,600 meters long, 111 meters tall, 980 meters wide at 
its base and 40 meters wide on top” (Ibid: 158). 
The World Bank supported the Aswan High Dam when it “issued a favourable 
report on the technological and economic feasibility of the concept in 1956 and Egypt 
hired a British civil engineering firm to design the Aswan High Dam” (Monsef, Smith 
and Darwish 2015). The government of Egypt also talked of an Anglo-American 
financing programme.  
However, the World Bank drew back from financing the construction of the 
dam when the United States and Britain cancelled their agreement to start the dam 
project. It was generally believed that this was because President Nasser recognized 
Communist China. However, Nasser wanted to develop Egypt’s agriculture, energy 
production and associated manufacturing, and he was under intense political pressure 
at the time. The most important issue faced by Egypt was a period of rapid population 
increase, and a very high percentage of the Egyptian populace relied on agriculture, 
which was mainly dependent on the waters of the Nile. However, in 1958 the Soviet 
Union offered to build the Aswan High Dam, and the “project was completed in 1970 
and the reservoir reached its operating level in 1976” (Ibid). 
The Aswan High Dam was not only constructed in order to prevent the flood 
but also involved a wider effort “to undertake an ambitious social and economic 
transformation, guided by principles of economic independence and social welfare, 
and that was to be achieved through technocratic state planning” (Shokr 2009). In 
summary, the most significant aspects of the dam appear to be the provision of water 
for irrigation, controlling floods and hydroelectric power production.  
 
6.4.1. GAP project versus Aswan project: a comparative analysis 
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Apart from controlling the flood and storing enough water for the requirements of 
summer cropping, the Aswan High Dam was also built for the economic stability of 
the Egyptian government during Nasser’s presidency. It is evident that the Aswan 
project has provided significant positive progress, with increased benefits for the 
region as well as for the country every year (Abu Zeid 1989; Hassan 2007). The 
following is a brief summary of the project outcomes:  
• expansion in rice cultivation  
• transfer of about 1 million acres from seasonal to perennial irrigation 
• agricultural expansion in 1.2 million acres of new land due to increased water 
availability 
• protection from high floods as in 1964 and 1975, and from low floods and droughts 
as in 1972, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1986 and 1987 
• generation of hydroelectric power 
• improvement of navigation and further increases in tourism as a result of the 
stability of water levels in the Nile's course and navigation canals (Abu Zeid  1989).  
So, the $1 billion dollar (US) Aswan High Dam began to regulate agricultural 
irrigation systems and produce hydroelectric power, which played a significant role in 
the Egyptian economy. The project was one of the crucial achievements in meeting 
the demands for water, energy and irrigation in Egypt (Hassan 2007). If we do not 
consider the regional economy, the GAP project also generates substantial energy to 
meet the country’s needs. Today, GAP is providing 50% of the country’s power 
production, which provides substantial support to Turkey’s developing industry. 
However, in terms of agricultural irrigation, GAP has not been as beneficial as Aswan 
for the locals, and almost 80% of the planned irrigation in the GAP area has still not 
taken place as the water has not yet been transferred.           
During my fieldwork in the GAP region, I observed that plans for the canals 
have been drawn up, but the water has not yet reached many parts of the region. 
According to Altan Tan, local MP, member of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP)) (personal interview, June 2011): “Turkey is 
not honest about the GAP social development project. Some of these dams were 
completed 10 years ago. So, there is water in the dams but no water in the fields.” He 
argued: “There is a completed irrigation job in the Harran area, where the Arabs live, 
but almost nothing has been carried out in the Kurdish region.” One of the male 
participants from Suruç said:  
	   160	  
 
This is all politics, Even if the state decided to complete the water pipes for 
irrigating land of Suruç, it is not for social development in the region but to 
serve Turkish multi-purpose interests, because the land of Suruç is rich and 
perfect for raising crops, of which Turkey is running out.  
 
In short, while the Aswan High Dam has operated mainly in the interest of the locals, 
GAP has been enmeshed with Turkish politics regarding the south-east. For instance, 
the Aswan project also proved to be important for safeguarding the region against 
droughts, and during the period between 1998 and 2002, provided effective flood 
protection against high water periods.  The floods occurring at this time would have 
been a catastrophe for the locals if it were not for the dam (Monsef, Smith and 
Darwish 2015). Moreover,  
 
the Aswan High Dam, when it was built, created Lake Nasser, a lake which 
has also created a lot more land for people to farm on. This is because a lot of 
water is stored in the lake, and in turn this water can be used to irrigate land 
around the lake.109 
 
The other significant fact is that “Lake Nasser has also created a big fishing industry, 
which produces 25,000 tonnes of fish a year, the fishing industry is aiming to produce 
100,000 tonnes by the year 2000.”110  
So the Aswan project has been responsible for: “(1) providing water for 
agricultural land reclamation (2) converting basin irrigation with perennial irrigation 
(3) expanding rice production (4) development of a fishery in the reservoir formed by 
the AHD (5) improvement of river navigation due to steady water level downstream 
from the AHD” (Ibid). It is clear that the Aswan project has played a role in 
increasing the region’s economic production, regulating the annual flooding and 
generating hydroelectricity, which means that the dam has had a significant impact on 
the economy and culture of Egypt. In the case of the GAP project, only hydroelectric 
output has been successfully improved, the remaining programmes still being only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See http://www.mbarron.net/Nile/envir_nf.html (accessed 5 March 2015). 
110 See http://www.mbarron.net/Nile/envir_nf.html (accessed 5 March 2015).  
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blueprints. 
The Aswan project has been tremendously positive not only for the region’s 
socio-economy but has also played a major role in contributing to the country’s 
overall development.  From this point of view, I would argue that GAP and Aswan 
have some similarities, when we consider how both projects produce energy, playing 
a significant role in their respective countries’ hydroelectric production. However, 
when we analyze their aims, the two countries differ. While the Aswan project has not 
been much involved with issues relating to regional politics, such as controlling or 
integrating locals into mainstream state politics, GAP has been deeply enmeshed with 
such issues and been constructed to serve Turkish state policies in the region.   
 
6.4.2. Evaluating GAP and Aswan: outcomes and impact 
 
There is no doubt that dam projects such as GAP or the Aswan project have always 
had some degree of negative impact on human life, the environment, cultural heritage 
and archeological sites. These projects have not always met international standards 
relating to archaeological preservation, environmental issues and human life. It seems 
there is no way to avoid all the problems arising from these projects, but the 
authorities can ensure that there are more positive than negative consequences. Was 
this the case for both projects? The answer is that when we evaluate GAP and Aswan, 
there are not many differences in terms of negative impact on their respective regions.  
I have stressed in this chapter that the GAP project has had huge negative 
impact on many people from the region, who have lost their houses and lands. I learnt 
about and observed many families torn apart and their communities destroyed. 
Obviously this has had a huge psychological impact on them. In the case of the 
Aswan project, there are similar issues in that the dam also displaced thousands of 
residents, forcing them to move from their lands and homes. 
To be more specific, the Aswan High Dam project deeply affected thousands 
of Nubian lives,111 as they were forced to relocate far away from their location. An 
estimated 90,000 Nubians lost “their ancestral land and their social fabric based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 “The Nubians, as with all other peoples, do not belong to a ‘race’. They consist of populations 
characterized by distinguishing cultural traditions, with various claims to Old Nubian, Arab, and 
Balkan ancestry. The survival of the Nubian language, and some particular Nubian social, material, and 
intangible traditions distinguishes the Nubians from other neighboring groups” (Hassan 2007: 84). 
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joint ownership of waterwheels and palm trees” (Hassan 2007: 85).  Despite the fact 
that the Egyptian government provided houses, the Nubians “found the houses 
lacking aesthetically and hastened to decorate them with traditional Nubian motifs” 
(Ibid: 85). 
In short, the Nubians who were forced to move could not sustain their own 
population, resulting in poverty and a rising death rate, and the resettlement areas 
were infested with the tsetse fly, with many people being exposed to sleeping 
sickness.112 My study shows that the state policy-makers never devised or planned a 
proper social foundation for the people who had been deeply affected by the project.  
The main similarity between these two projects has been the fact that both 
countries’ governments did not seriously consider their negative aspects. The 
potential advantages of the projects were more important than the potential negative 
impact. The Nile Valley, like the area flooded by the GAP project, is home to the 
cradle of civilization, with many claiming that humanity originated in the valley. The 
hunter-gatherer society and the transition to an agriculturally sustained community 
were also believed to have come from this valley, including the development of 
metallurgy and the start of monotheistic religion. The world’s most ancient antiquities 
have been found here, revealing thousands of years of human progression. However, 
the Aswan High Dam project has not destroyed as many archeological sites as GAP. 
During the planning process, the Egyptian government did not consider 
archaeological treasures in the Nile Valley, most of which were buried under the 
Aswan project. Despite the fact that UNESCO (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization) played a major role in rescuing ancient 
Egyptian remnants and saved hundreds of sites, a substantial number of archeological 
sites and temples were buried under Lake Nasser. The UNESCO team tried to salvage 
whatever it could; for instance, the temples of Kalabasha, Abu Simbel and Philae 
were among those to be saved from the flood waters, the Debod Temple was 
reassembled in Madrid, Spain, while the Roman temple of Dendur now rests in the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City.113 
Thus my research demonstrates that the GAP and the Aswan High Dam 
projects have similarities in terms of their negative aspects. However, the projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See https://courseware.e-education.psu.edu/ (accessed 5 March 2015). 
113 See more detail on assessing the impact of the Aswan High Dam at 
...jpkc.ecnu.edu.cn/sy0701/upload/...PDFs/aswandam.pdf (accessed 5 March 2015). 
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have not offered the same prospects in terms of socio-economic development. The 
Aswan High Dam project overall has been overwhelmingly positive in this respect. 
Despite the fact that it has had some negative environmental effects, it has offered a 
beneficial contribution to Egypt’s overall economic development as well as regional 
agricultural development, whereas GAP has not been a sustainable regional and 
socio-economic development project. 
 
6.4.3. Concluding remarks  
 
As I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Chapters Two to Four were mainly 
intended to assist in understanding the background of the GAP project, not only in 
terms of its materialization, but also with regard to its promise to overcome the socio-
economic underdevelopment of the south-east, and through an overall analysis of the 
literature regarding the project’s social development programmes. 
This chapter has outlined the positive and negative impact of the GAP project 
in the south-east. Despite the fact that GAP has made some positive progress in social 
services, irrigation, the improvement of industry sectors and energy production, the 
negative impact has been substantial with regard to environmental issues, ecological 
problems, the destruction of archaeological sites, historical towns, settlements and 
cultures in the region.  
The chapter has also examined the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River in 
Egypt, and assessed the Aswan project in terms of a comparative analysis with GAP. 
The chapter has shown that both projects have played major roles in providing 
hydroelectric production. However, GAP has not been as beneficial as the Aswan 
project in terms of agricultural irrigation. Having said that, both projects have had a 
serious negative impact in their areas, which suggests that such impact on human life, 
the environment, cultural heritage and archeological sites may be inevitable in relation 
to projects such as GAP and Aswan, neither of which, on the whole, meet 
international standards.  
However, having arrived at these conclusions, the following chapter will 
explore the main obstacles resulting in the project being so sluggish or failing to 
achieve its social development goals.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The obstacles and challenges to successful implementation of GAP 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The ninth former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, who played a major role in 
creating the GAP project, claimed that GAP was of national significance and that its 
completion was necessary in order to provide vital national resources.114 In 1998, the 
then prime-minister, Mesut Yilmaz, said “GAP will be completed by 2010”.115  The 
Turkish National Security Council, at its monthly meeting on 28 May 2003, stated 
that it had assessed the project and decided that it should be completed (TUSIAD 
2008).  
Despite the fact that the above statements by Turkish leaders and the state 
reflected a desire to complete the GAP project, and despite the fact that many Turkish 
political leaders, including those representing the Turkish state, have expressed the 
view that GAP has been a bonus for Turkey in terms of securitization of the south-
east and the strengthening of state authority in the region,116 my research, as outlined 
in Chapter Five, has revealed that GAP has not materialized in terms of 
revolutionizing the region’s socio-economic situation via profitable farming and 
employment opportunities for the local inhabitants.  
Therefore, the question arises as to why the project has not reached its ‘social 
development’ target in the south-east. This chapter will mainly be concerned with 
investigating the main obstacles that have prevented the GAP social programme from 
becoming reality. I suggest three internal and one external development factor that 
need to be studied in order to comprehend why the project has not reached its 
ambitious modernization goal. The three internal factors are (1) the rise of the 
Kurdish national movement in the south-east and in Turkey’s neighbouring states; (2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  See Haberleri, Demirel'den GAP için son çağrı, www.haber7.com; Şanlıurfa: 9. Cumhurbaşkanı 
Demirel'in Şanlıurfa Ziyareti, www.haberler.com/Haber (accessed 29 August 2015). 
115  See www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/06/06/yazar/kulis.html; www.usiad.net/index.php (accessed 29 
August 2015). 
116 See GAP Raporu - USiAD, www.usiad.net/index.php?option=com...gap-raporu...raporlar; 'GAP, 
TC'nin en büyük projesi' - Yeni Şafak, www.yenisafak.com/politika (accessed 29 August 2015). 
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the shifting balance of political power (the rise of the pro-Kurdish political party and 
the weakening of mainstream Turkish political parties in terms of electoral votes in 
the region); (3) the failure of Turkish politics to resolve the Kurdish question.  
Although I propose these three interrelated internal political factors, I also put 
this into a larger context which enables more comprehensive understanding of the 
unfinished nature of the project, by scrutinizing the ‘external’ political development 
factor, that is, the development of cosmopolitan democracy or cosmopolitanism. This 
concept has played a unique role in the post-Cold War world order, and EU 
candidates are forced to respect its criteria. I examine to what extent cosmopolitanism 
has impacted on Turkish policy regarding the completion of the GAP modernization 
strategy. 
 
7.2. The rise of the Kurdish national movement in the region  
 
Before assessing to what extent the rise of the Kurdish national movement has played 
a role in contributing to a sceptical attitude on the part of the Turkish state towards the 
completion of the ‘social development’ project, I will briefly reiterate the history of 
the movement.   
As I indicated in Chapter Two, after the Kurdish uprisings between 1925 and 
1938 had been crushed, Kurdish nationalism was almost vanquished by the mid-
1940s. Either the Kurds had been cowed into silence or they had been thoroughly 
assimilated. The idea of Kurdish nationalism was almost non-existent in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey, though the Kurdish movement exerted a limited influence under 
Barzani’s leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan. The only demands for Kurdish rights and 
socio-economic rights were made by Kurdish students in the big cities of Turkey such 
as Istanbul and Ankara.117  
However, a new Kurdish National Liberation Movement appeared in the 
region in the late 1970s, the PKK, under Abdullah Öcalan’s leadership. In the 
beginning, neither the Kurds nor the Turkish state took the PKK seriously. While the 
Kurds saw the PKK as a student movement, a typical student reaction to the Turkish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Kurdish students formed the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East, or Dogu (DDKD), in the 
1970s. They were not a serious Kurdish national development movement but mainly focused on the 
Kurdish region’s socio-economic issues and the need for development. However they were outlawed in 
1980, their activities banned and their leaders imprisoned. 
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state, the Turkish state itself perceived it to be a marginal group who posed no major 
threat to its national security.118 For example, in 17 August 1984, when the PKK 
launched its first active attack on the Turkish gendarme station in Eruh, a town in the 
south-east, Prime Minister Turgut Özal told the media that it was nothing to be taken 
seriously: “three, five rogues’ ingenuity”.119  
The above short statement is significant, because it was made during the 
period when Turkey was drawing up the GAP socio-economic development 
programme for the south-east, which was considered to be the first serious Turkish 
socio-economic plan since the creation of the country.  However, the PKK 
“developed [a] broad organizational structure and displayed an enormous capacity to 
mobilize Kurds both within and without Turkey, especially in Europe” (Hirschler 
2001: 146). Despite the fact that the literature (see Chapter Four) contains the notion 
that the whole idea of the GAP ‘social development’ project was to weaken and 
control the rise of the Kurdish national movement led by the PKK, the PKK had 
“become the first political-military organization transcending regional and tribal ties 
capable of appealing to a wide range of Kurds residing in different parts of the 
country” (Barkey and Fuller 1997: 61). At the time, according to Barkey and Fuller 
(Ibid: 60), “[t]he PKK, at one point, was estimated to have some 10,000 well-armed 
insurgents and could command the loyalty of 50,000 militia and, according to 
government estimates, 375,000 sympathizers.” 
The battle between 100,000 Turkish troops and the PKK, with at least 10,000 
guerrillas, turned the region into a war zone.120 The Turkish troops, backed up with 
modern tanks, helicopters and with strong government support from Ankara, found it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 It should be noted that, just before the 1980 military coup in Turkey, PKK leaders left Turkey, and 
moved to the Syrian-controlled Beqa’ Valley. In the Beqa’Valley, in a very short time, many young 
women and men joined the PKK, where they first trained. The number of the militants had “grown so 
large there was no longer enough room to train them” (Marcus 1993: 242). The PKK, who were well 
organized in the Beqa’ Valley camp, turned back to the Turkish Kurdish region and launched their 
attack on the Turkish state on 15 August 1984. This attack was on the gendarmerie station in Eruh in 
the province of Siirt, where later the PKK gained strong support from the Kurds. The Kurds in Turkey, 
who had been greatly intimidated by the authority of the Turkish state for years, were now beginning to 
take sufficient courage to make socio-economic demands and ask for their cultural rights. 
119  See Özal, 26 yıl önce “Üç, beş çapulcu” demişti | Hasan Pulur 
...www.milliyet.com.tr/ozal...capulcu.../default.htm; Cumhuriyet-28.11.2010 Günü 9. Sayfa - 
Cumhuriyet Arşivi, www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/.../9.xhtml (accessed June 2015). 
120 Since the war between the Turkish army and PKK militants began, over 40,000 have died and 3,000 
villages have been destroyed, and many evacuated by the Turkish authorities in order to cut off locals’ 
relations with the PKK in the interests of security (Galletti 1999). It is estimated that over 3 million 
Kurds became refugees on their own soil, of whom more than 2 million moved to the west of Turkey, 
while thousands migrated to European countries. 
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impossible to put an end to guerrilla attacks. When the Turkish army came to realize 
that the PKK had established a strong relationship with the Kurdish people, the army 
began to terrorise the region in order to put a stop to the people’s support for the 
PKK. Turkey imprisoned thousands of PKK activists and burned thousands of 
villages in the name of security.  
As Hatip Dicle, Kurdish politician and former chairman of the Turkish Human 
Rights Association office in Diyarbakir said: “The government is losing authority in 
this region and they are trying to solve the problem with violence” (Marcus 1993: 
240). As Marcus put it: “The on-going violence only strengthened Kurdish support for 
the guerrillas” (Ibid: 240) and increased Kurdish nationalism. 
Thus, the whole idea of GAP’s social programmes, to ameliorate socio-
economic problems and politically stabilise the south-east, slowed down due to the 
rise of the Kurdish national movement. In this regard, the GAP regional director, 
Mehmet Acikgöz (personal interview July 2011), indicated to me that political 
problems in the region made Turkey’s work harder in relation to the completion of 
GAP. 
Moreover, Kurdish nationalism also developed in Turkey’s neighbouring 
countries. In particular, with the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the creation of  no-fly 
zones over northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) by the US and its ally Britain to protect 
potential victims from Saddam’s regime, provided a substantial opportunity to the 
Kurds there (Finlan 2003: 69).  
The invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition provided the Kurds with a unique 
opportunity to administer their own region, which later gave birth to Kurdish 
autonomy and prosperity (Stansfield 2003: 121). So the Gulf War was the real 
foundation of a de facto Kurdish state, and this profoundly “affected the Kurdish 
question, the geopolitical and geostrategic role it plays in the Middle East” (Olson 
1992: 485).  
What is more, “since 1991, geopolitical realities have promoted a further 
development of the Iraqi Kurdish situation, which, for the Kurdish leaders, is now 
dominated by the issue of self-governance” (Stansfield 2003: 12). So, for the first 
time ever, Kurds have begun to be in a position to secure their rights in world politics; 
the Kurds now “freely … determine their political status and […] pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development – [which] is a compelling legal concept for 
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many groups seeking greater autonomy, protection and freedom from a repressive 
authoritarian regime” (Yildiz 2004: 151).  
In this regard, the establishment of an autonomous government in Iraqi 
Kurdistan “gave hope to Kurds throughout the region, marking a shift in attitudes to 
the Kurdish question amongst the Kurds themselves and raising the possibility of 
improving their standing within individual states” (Yildiz 2005: 64). This 
development in Kurdish fortunes, in particular the accompanying rise in nationalism, 
posed a substantial threat to Turkish national security. This development was not what 
Turkey wanted to see either within its border or next to its border.121  
With regard to these political developments, not only in Turkey but also in 
neighbouring countries, one of the participants (name not given) at my group 
interview in Hasankeyf , June 2011, stated that the GAP project slowed down, 
particularly in many parts of the pro-PKK Kurdish area. The group’s general view 
was that Turkey had changed its mind regarding the social programmes. The prime 
minister, Recep T. Erdogan, who went to the south-east with 75 of his regional MPs 
to present a new GAP Action Plan in 2008, admitted that “factors such as resource 
limitations, economic crises, terrorist activities striking the region and unstable 
environment reigning in the Gulf Area as well as some technical defects kept this 
project behind the desired level of success” (www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 11 February 
2014).  
However the situation may have been presented by the prime minister, based 
on my observation and empirical data, when the Turkish state realized that its original 
concept of GAP would not be properly realized as a consequence of the unpredictable 
effects of Kurdish political escalation, it drew back from implementing the social 
programme and focused on hydroelectric production for Turkish energy needs. It also 
began to use some of the dams in the GAP project for internal security. For example, 
11 dams were completed in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces, close to the Iraqi-Turkish 
border, with security in mind, both to block the PKK from having relations with the 
locals and to prevent a possible attack on Turkish military stations in the region. As I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For instance, in 1997, when the rise of the PKK was underway, and it was being developed in what 
is now Iraqi Kurdistan, raising the possibility of an independent Kurdish region, Turkey attacked it in 
northern Iraq, and maintained a buffer zone in Iraq on a permanent basis, with almost 8,000 Turkish 
soldiers, 15 kilometres deep, and “along the entire length of the 330 kilometre frontier between the two 
countries” (Gresh 1998: 167). This buffer zone was also intended to cut off the PKK’s connection with 
and entrance from the Syrian-Iraqi borders.  
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indicated in Chapter Five, the purpose of these 11 dams was to fill many caves and 
valleys, thus preventing PKK guerillas from using them and deterring militants from 
the PKK camps in the region.122 
So, to conclude this section, it is clear that when the Turkish state (as the result of 
developments in Kurdish nationalism) became deeply concerned about its internal 
security, geo-strategic and geo-politics factors, it began to apply rational choice. 
Therefore, one of the reasons that GAP has not yet achieved its key aims is because of 
regional political developments which impacted on the ‘social development’ project. 
The Turkish state and its policy-makers have mainly been concerned with security 
issues, while neglecting the interests of GAP and ignoring the importance of the 
social programmes in the region. However, one cannot encompass the whole 
condition of GAP within the framework of the above statement; there are other factors 
which need to be assessed. Hence, the following section will discuss how the rise of a 
pro-Kurdish political party has also played a role in shifting the balance of political 
power in the south-east, another factor which had led to the project being neglected. 
 
7.3. The rise of the Pro-Kurdish political party in the south-east: shifting 
balances in political power 
 
When exploring the question of how the pro-Kurdish political party has played a role 
in shifting the political power balance in the south-east, thereby shrinking the 
mainstream Turkish political parties’ support for GAP, it is important to begin with a 
brief historical account of the role of the Kurdish electorate in Turkish politics. As I 
indicated in Chapter Three, when Turkey made its transition from a single-party to a 
multi-party system during the 1950s, the Kurds played a major role in electing the 
Democratic Party in Turkey, and since the victory of the Democratic Party, the Kurds 
had become important for many mainstream Turkish political parties in the region in 
terms of delivering votes (McDowall 1985). To generate a huge number of votes in 
the south-east was much easier for the mainstream Turkish parties at the time, and 
they would get elected with the assistance of the local tribal leaders (Ibid). So, from 
the transition from single party to multi-parties until the 1990s, Turkish politicians 
and the government greatly benefited from the Kurdish voters. Until the 1990s, since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See www.milliyet.com.tr; www.Hurriyet.com.tr; Yeni Ozgur Politika,  (accessed July 2011). 
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there was no pro-Kurdish party in Turkey, the votes of Kurds were going to Turkish 
mainstream parties with the help of Kurdish tribes, landlords and religious men or 
sheikhs. 
However, the emergence of the pro-Kurdish political party, the People’s 
Labour Party, or Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP), which was established in the 1990s and 
in 1991 had a successful result in the regional election when it was represented for the 
first time in the national assembly, has revolutionized the political nature of the south-
east. The region used to be in the hands of Kurdish tribes, landlords and sheikhs, 
socially and economically, with the knowledge of the Turkish state. This state of 
affairs perfectly suited the mainstream Turkish political parties who used to then 
receive the electoral votes in the region, but, as the result of the emergence of this 
pro-Kurdish party, this is no longer the case.  
Before examining the impact of the pro-Kurdish party in the region and 
outlining the ways in which it has become a threat to the mainstream Turkish political 
parties, and before seeing to what extent its rise has diminished support by other 
parties for GAP, it is important to examine a few election results in the south-east.  
The chart below shows the percentage of votes for the five mainstream 
Turkish parties at the election in 1987, when all five parties got a considerable 
number of votes from the region. I have selected the city of Diyarbakir as the sample 
area on account of its important political position in the region.  
 
Diyarbakir election result, 1987123 
Percentage of vote obtained by each political party 
 
• Social Democratic People's Party or Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Partisi (SHP) 
25% 
• Welfare Party or Refah Partisi (RF) 24% 
• Motherland or Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) 22% 
• Right Path Party or Dogru Yol partisi (DYP) 13% 
• Democratic Left Party or Demokratik Sol Partisi (DSP) 9% 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123  See milletvekili genel seçimleri 1923 - 2011 ri - Türkiye İstatistik, 
www.tuik.gov.tr/IcerikGetir.do?istab_id=152; www.secim-sonuclari.com/1987; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/.../secim_sorgu.genel_seciml (accessed March 
2015). 
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As the above table shows, all the mainstream political parties received significant 
numbers of votes from Diyarbakir in 1987. The SHP received more votes than other 
parties, because most regional sitting MPs were members of that party. However, with 
the rise of the pro-Kurdish political movement in the 1990s and onwards in Turkish 
politics, the traditional system began to change within the region. In the 1990s, Kurds 
in Turkey established their first legal party, the People's Labour Party (HEP). In the 
1991 national general election, the HEP made an agreement to join with the SHP. 
This led to the most successful outcome for the SHP during this period, not only in 
Diyarbakir but in the region as a whole.124 
 
Diyarbakir election result, 1991  
 
• SHP 49% 
• RF 12% 
• ANAP 13% 
• DYP 19% 
• DSP 2% 
 
So although the SHP substantially increased its votes in Diyarbakir in the context of 
its agreement with the HEP, other mainstream Turkish political parties, though 
weakened, continued to exist in the south-east. Nevertheless, the Kurdish political 
movement, through integration into the SHP, managed to win 16 seats in the Turkish 
parliament (Bruinessen 1996). However, when Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle took their 
vows in Kurdish as well as in Turkish in parliament, the Kurdish MPs were forced to 
leave the SHP as the result of the ensuing political pressure. The HEP MPs created 
their own group in parliament. This was the first time in Turkey’s history that there 
were Kurdish MPs represented in parliament, taking their places as new actors in 
Turkish politics. So, “the HEP managed to play a prominent part in Turkish politics 
for several years” (Watts 1999: 631-2) and gained a significant level of success in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124See milletvekili genel seçimleri 1923 - 2011 ri - Türkiye İstatistik, 
www.tuik.gov.tr/IcerikGetir.do?istab_id=152; or www.secim-sonuclari.com/1987; Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/.../secim_sorgu.genel_seciml 
(accessed March 2015).  
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south-east. This created confusion and a new threat for the other Turkish parties and 
the Turkish state, despite the fact that this group of MPs could not openly declare 
themselves to be a Kurdish party for legal reasons, since the Turkish courts would not 
permit it.     
Nevertheless, the conventional Turkish political parties were deeply concerned 
that if Kurdish nationalism awoke, they may lose their traditional role in the region. 
When the Kurdish MPs began openly talking about basic Kurdish rights and Turkish 
state policy in the south-east,125 all the mainstream Turkish parties supported the state 
in its efforts to overcome the notion of Kurdishness in the region.  The group of 
Kurdish MPs faced frequent pressure from the Turkish authorities and political 
parties. In 1993, the HEP was closed down and outlawed by the Turkish High 
Security Court, and its MPs, Leyal Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, Ahmet Turk, 
Sirri Sakik and Mahmut Alinak, were imprisoned by the State Security Courts for a 
decade.126  
In addition, many pro-Kurdish politicians were targeted, and Kurdish writers, 
such as activist Musa Anter, were killed; Vedat Aydin, a lawyer and human rights 
activist in Diyarbakir who became the HEP's provincial chairperson, was assassinated 
in 1991, and the Kurdish party deputy for Mardin province, Mehmet Sincar, was 
assassinated in September 1993 (Bruinessen 1996). However, pro-Kurdish activists 
and voters did not give up their movement in the region. This was not welcomed by 
the Turkish mainstream parties because it meant they were losing their hegemonic 
position there. As Watts puts it; “As one layer of pro-Kurdish leadership was removed 
from active political participation, others rose to take its place. When the 
Constitutional Court closed one pro-Kurdish party, pro-Kurdish activists opened 
another” (1999: 640). 
Despite the fact that there was a brief period of relief for the mainstream 
Turkish parties when the court closed down the first Kurdish party, pro-Kurdish party 
members created the People's Democracy Party or Halkin Demokrasi Partisi 
(HADEP) in 1994. The Kurdish political movement participated in Turkish general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125  See 1990'larda Kürt siyasi hareketi | Al Jazeera Turk – Ortadoğu, 
www.aljazeera.com.tr/.../1990larda-kurt-siyasi-hareket; CHP-Kürt siyasi hareketi diyalektiği – Cengiz 
Çandar, www.Hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/16360124.asp (accessed April 2015). 
126 See Human rights of parliamentarians - Inter-Parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org/hr-
e/158/mission.htm; Hürriyet, Turkey - High Court upholds verdict against DEP MPs, 
www.Hurriyetdailynews.com/high-court-upholds-verdict-against-dep-mp (accessed April 2015). 
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elections in the form of HADEP in 1995 and 1999. Although it only received a 4% 
vote across Turkey, in the Kurdish region it received substantial numbers of votes in 
both elections.127 Again, if we take Diyarbakir city as our example, all the popular 
Turkish mainstream parties lost votes and HADEP received the most. 
 
 
Diyarbakir election result, 1995128  
 
• HADEP 46% 
• SHP 1% 
• RF 18% 
• ANAP 13% 
• DYP 10% 
• DSP 2% 
 
As the table above shows, the SHP, which used to get the highest electoral vote in the 
south-east, and other parties, in particular ANAP and DYP, all lost substantial 
numbers of votes. In 1999, the situation for HADEP got even better, when we assess 
the overall number of votes received in the region. 
 
Diyarbakir election result, 1999129 
 
• HADEP 46% 
• CHP 3% 
• FP 14% 
• ANAP 11% 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  See milletvekili genel seçimleri 1923 - 2011 ri - Türkiye İstatistik, 
www.tuik.gov.tr/IcerikGetir.do?istab_id=152; www.secim-sonuclari.com/1987; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/.../secim_sorgu.genel_seciml (accessed April 
2015). 
128 Seçim 1995 - Genel Seçim Sonuçları - Habertürk, www.haberturk.com/secim1995; 1995 Yılı Seçim 
Sonuçları - Seçim Sonuçları, www.secim-sonuclari.com/1995 (accessed April 2015). 
129  See Diyarbakır - 1999 Yılı Seçim Sonuçları - Seçim Sonuçları, www.secim-
sonuclari.com/1999/diyarbakir; Yerel Secim.com-Diyarbakır Seçim Sonuçları, Milletvekilleri,  
www.yerelsecim.com/Detays.asp?ID=21&SY=1999 (accessed April 2015). 
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• DYP 11% 
• DSP 5%  
 
Note: The SHP joined the Republican People’s Party, or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), and RF 
members joined the Virtue Party (FP). 
 
HADEP received a considerably higher level of votes from the region than other 
parties,  
 
Despite the fact that due to the 10% nation-wide vote threshold for 
Parliamentary representation impedes any HADEP… representative to win a 
seat in the Parliament and thus forms a disincentive to vote for these parties, 
people in the region chose to vote for them most likely as a sign of distinct 
political identity. (Carkoglu and Eder 2005) 
  
However, when the Turkish Constitutional Court closed HADEP down in 1997, with 
Turkish police later entering HADEP headquarters and arresting its administrators,  
pro-Kurdish political activists had already formed the Democratic People’s Party or 
Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP).130 It is worth analyzing the table below: 
 
General Election, 2002 
GAP Region Provinces 
A
K
P 
C
H
P 
D
Y
P 
M
H
P 
G
P 
D
E
H
A
P 
A
N
A
P 
SP
 
O
th
er
 p
ar
tie
s 
ADIYAMAN 41.3 13.4 9.7 4.8 2.1 11.9 5.3 5.4 6 
DİYARBAKIR 15.9 5.9 7.2 1.5 1.7 56.2 4.0 2.3 5.1 
GAZİANTEP 40.0 19.2 6.4 6.9 7.2 8.0 4.4 2.2 5.9 
MARDİN 15.4 11.6 8.2 2.8 1.5 39.6 8.8 1.6 10.6 
SİİRT 17.5 8.9 4.8 7.1 1.1 32.2 9.9 1.7 16.8 
ŞANLIURFA 22.9 9.9 16.3 8.0 1.7 19.4 10.1 4.6 7.1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See Hızla yükselen Kürt oyları ne zaman kırıldı - Gündem - T24, t24.com.tr/.../hizla-yukselen-kurt-
oylari-ne-zaman-kiri (accessed 28 April 2015). 
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BATMAN 20.6 6.9 9.6 2.0 0.8 47.2 7.5 3.4 2.2 
ŞIRNAK 14.1 4.7 5.2 2.9 1.3 45.9 11.3 0.4 14.3 
KİLİS 36.4 6.5 15.2 10.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 3.6 21.8 
TURKEY  34.3 19.4 9.5 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.1 2.5 7.4 
Carkoglu and Eder 2005 
 
As the above table indicates, the Justice and Development Party, or Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), which had become one of the most popular parties in 
Turkish politics, received a noticeably lower vote in the GAP region, though it 
received a high proportion of the national vote.  
 
Other centrist parties of the left and right as well as the Nationalist Action 
Party or Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) and in most provinces the old-
generation pro-Islamist Felicity Party or Saadet Partisi (SP), have all received 
lower support in the region than their nation-wide averages. (Ibid) 
   
DEHAP was the party to receive the highest number of votes from the region. “Only 
in Kilis and Adıyaman the centrist parties could perform better than their national 
averages” (Ibid 2005). As Carkoglu and Eder point out, “from the perspective of the 
distribution of party preferences across [the] region’s provinces we see that there is a 
very distinct support for the ethnic Kurdish DEHAP that continues from 1999” (Ibid).  
Despite the fact that “President Turgut Özal had broken years of state silence 
by claiming he was part Kurdish, and even more conservative centre-right statesmen, 
such as Süleyman Demirel, had acknowledged a ‘Kurdish reality’” (Watts 1999: 649), 
their electoral votes did not increase, and gradually they disappeared from the region. 
Furthermore, although both Demirel and Özal began to use the GAP project in their 
political campaigns during national elections in the south-east in order to increase 
their votes, and although both would argue that the project was for the region’s socio-
economic development,131 the locals, in particular the Kurds, did not change their 
minds. So, these two famous Turkish leaders’ parties, who had both played significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 For instance, the ninth president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel (2006), who played a major role in 
creating the project, argued that he was its founder and that he would not let anyone snatch the project 
away. On the other hand, Turgut Özal argued that it was his signature under all the dams created in the 
region. 
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roles in creating the GAP project, no longer received votes as they used to. Later, in 
2008, when Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan went to the region, partly in an attempt 
to secure its future votes, he claimed that the project would be completed by 2012 and 
the region would be better off (www.gov.tr).132 Such political claims gradually lost 
their meaning with the locals and they made a clear choice for the pro-Kurdish party.  
There is no doubt that the progress of  the pro-Kurdish political movement in 
the south-east region has had a profound effect on the attitude of all centrist parties,  
of both left and right perspectives, to the south-east. According to my research in the 
region, when the mainstream Turkish political parties began to lose their dominant 
position and did not receive votes from the region, they gradually removed their 
support from GAP. According to one of the participants in the group in Hasankeyf, 
“All this is politics and the Turkish government and politicians are punishing the 
Kurds for not being faithful.”  
To recap, my research shows that, despite the fact that Turkey has tried to 
block the development of a pro-Kurdish party, closing it down several times and 
imprisoning many elected Kurdish politicians, the party receives a higher percentage 
of votes in the south-east than any other. In particular, in the 2015 general election, 
the pro-Kurdish movement, led by the People’s Democratic Party, or Halkların 
Demokratik Partisi, managed to break the 10% nation-wide vote threshold and 
became the fourth party in the Turkish parliament, with over 13% of the national 
vote.133  
So it has become clear that the loss of the Turkish mainstream parties’ 
dominant position to pro-Kurdish parties in the GAP region has resulted in negligence 
towards the GAP ‘social development’ project, not only by the leaders of the Turkish 
political parties, but also by the government, and this has played a significant role in 
the project failing to reach its ‘social development’ target.  However, it would not be 
accurate to argue that the loss of these parties’ dominant position and the 
establishment of Kurdish political parties was the only reason why the project faced 
failure. There are other obstructions, such as the lack of Turkish policies for resolving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See also GAP'ta 26 yıldır süren yalan - ANF | Ajansa Nûçeyan a Firatê, anfturkce.net/news/gap-ta-
26-yildir-suren-yalan (accessed 10 June 2014). 
133 See BBC, Diyarbakır: HDP artık Türkiye partisi olma yükünü sırtland,  
www.bbc.com/.../150608_diyarbakir_secim_gs2015; Seçim 2015 | Hürriyet, Türkiye Genel Seçimleri, 
www.Hurriyet.com.tr/secim-2015/ (accessed 20 June 2015). 
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the Kurdish question and the failure to reach an agreement with the PKK regarding 
the ‘peace talks’, and this is discussed in the following section.    
 
7.4. The lack of resolution of the Kurdish Question: failed policies and strategies 
 
In this section I will analyze the failing policies and strategies of the Turkish state 
regarding the Kurdish question, in particular ‘peace processes’ or ‘peace talks’ 
between the PKK and the state, which have had a negative impact on the GAP 
project. To understand how the project has been obstructed by such policies and 
strategies, it is necessary to briefly restate the history of Turkish state politics towards 
the Kurds, after which I will scrutinize the ‘peace talks’ in order to understand why 
they failed and the negative impact this has had on the GAP project. 
Since the creation of the republic, Turkish policy-makers have been very 
concerned by the Kurds’ demands for their political and cultural rights. The policy-
makers always believed that these could ultimately lead to the independence of 
Kurdistan, and that such a development would damage the country’s republican 
formation (Kiliç 1998; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003). However, for the first time, the Turkish 
state began to put some effort into undertaking negotiations with the Kurds/PKK 
when the latter was at its strongest, in the 1990s.  
The negotiations began with the first unilateral ceasefire by the PKK, in 1993, 
during Turgut Özal’s presidency. Although the unilateral ceasefire was a PKK 
initiative, it was partly the result of Özal’s influence. He encouraged Abdullah 
Öcalan, the PKK leader, to seek a ceasefire through the mediation of a group of pro-
Kurdish parliamentarians and the Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, head of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), an influential force in Iraqi Kurdistan (Barkey 
and Fuller 1997). Özal’s initiative was based on a very strong personal desire to make 
peace with the PKK, as Turkish state policy more broadly was quite sceptical at the 
time about the possibility of doing so. 
Özal not only played a major role in the Turkish economy’s development 
model, which created a new entrepreneurial middle class, but also helped transform 
Turkey in the areas “of politics, culture and foreign policy initiatives in the post-1980 
era” (Öniş 2004). In this context, he predicted that, without solving the Kurdish 
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question, Turkish economic growth and political stability would not be achievable.134 
He also knew that the GAP ‘social development’ concept would be just a dream amid 
the tense conflict in the south-east. There was also the associated external threat of 
water disputes with Syria and Iraq. When Turkey began to build dams on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, this created serious tension in the Middle East, because it 
decreased Iraq and Syria’s access to water (Schulz 1995).  
Although there has not been serious conflict between these countries on the 
water issue, a group known as the Kurdish–Arab Front Against Turkey have several 
times threatened to destroy dams in Turkey (Ibid: 100). Özal knew that the unstable 
political conditions in the south-east had to be addressed, the first step being to reach 
a peaceful settlement with Turkey’s own Kurds in the form of the PKK. However, 
there were serious political obstructions in the way of peace talks in the early 1990s. 
So, in order for the 1993 ceasefire to be extended, Talabani and pro-Kurdish 
parliamentarians, “who claimed to have gone there [to Öcalan’s base in Syria] with 
Özal’s encouragement,” held discussions with Öcalan, and he subsequently called a 
second international press conference at which he announced an extension of the PKK 
ceasefire (Barkey and Fuller 1997). 
According to Robin “The ceasefire was a unilateral declaration made as a 
‘gesture of goodwill’” (1993: 669). It was to run from 20 March through to 15 April, 
with the benefits immediately being garnered through a more or less peaceful Kurdish 
New Year celebration, Newroz. Öcalan’s order to his militants ensured that the 
ceasefire took place successfully for a while; but the Turkish army, instead of using 
the opportunity to solve the Kurdish question, which would have made a huge 
difference to the continued implementation of the GAP social development project, 
continued their operations in the south-east. These military operations had an 
extremely negative effect on GAP proposals such as GAP-GIDEM (see Chapter 
Two), which aimed to encourage national and international entrepreneurs to invest in 
the region.135 
Nevertheless, the Turkish state claimed that “the PKK had suffered 
extensively during the October 1992 incursion of the Turkish army into northern Iraq” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See Radikal, www.radikal.com.tr/ Yazarlar/ Politika; Ruşen Çakır, Turkiyenin Kurt Sorunu 11, 
www.rusencakir.com/Turkiyenin-Kurt-Sorunu-11/14, Cengiz Çandar Özal (accessed 15 March 2015). 
135 See more regarding GAP-GIDEM in www.gap.gov.tr (accessed in December 2009); TC Kalkınma 
Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, GAP Nedir, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx. 
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(Barkey and Fuller 1997). Thus, the state and security forces claimed that the reason 
the PKK had declared a ceasefire was because it was getting weak; once it became 
stronger, it would attack again (Ibid). The Turkish security forces used this as their 
pretext to continue their military attacks on PKK bases during the ceasefire.  
Moreover, during 1993 there was a vacuum in Turkish politics under 
Süleyman Demirel’s leadership, as he “refused to take the ceasefire offer seriously, 
despite the fact that the PKK declaration had been met with great relief in Turkey as a 
possible end to the conflict that had been claiming a rising number of casualties 
among Turkish soldiers and costing billions of dollars” (Ibid: 70).  
The billions of dollars being spent on the war between the PKK and Turkish 
security forces were coming from the central budget and, since the GAP project was 
financed by the central budget, this meant that these billions of dollars included 
financial resources originally intended for GAP. This became clear when I 
interviewed the regional director, Acikgoz (personal interview July 2011), who stated 
that although their target of completing the project was 2005, the government could 
not find credit to do so. The state could not provide a budget for the project because it 
was spending money on the war with the PKK.136 Thus, as Açikgöz states, the project 
was extended to 2010, later to 2012, and now to 2018, as a result of the budget deficit.  
However, on 17 April 1993, Özal died from a heart attack and many people, 
including the PKK leader Öcalan, believed that he was deliberately killed137 by a 
Turkish ‘deep-state’138.  
Turkish ‘deep-state’ organization is based in the Turkish army, ranging from 
low to high level commanders (Gunter 2006). Top military generals may appear to be 
mere state officials, but they secretly support the ‘Deep State’ group, which has been 
extremely resistant to the idea of the existence of the Kurdish question, and would 
provoke anything to deny Kurdish basic rights or undermine anything related to them. 
Many journalists, young radical students, Kurdish politicians and ordinary people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136  See Ekonomi, 30 yılda teröre harcanan para dudak uçuklattı!  
ekonomi.haber7.com/ekonomi/.../1034683-30-yilda-t..; İç Politika, PKK ile 30 yıllık mücadele 350 
milyar dolar, www.haber7.com/ SİYASET/ İç Politika (accessed June 2015).  
137 See Ölümü şüpheli mezarı açılsın - Özgür Gündem, ozgur-gundem.com/.../olumu-supheli-mezari-
acilsin; Özal suikasti faili meçhul bağlantılı - Politika, haber.star.com.tr/ Politika Haberleri (accessed 
June 2015). 
138  See also SABAH - Demirel derin devleti anlatıyor 
arsiv.sabah.com.tr/ozel/derin911/dosya_900.html; 'Derin devlet' nedir? - Zaman, 
www.zaman.com.tr/.../derin-devlet-nedir_497509.htm (accessed June 2015). 
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involved in any way with the rights of the Kurds, have suddenly disappeared or been 
killed by the ‘Deep State’ organization (Ibid) Though Gunter shows that the ‘Deep-
State’ was not a specific organization with a leader, he correctly identifies that it was 
a mentality; “concerning what Turkey should be, namely strongly nationalist, statist, 
secular, and right-wing” (2006: 348). Gunter demonstrates that the ‘Deep-State’ 
somehow managed to institutionalize itself within the National Security Council 
(NSC).  
The NSC’s job was to advise the government on matters of internal and 
external security issues. Gunter also points out that, though it seems that the Cabinet 
runs the state, this power “actually lies elsewhere… in the military and other dubious 
and secret formations involving people either directly from within the institutions of 
the state or those who are very close to this establishment defined as ‘the Deep 
State’”(Ibid: 336).  
In Semdinli, a Kurdish town in south-east Turkey, in November 2005, “the 
Umit (Hope) bookstore owned by Seferi Yilmaz, a former PKK member … was 
bombed” by the ‘Deep-State’ (Ibid: 344). Locals who witnessed the attack surrounded 
the car belonging to the three attackers, which had a civilian number plate - but turned 
out to be registered to the army unit in the town. Two of the men were officers of a 
paramilitary anti-terror intelligence unit while one was a former PKK member turned 
state informer (Ibid: 344). At the time, Turkish land forces, headed by General Yasar 
Buyukanit, strongly rejected any official connections with the Semdinli bombing, but 
the general stated that he knew one of the suspects and admired him as a ‘good guy’.  
Moreover, the public prosecutor, Ferhat Sarikaya, claimed that Buyukanit was 
attempting to influence the court by expressing his admiration for one of the officers 
charged with the bombing, and stated that Buyukanit was setting up an illegal force to 
provoke unrest among the Kurds. It was shortly after his statement about Buyukanit 
that the prosecutor was sacked by the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges 
(HSYK). He was accused of making irrelevant claims. Furthermore, the state 
“removed Sabri Uzun, the chief of the Intelligence Department of the General 
Directorate of Security, who had sought to support Sarikaya” (Ibid: 345).  
The former president and prime-minister, Suleyman Demirel, stated in a 
television interview that there are two states. “There is the state and there is the deep 
state… When a small difficulty occurs, the civilian state steps back and the deep state 
becomes the generator [of decisions]” (Ibid: 346). 
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So one of the reasons that the possible peace preccesses failed was because the 
role of the ‘deep-state’ in Turkey, which organized to sabotage possible peace talks 
between the Turkish government and the PKK. This had a huge negative impact, not 
only on the peace talks themselves, but also on the progress of the GAP project. 
Shortly after Özal’s death, on 25 May 1993 a bus carrying unarmed army 
recruits was stopped in Bingöl province and 23 were killed by PKK militants under 
the regional commander Sakik, who later left the PKK and was arrested by the 
Turkish army in Iraqi Kurdistan (Robins 1993). This attack on Turkish soldiers came 
as a surprise, and Öcalan announced that the event had not been authorized, to his 
knowledge; this led to many questions as to whether it really was the PKK which was 
responsible, or whether it was a ‘deep-state’ organization wanting to sabotage the 
ceasefire.  
However, the 1993 unilateral PKK ceasefire could have been an opportunity 
for peace in the region, which might have helped resolve the socio-economic issues in 
the south-east and/or enabled progress with the GAP project. Instead, the region sank 
deeper socially and economically, and the war between the PKK and Turkish security 
forces brought more destruction to the region and its inhabitants. So Turkey’s agenda 
for the south-east during this period was mainly focused on the conflict rather than on 
the completion of the ‘social development’ project. Turkey continued to fight against 
the PKK and wanted to shelve GAP and the region’s socio-economic problems. 
During 1998 Turkey threatened Syria with war if the Syrian authorities did not 
expel the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who had been resident there since 
1980. Shortly after Öcalan’s departure from Syria, he was captured in Kenya and 
brought to Turkey (Gunter 2000: 850). Öcalan believed that, now he was back in 
Turkey - albeit in prison - it would be easier to negotiate for peace between Turkey 
and the PKK: 
 
Instead of issuing a hardline appeal for renewed struggle during his trial for 
treason that ended on 29 June 1999 with a sentence of death, Öcalan issued a 
remarkable statement that calls for the implementation of true democracy to 
solve the Kurdish problem within the existing borders of a unitary Turkey, and 
thus fulfills Atatürk's ultimate hopes for a strong, united and democratic 
Turkey that can join what is now the European Union. (Ibid: 853) 
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Öcalan called on his militants to declare ceasefire and withdraw from Turkish 
territories to Mount Qandil and, in order to demonstrate the authenticity of their 
demands for peace, on Öcalan’s instruction, a group of eight PKK militants handed 
themselves in to Turkish security forces and claimed that their entry into Turkey was 
a peace initiative.139  
During this period of ceasefire, the region was significantly more stable than 
during previous years, but as Turkey did not use the opportunity this political 
normalization period provided to focus on completing GAP social programmes in the 
region, in 2004, after a long wait outside Turkish territory, on Mount Qandil, when 
Turkey refused to consider ‘peace talks’, “the PKK regrouped its forces and called off 
its lopsided ceasefire” (Marcus 2007: 75-84).  
A year after the ceasefire, in 2005, Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan stated 
that Turkey’s most pressing domestic issue was the ‘Kurdish problem’, and declared 
that Turkey must “resolve the discontent of its Kurdish population through democratic 
processes” (Uslu 2007: 157). The statement sparked new hope for the region’s 
development. In particular, in 2008, when Erdoğan proposed a new GAP Action Plan 
with the target of completing the project by 2012 and, during 2009, when his 
government began its first serious talks with the PKK, which came to be known as the 
Oslo talks or Oslo process, and were carried out in secret there until 2011,140 there 
was a positive atmosphere and a belief that normalization would continue in the 
south-east - and that spelt good news for GAP. 
However, these first talks did not succeed because typical statist or ‘deep-
state’ games were in play. The Oslo process came to an end when news of the 
meetings was leaked through a news agency in Turkey via unknown actors 
(Ensaroglu 2013). With the end of the Oslo process, the PKK increased its attacks on 
Turkish security forces, one of which was an attack on Silvan, in the province of 
Diyarbakir. During the following days, the region suddenly turned into a war zone 
between the PKK and the Turkish army. While the PKK’s attacks increased in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 See Öcalan'ın büyük barış mücadelesi - Özgür Gündem, www.ozgur-gundem.com/.../ocalanin-
buyuk-baris-mu; PKK'lılar Habur'da askere teslim oldu - GÜNCEL Haberleri, www.haber7.com/ 
GÜNCEL (accessed March 2015). 
140  See Al Jazeera, Turkey continues peace talks with the PKK, 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/.../2013110153318352861.ht; Neşe Düzel, Avni Özgürel: 
Türkiye barışa hızla yaklaşıyor, arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/nese-duzel/avni.../21872/ (accessed March 
2015). 
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region, the Turkish state did not only respond to these but also turned on Kurdish 
people and politicians whom they believed had relations with the PKK. Over 8,000 
Kurdish activists, politicians and journalists were imprisoned under arbitrary 
terrorism laws (The Guardian, 7 May 2013).   
However, after the failure of the secret peace talks in 2012, the Turkish Prime 
minister and the PKK leader publically revealed that new peace talks were taking 
place   between the state and the PKK. It was claimed that these involved negotiations 
with “the ultimate aim of ending the hostilities on both sides and disarming the PKK 
in return for reforms improving the rights of Turkey’s Kurds” (Nykanen 2013: 85-
102). 
In December 2012, the first announcement regarding negotiations with the 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan came from Prime Minister Erdogan, followed by 
Öcalan’s historic ‘peace talks’ announcement during Newroz (meaning new day or 
Kurdish New Year) celebrations in the Kurdish unofficial capital city, Diyarbakir, on 
21 March 2013 through the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy (BDP) party’s MPs, 
Pervin Buldan and Sirri Sureyya Onder:  
 
We have now reached a point where guns must go silent and ideas and politics 
must speak. We will unite in the face of those who try to split us. From now 
on, a new period begins when politics, not guns, will come to the fore. It is 
now time for armed elements to withdraw outside the country. (Ensaroglu 
2013: 7-18). 
 
Öcalan’s announcement was cheered by over one million Kurdish people, who were 
gathered for Newroz, and who perceived this as a political victory. 141  The 
announcement of peace was accepted by the senior PKK leader, Murat Karayilan, 
situated in Mount Qandil.142 Although opposition parties such as the Nationalist 
Movement Party or Milliyetci Haraket Partisi (MHP) indicated their concerns and 
were radically against talks with the PKK, believing that this would split the country 
apart, the Turkish government and many of the Turkish and Kurdish public saw 
Öcalan’s announcement at Newroz and the withdrawal of the PKK as positive, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 From my personal notes, when I participated in the Newroz celebration, March 2013, Diyarbakir. 
142 Mount Qandil is located in northern Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan, near the Iranian border and about 50 km 
south of the Turkish border. It is considered to be the largest PKK base in the region (Ensaroglu 2013). 
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welcomed the peace talks: ‘“The war is over’, assorted screeds declared” (Economist, 
30 March 2013). 
However, following the recent outbreak of civil war in Syria, the Syrian 
Kurds, led by the Democratic Union Party or Partiya Yekîtiya Demokra (PYD), 
which is regarded as the Syrian counterpart to the PKK, are in the process of creating 
their own autonomy.143 So, since the Turkish state does not want to see another 
Kurdish autonomous state, based on PKK ideology, alongside Iraqi Kurdistan, which 
“would mean … two officially recognized Kurdish regions would flank Turkey’s 
inhabited [south-east] region, providing inspiration, support and resources to Turkey’s 
Kurds to similarly realize their autonomy” (Nykanen 2013: 88), Turkey has continued 
its traditional policies, refusing to solve the Kurdish question. In other words, the 
‘peace talks’, which had been perceived as a great opportunity for the region’s 
stabilization and the development of its socio-economy through the GAP project, 
ended with a strong and contradictory statement from President Erdogan;144 all of 
which shows that the GAP ‘social development’ project is not going to be completed 
in the near future.  
In summary, there has been a lack of constructive strategies being 
implemented towards a healthy peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, and this 
has had a significant negative impact on GAP’s social programmes for the south-east. 
As a result, the idea has been swept under the carpet, although it was supposed to 
rebalance the economy between the west of Turkey and the south-east. 
To conclude this section, my research explores three issues (indicated above) 
which have been among the main obstacles preventing GAP from being realized. 
Having suggested three internal or domestic interrelated political issues that have 
played a role in preventing the GAP ‘social development’ project from reaching its 
target, I would advocate looking beyond these three internal obstacles and analyzing 
GAP in the context of the external or global political development framework that has 
faced the individual nation-state ever since the immediate post-Cold War period. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 See Cengiz Candar, Yeni jeopolitikte Türkiye, Öcalan, PKK, Radikal.com.tr, 24 April 2013; Rusen 
Cakir, Hükümet Öcalan ile niye anlaştı? http://www.internethaber.com (accessed 9 May 2013). 
144 See The Guardian, Turkey: it is not possible to continue peace process, www.theguardian.com/ 
World/Turkey; Zaman, President Erdoğan says Turkey never had a Kurdish problem, 
www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_president-erdogan-says-turkey-never; Hürriyet, Cumhurbaşkanı 
Erdoğan: Kardeşim ne Kürt sorunu ya, www.Hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28457474.asp (accessed July 
2015). 
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Thus, the following section will make GAP’s unfinished ‘social development’ 
project more comprehensible by analyzing it from the point of view of a cosmopolitan 
regime of democracy being an element of the post-Cold War ‘new world order’ which 
Turkey perceives as a vital threat to its unitary state.   
 
7.5.  Cosmopolitan regime of democracy: block to Turkish GAP’s ‘social 
development’ strategy?  
 
To explore to what extent the notion of cosmopolitan democracy has become an 
obstacle to the GAP ‘social development’ project being realized, the following 
discussion focuses on these issues:  (1) States Prior to Post-Cold War World Politics 
(2) End of the Cold War: Shifts in the World Order and the Rise of Cosmopolitanism.  
The above are discussed mainly to make the third and fourth sections more 
comprehensible: (3) Turkey-EU: Implementation of Cosmopolitan Democracy, and 
(4) Cosmopolitanism: GAP Social Development Project and Turkey’s Approach.  
 
7.5.1. States prior to post-Cold War world politics  
 
Although it took a long time (after the Westphalia Treaty of 1648) for sovereign states 
to occupy the central position in world politics, they came to dominate world politics 
in the mid-nineteenth century, “with territorially based nation-states born one after 
another within Europe (Germany and Italy) as well as in its periphery (the United 
States and Japan)” (Inoguchi 1999: 174). The concept of the ‘sovereign’ or ‘nation-
state’ was informed by the ‘Realist’ view that the nation-state is the sole actor in 
world politics, controlling every aspect of national and international politics.  
 According to E. H. Carr (1981: 63), who analyzed the nature of the state within 
Spinoza’s (1632–77) account of state development, “statesmen had contributed more 
to the understanding of politics than of theory and, above all, theologians; for they 
have put themselves to the school of experience, and have therefore taught nothing 
which does not bear upon our practical needs.” Spinoza goes further, as Carr relates, 
“Spinoza declares that every man does what he does according to the laws of his 
nature and to the highest right of nature” (Ibid: 63). So the crucial continuity of the 
power-seeking behaviour of individuals and states is deeply rooted in human nature. 
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As regards power-seeking, the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), reveals that 
before the names of ‘Just and Unjust’ can be invoked, there has to be some coercive 
power. So, power is and always has been the main value required for the survival of 
the state.  
 Although the state dates as far back as Thucydides (c. 460–395 BC) and 
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), it was initially based on the basic unit - the polis or 
city-state. However, after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the sovereign state became 
the principle actor in world politics (Dunne and Schmidt 2001). The justification for 
the statist approach, based mainly on a ‘Realist’ perspective, is that a desire for 
dominance through power politics is required in order to repel external threats, to 
maintain state independence, and to create stabilization in world politics. As Pettiford 
and Curley put it, realists “believe laws of realism are immune to moral injection” 
(1999: 46).  
 
 In supporting this view of the stabilization of world politics, Carr, one of the 
leading Realist thinkers between 1939 and 1979 (Hollis and Smith 1990), described 
how world politics worked from the Realist perspective. According to Carr (see 
Michael Cox, 2001, in his introduction to Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis), the world 
was empirical and he saw the world ‘as it is’. He believed that association with non-
governmental organizations could bring disaster to the state structure. Carr rejected 
what he saw as utopian views, that is, that there was a universal standard of morality. 
In his perspective, there were “no absolute standards save that of fact, and […] 
morality therefore could only be relative and not universal” (Ibid). The idea that 
universal moral principles exist is not in the interests of Realism.  
 In this regard, because of the abstract nature of international politics, Realism 
believes that states are the only actors that can be counted on in international 
relations. They believe that, to gain the highest authority, an independent sovereign 
state must not recognize a higher power above itself.  For example, “Transnational 
corporations, international organizations, and religious denominations, like all other 
ideologies, rise and fall but the ‘state’ is the one permanent feature in the landscape of 
[…] global politics” (Dunne and Schmidt 2001: 150). So, the whole idea of Realism 
is that any development, internally and externally, has to be for the interests of the 
state. Prior to the post-Cold War period, vital areas such as food, water, health, 
environment, politics, economics and society were attended to and regulated by the 
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state and developed for the interests of the state. The state was virtually the sole actor 
in all areas.  
 In the case of the Turkish policy of transforming GAP from a matter of land and 
water resources alone into a ‘social development’ project, the policy-makers 
evaluated the project in terms of the long-term self-interest of the Turkish state - as is 
a requirement of Realism. As stated in Chapter Three, since the creation of modern 
Turkey, the state/military has acted as and considered itself to be the sole guardian of 
the Turkish republic, and it was considered imperative that the state should have the 
dominant role in the economy, reformism and politics. Despite the fact that the 
Turkish state/military intervention into civilian politics has triggered major criticism, 
the state has been accepted as the most appropriate actor in the eyes of the Turkish 
public.  
 As I briefly mentioned in Chapter Five, Turkey is the only country that sees the 
state as the ‘Father state’ (Devlet baba). Mustafa Kemal, when he built Turkey, 
extended his own name, adding ‘Atatürk’, which means ‘Father of the Turks’. Hence, 
since the Turkish state/military is perceived by the majority of the Turkish republic as 
a phenomenal and sacred actor, it has had no difficulty in securing its position and the 
invisible dimension of its power in Turkish politics, particularly with regard to issues 
related to security, geo-politics, geo-economics, the Kurdish question or the GAP 
project.  
We know that elsewhere military organizations have played an important role 
on behalf of the state in establishing the social, political and economic conditions for 
the population (Fidal 1975). In particular, for people living in developing countries 
the military is the only important actor, and this shapes the quality of their existence. 
The military’s role may seem less important in developed or semi-developed 
countries, but it still plays a certain role in politics as well as in economics and 
security (Ibid).  
However, to understand why I describe the Turkish state as the decision-
maker, in relation to GAP in particular, Jacoby’s view on the state is worth 
examining. Jacoby notes that “Within Mann’s encyclopedic account of state 
development, there are two regime types — semi-authoritarian incorporation and 
autocratic militarism — in which military elites remain politically active” (2005: 
641). He argues that, since the early 1980s in Turkey, we have seen two regimes. One 
is the semi-authoritarian incorporation, which still predominates in areas of the 
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country not administered through emergency legislation. This model is prevalent in 
economically developed areas such as the Marmara region and the west of Turkey. In 
the Kurdish regions of the south-east, on the other hand, a second model, autocratic 
militarism, is visible (Ibid). This model has been institutionalized under a new 
constitutional structure, following the 1980 junta, as a means of dealing with the 
Kurdish uprising and regional socio-economic issues in the frame of the state’s 
policy. Thus, examining the GAP ‘social development’ project without considering 
the position of the Turkish state will not do the subject justice.  
The following section discusses the post-Cold War ‘new world order’ and the 
rise of cosmopolitan democracy, which I will explore in relation to Turkish politics, 
regarding GAP in the framework of this ‘new world order’, and I will also investigate 
the cosmopolitan regime of democracy, led by global governance organizations such 
as the EU.  
 
 
 
7.5.2. End of the Cold War: shifts in the world order and the rise of 
cosmopolitanism  
 
Since the immediate post-Cold War period, Turkey has been struggling to maintain 
the model of autocratic militarism in the south-east. The post-Cold War period 
involved the creation of a ‘new world order’ based on cosmopolitan democracy, 
which has had an impact on Turkish policy regarding the GAP project, because the 
project was implemented within the framework of the ‘old world order’, which was 
based on an economic and security paradigm. 
During the Cold War, the world was divided into two predominant orders: 
capitalism (US/Western Europe) and communism (Soviet Union/Eastern Europe), and 
the whole of world politics was based on these two blocs. However, when Soviet 
forces left Germany in 1994, and when Soviet leaders declared their readiness to 
withdraw their troops from the rest of Eastern Europe in 1995, the old international 
order rapidly crumbled and a ‘new world order’ arose. 
During the Cold War period, states were the most important actors and 
symbols in international relations (Williams 2008: 7), and managed to keep the peace 
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between the two blocs for 45 years. With the end of the Cold War, the position of the 
state has been increasingly challenged.  
 In liberal thinking, the contemporary nation-state is fragmented by the 
development of transnational relations. In a globally penetrating web of transnational 
relations, actors are able to challenge the political, military or economic power of a 
state. So, liberals believe that the increasingly complex and globally penetrating web 
of sovereign states is “hardly more than a symbol of territorial integrity” (Eriksson 
and Giacomello 2006: 230). 
 For contemporary liberals such as Anthony McGrew (2002), since the end of 
the Cold War, liberal “internationalism no longer appears, as E. H. Carr once 
described it, a ‘utopian edifice’ but on the contrary constitutes, in the absence of any 
secular ideological competitors, the dominant discourse of the emerging post-Cold 
War world order” (Ibid: 267). Liberal internationalism, for McGrew, provides “a 
special claim to what world politics is and can be: a state of peace” (Ibid: 268). 
 According to liberal internationalists, the discourse provided by “liberal 
internationalism has constituted a principal intellectual alternative to realism and 
geopolitics not only for explaining world order as it is, but also prescribing how it 
could be” (Ibid: 268). Liberal internationalists believe that  
 
[s]ince conflict and war are an endemic feature of a system of states in which 
sovereigns seek to maximize their power, liberal internationalism holds that it is only 
through the governance or transcendence of power politics that the necessary 
conditions for the promotion and realization of human freedom can be effectively 
achieved. (Ibid: 268) 
  
It has become clear that, since the post-Cold War period, “[m]any issues and 
problems – pollution, the use of diminishing resources, the regulation of global trade 
– [could not] be acted on effectively by any single nation-state” (Rumford, 2003: 20). 
In order to create a stable world system, cosmopolitan regimes of democratization, as 
one element of globalization, have been developed by liberal thinkers such as 
Archibugi, Held, Beck and others “with the aim of providing intellectual arguments in 
favour of an expansion of democracy, both within states and at the global level” 
(Archibugi 2004: 437) to fulfill a Kantian idea of perpetual peace in the world.  
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In order to achieve perpetual global peace, the cosmopolitan theorists or 
liberals have begun to reduce the power of the state, in the belief that “world peace 
will come through individual freedom, the free market, and the peaceful and 
voluntary associations of civil society” (Navari 2008: 29). This approach takes the 
view that “international relations could be guided by the ideals of democracy and the 
rule of law” (Archibugi 2004: 437). Thus, the idea of a cosmopolitan regime of 
democracy under international and global institutions has been regarded as the perfect 
method by which to stabilize or restore global politics.   
This idea has been popular with those who were in favour of global 
democracy, and disliked particularly by those states which fitted the autocratic 
militarism model; because such a “notion of ‘globalizing democracy’ [was] 
understood simply as a phenomenon affecting the internal regimes of the various 
states” (Ibid: 438). As Archibugi puts it:  
 
This was the basic idea behind cosmopolitan democracy — to globalize 
democracy while, at the same time, democratizing globalization (in an 
increasingly vast literature, see Archibugi and Held, 1995; Held, 1995, 1997, 
2002; Falk, 1995, 1998; McGrew, 1997, 2002; Archibugi and Koehler, 1997; 
Archibugi et al., 1998; Habermas, 1998, 2001; Kaldor, 1999; Linklater, 1998; 
Dryzek, 1999; Thompson, 1999; Holden, 2000; Franceschet, 2003; Archibugi, 
2003; Morrison, 2003). (Ibid: 438)  
 
To recap, cosmopolitanism has put the nation-state under serious pressure by  
requiring democratization of domestic policies and insisting they take up a political 
position within a globalized world system (Rumford 2003), which required that 
political power be handled by democratic actors such as international institutions, the 
UN, EU or other non-governmental organizations, which were intended to support the 
model of cosmopolitan democracy in order to force states to uphold democracy and 
allow the citizens of the globe to enjoy fundamental human rights (Held 1995) as well 
as promote the functioning of a democratic market economy. Beck describes the 
notion of cosmopolitanism very clearly:   
 
The cosmopolitan gaze opens wide and focuses – stimulated by the 
postmodern mix of boundaries between cultures and identities, accelerated by 
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the dynamics of capital and consumption, empowered by capitalism 
undermining national borders, excited by the global audience of transnational 
social movements, and guided and encouraged by the evidence of worldwide 
communication (often just another word for misunderstanding) on central 
themes such as science, law, art, fashion, entertainment, and, not least, 
politics. Worldwide public perception and debate on global ecological danger 
or global risks of a technological and economic nature (‘Frankenstein food’) 
have laid open the cosmopolitan significance of fear. And if we needed any 
proof that even genocide and the horrors of war now have a cosmopolitan 
aspect, this was provided by the Kosovo War in spring 1999 when Nato 
bombed Serbia in order to enforce the implementation of human rights. (Beck 
2000: 79) 
 
Beck’s view (Ibid: 91) is that ‘old fashioned modernists’ believe that a cohesive 
modern society is essentially “held together by language, military service and 
patriotism,” whereas cosmopolitanization depends on ethnic diversity, which allows 
for allegiances to a variety of nation-states. Archibugi and Held (2011: 343) defined 
cosmopolitan democracy as “an attempt to generate democratic governance at a 
variety of levels, including the global level.”  According to this concept, citizens are 
free to become involved in global politics without having to adhere to their own 
specific state governments. This transformation in world politics could have a 
significant impact on the domestic policies of nation-states, leading to greater 
accountability and wider representation at both a global and domestic level. 
Despite the fact that there are those who challenge the idea of cosmopolitan 
democracy, such as “Robert Dahl, Ralf Dahrendorf, David Miller, Philippe Schmitter, 
and many others, who have declared, more or less politely, that the idea of applying 
the concept of democracy beyond the state is premature, naïve, or simply wrong and 
dangerous” (Ibid: 435), the supporters of the cosmopolitan model have been very 
numerous, their belief founded on the idea that international institutions will carry out 
democratic functions: 
 
the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe; independent 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International and 
Freedom House; and transnational associations, such as trade unions and business 
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organizations, all regularly monitor the transparency, corruption level, and human 
rights regimes of individual countries. (Ibid: 435-6) 
 
Through such international organizations, cosmopolitan democracy has been given 
power to play a direct political role in citizens’ lives. The cosmopolitan regime has 
focused “on the role of citizens who should be empowered in order to exercise their 
rights and duties, not just in their nations, but also in the political communities which 
affect their lives” (Archibugi 2012: 11). International organizations such as the EU 
have become a main bearer or porter of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, “to ensure that the 
democratic state will be the global norm” (Rumford 2003: 384). 
 As I indicated in Chapter One, the enforcement of cosmopolitan democracy, 
has been imposed on candidates for membership of the EU. Turkey has been 
knocking on the EU door to take its place in the club, and this has had a vital impact 
upon its internal politics, including regional socio-politics and socio-economic 
development policy such as GAP. Thus, to clarify why GAP’s social programmes 
remain incomplete, the following section is about Turkish-EU relations and the 
concern of Turkish policy-makers over the development of cosmopolitan democracy 
led by the EU. 
 
7.5.3. Turkey-EU: implementation of cosmopolitan democracy  
 
 Turkey, in fighting to join, has perceived the EU in terms of potential economic and 
security benefits, but with the end of the Cold War, when the criteria for membership 
were expanded, and the potential impact of the EU’s support for the cosmopolitan 
regime of democracy became more strongly felt in Turkish regional domestic politics 
(for example, with regard to the GAP Project), the Turkish state and its political elites 
became sceptical as to whether they should join. For instance, according to Rumford 
(Ibid: 380), “The Turkish state and its political elites have frequently resisted calls for 
democratization on the basis that this amounts to foreign interference in the legitimate 
business of running the country.” 
With the end of the Cold War, the EU has come to be seen as two-faced: 
opportunity and threat. In terms of opportunity for Turkey, the development of 
cosmopolitan democracy in Turkey meant that the Turkish struggle for EU accession 
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would not be the major problem. It should be reiterated that Turkey, which, from its 
creation, adopted western civilization and hoped to join the EU club, already had a 
number of economic and security agreements with the West.  
Since the Second World War, Turkey has become a member of several 
European and Western organizations, “such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD [1948]), the Council of Europe (1949) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO [1952])” (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç 
2003: 196). In 1963, Turkey signed the Treaty of Ankara with the European 
Community (EC) to “establish an Association Agreement”, and this was the first 
serious indication of Turkey’s movement toward full membership (Leicester 1995: 1). 
Most importantly, in April 1987 Turkey made its formal application for full 
membership of the European Community (Müftüler-Bac 1999: 240). 
It has been argued that Turkey’s accession to the European Union could not 
only “bridge the cultural gap between the East and the West but would bolster the 
ailing Turkish economy and create an opening for the EU to Asia” (Moustakis and 
Chaudhuri 2005: 78). Furthermore, Turkey’s accession to the EU would provide an 
important source of employment for the young generation. Based on this view, the EU 
was perfect for the Turkish state. Turkey following the criteria of cosmopolitan 
democracy guaranteed its accession to the EU, and this would mean growth in the 
Turkish economy and a stronger position for Turkey in the global web. However, in 
order to join the EU, Turkey was asked to ensure the following:  
 
(i) stable institutions governing democracy; (ii) the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure; and (iii) 
the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
principles of political, economic and monetary union. (Muftuler-Bac, 1999: 
241) 
 
The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 claimed that countries developing 
solid institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and regard 
for minorities create a functioning market economy, and “incorporation of the 
community acquis—adhere to the various political, economic, and monetary aims of 
the EU” (Moustakis and Chaudhuri 2005: 78). The EU begins accession negotiations 
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with a candidate state only if it has satisfied political criteria defined as: a stable 
democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minorities 
(Sarigil 2007:  39). 
The Copenhagen criteria (1993) have forced Turkey to reform its legal system 
and bring in new laws to create a real and stable democracy. Though Turkey has 
adopted 143 new laws, which “ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and […] the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, it has not yet 
practically implemented any of these laws (Ibid: 85). 
  The Helsinki summit of the European Council in 1999 accepted Turkey as a 
candidate for full membership (McLaren 2000). In December 2004, the EU agreed to 
open negotiations with Turkey and, in October 2005, stated that it was open to new 
members on condition that they continued with “domestic reforms and the extension 
of the customs union to all new member states” (Diez 2005: 197).  Ultimately, one of 
the specific EU demands of Turkey concerned the Kurdish question and the socio-
economic issues of the south-east region. 
However, the notion of cosmopolitan democracy or of transnational processes 
of democratization, led by the EU and contained within the EU criteria, are frequently 
perceived by the Turkish state and the EU-sceptics in Turkey, who form part of a 
mainly statist elite, “predominantly traditionalists from the civilian–military elite” 
(Aybet 2006: 344), as being contrary to the interests of domestic harmony and a threat 
to national integrity” (Rumford 2003: 380). 
Despite the fact that politicians, military commanders and bureaucrats who 
control the Turkish state, and whose lifestyle has been closely aligned to the West, 
wanted to join the EU in order to benefit in terms of economic prosperity and 
security, and who were also supposed to turn Turkey into a more advanced modern 
society by modernizing its way of life along Western lines, they have become 
strongly sceptical towards accession, because of the cosmopolitan criteria advocated 
by the EU.  
Turkey in the EU would mean a Turkey embedded within a system of rules, 
one which accepts cosmopolitan democracy. In other words, the EU and the Council 
of Europe give power to citizens through democratic bodies, using EU criteria and 
human rights organizations to legitimize civilian freedoms relating to culture and 
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identity, which were formerly denied to repressed minorities by the national state 
(Ibid: 388).  
The Turkish state and predominantly civilian–military elite want to continue 
to be the only principal actor in both economic and political affairs; because any 
external organization such as the EU, with its cosmopolitanization of democracy, is 
considered as a threat to national sovereignty, traditional values and the traditional 
system of internal security. Employing cosmopolitanism means the end of the 1980s 
constitution, which is based on authoritarian laws restricting the freedom and rights of 
minorities and allowing the military to intervene in Turkish politics, particularly when 
dealing with the Kurdish question and the socio-economic development of the south-
east. The Turkish state wants a more nationalistic, isolationist Turkey with a 
politically powerful military, because it fears that the Kurdish question would 
otherwise undermine the unity of the Turkish Republic. For example, former 
president Süleyman Demirel, who is believed to be the creator of GAP, and who 
argued at the time that GAP was a national project and therefore had to be completed, 
also claimed that “lifting the language ban would pose a threat to Turkey, [and] 
protecting the official language is one of the musts of being a unitary state” (Rumford 
2007: 55).  
Moreover, the chief of the General Staff, Yasar Büyükanit, refused to 
countenance the idea of the Kurds being a legally protected minority. He stated that 
such “approaches are an insult to the Turkey of Kemal Atatürk [. . .] Atatürk would 
have been deeply saddened if he had lived through these days” (Gunter 2007: 121). 
Quite simply, the Turkish state, the army and also extreme nationalists are not willing 
to attempt to follow the criteria for EU democracy.  
Since the creation of the modern Turkish Republic, Turkish army officers 
have always been trained in westernized military schools, “where to a certain extent 
they became familiar not only with new military techniques, but also with the 
Western way of life and Western culture and ideas” (Sarigil 2007: 47), which shows 
that the military inclination is not to stay away from the EU, rather that it has its own 
perspective on EU accession.  While the Turkish military recognizes full membership 
of the EU as desirable in certain ways, it is deeply concerned about losing its position 
of power within Turkish politics and, more importantly, it is concerned that the state 
may have to leave regional socio-economic policy to the regionally elected actors, in 
which case the military would be more than likely to lose control over how the GAP 
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project should be implemented. All this makes the military sceptical about the future 
of Turkish accession to the EU.  
Many members of the predominantly civilian–military elite, particularly in the 
army, have expressed their fears that full integration into the EU will tear Turkey 
apart. The unification of Turkey is one of the most sensitive issues among this elite 
and the army. They believe in the “connections between EU demands and those of the 
Sevres Treaty, which was to divide up the Ottoman lands after the First World War, 
and they emphasize the overlap between EU demands about minority rights” (Aydinli 
2004: 155). It should not be forgotten that some still see Europe as an historical 
enemy. General Ilhan’s statement illustrates this: “We have been waging war against 
Europeans for the last 1500 years… that is why all European parliament decisions, 
e.g. Cyprus, Armenian, Kurdish, have all been against us – they are still waging a war 
against us” (Ibid: 155).  
Moreover, the National Action Party, Milliyetci Hareket Partesi (MHP), which 
was formed under the leadership of Alpaslan Türkeş (1917–97) in the 1960s, “has a 
long history of involvement with paramilitary insurgencies, organized political 
violence and state-centric totalitarian political scenarios” (Canefe and Tanıl 2007: 
128). This party is not just EU-sceptic, it is anti-EU, because its formation was based 
on the nationalist movement.  
The EU’s criteria of human rights, religious rights and the rule of law are 
viewed with great suspicion by the MHP. This nationalist right-wing party regards EU 
democracy as purely divisive for Turkey. For example, when Mesut Yilmaz (the 
former leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP)), suggested that cultural rights could 
be granted to the Kurds, in response the deputy leader of the MHP, Sevket Bulent 
Yahnici, declared that he would not accept any alternative views or EU demands for 
Kurdish rights. He stated that it was impossible for Turkey to discuss any cultural 
rights for the Kurds (Rumford 2007: 57-8). This included barring the Kurds from 
taking any key role in socio-economic decision making in relation to the GAP project.  
Turkey has been put under pressure by the EU democratic criteria in relation 
to the Kurdish question and the social economy of the south-east region. In short, EU 
criteria requires a membership mandate; not only the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minority 
rights, but also a guarantee of regional socio-economic development. In other words, 
the GAP project should be nurtured within the cosmopolitan regime of democracy.  
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Nevertheless, since the EU has begun to negotiate with Turkey, Turkish 
domestic and foreign policies have undergone some important alterations, such as 
constitutional and legal changes which appear quite radical. For instance, the Turkish 
state agreed that “efforts would be made to ‘remove obstacles’ to Kurdish-language 
broadcasting and education” (Ibid: 55). Furthermore, after the Helsinki Council 
summit, the then foreign minister, Ismail Cem, stated that Kurdish cultural rights 
would be extended, especially in the area of language and broadcasting. He cited “the 
ban on Kurdish language broadcasting as an obstacle to democracy and human rights” 
and declared that “everyone living in Turkey should have the right to broadcast in 
their own mother tongue” (Ibid: 55).  
Most importantly, in 1999, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz visited the Kurdish 
city of Diyarbakir and said: “The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir” (Gunter 
2007: 117-18). What Yilmaz meant was not only that Turkey should consider the 
basic rights of Kurds in the region but also that the region’s backward social economy 
should be considered within the framework of GAP. So, one could argue that this was 
the first time that any Turkish leaders realized that GAP could be seen not only in 
terms of economic growth but also that it should be perceived within the framework 
of the cosmopolitan criteria required by the EU.  
However, the state policy-makers and elite have begun to see the EU and the 
associated cosmopolitanization as a threat to the unification of the Turkish republic, 
simply because the regime of cosmopolitan democracy supports “certain ethnic or 
cultural groups that, although willing to continue to be part of their state of origin, 
want to obtain specific collective rights” (Archibugi 2008: 227). 
The Turkish state, politicians and ruling elite were concerned about the impact 
of EU accession on Turkey’s traditional system of internal security, and also feared 
abandonment and loss of territory. They became more EU-sceptical, thinking that the 
‘Sèvres syndrome’ might be reconstructed within the context of the EU and 
cosmopolitan democracy (Aybet 2006).   
 Without doubt, the Turkish state, politicians and ruling elite feared that the 
concept of cosmopolitan democracy would call for a rethinking of Turkey’s politics 
regarding GAP, propelling it away from its traditional approach towards one more 
concerned with the rights of locals. They became concerned that this new policy 
would give the Kurds a chance, for instance, to demand their collective rights, and 
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this concern has caused total confusion for the Turkish state and GAP policy-makers 
over what to do with the so-called ‘social development’ project. The following section 
is more directly focused on this matter and analyzes to what extent the cosmopolitan 
regime of democracy, led by non-governmental international institutions, has played a 
role in fostering a sceptical attitude in the Turkish state towards the completion of the 
‘social development’ project. 
 
7.5.4. Cosmopolitanism: the GAP social development project and Turkey’s 
approach 
 
As I have already pointed out, when Turkey proposed the GAP ‘social development’ 
project, it considered it within the framework of economic growth and security, not in 
terms of the cultural and political dimensions of the south-east. However, since the 
post-Cold War period, Turkey has come under pressure from external international 
institutions and political developments in the form of cosmopolitan democracy as an 
element of the ‘new world order’ or globalization, led by the EU and other non-
governmental organizations, in relation to GAP’s purpose as a social development 
scheme. 
For instance, in 1993 the World Bank established an appeals mechanism, 
allowing people and riparian countries “adversely affected by Bank funded projects to 
file claims regarding violations of its policies, procedures and loan agreements” 
(WDC 2000: 19). When Turkey began to reverse the water flow in attempting to fill 
the Atatürk Dam, Syria began a financial campaign against the GAP project, and 
managed to block international financial assistance for its completion. Syria 
campaigned successfully against funding and convinced the World Bank that GAP 
should not be financed until Turkey worked out a riparian treaty. They managed to 
stop $32 billion (US) funding being provided by the World Bank (El-Fadel et al 2002: 
103). This setback drastically affected the Turkish national economy, and the GAP 
project was postponed for years. The Syrian government made a clear statement to the 
international community that the project would eventually “lead to something 
paramount to an environmental, social and cultural disaster for the Syrian state” 
(Knudsen 2003: 208).  
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Thus Turkey began to realize that it could not ignore international institutions 
and carry out the GAP project purely within its own policy framework, though in 
1988 President Turgut Özal said: ‘we don't tell Arabs what to do with their oil, so we 
don’t accept any suggestion from them about what to do with our water’ (Darwish 
1998).  
Furthermore, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), which was formed in 
1997 and began to operate in 1998, in order to review the socio-economic, 
environmental and social effectiveness of large dams globally and assess alternatives 
for water and energy resource management, indicated that:  
 
Large dams have had serious impacts on the lives, livelihoods, cultures and 
spiritual existence of indigenous and tribal peoples. Due to neglect and lack of 
capacity to secure justice because of structural inequities, cultural dissonance, 
discrimination and economic and political marginalisation, indigenous and 
tribal peoples have suffered disproportionately from the negative impacts of 
large dams, while often being excluded from sharing in the benefits. (WCD 
2000: 110) 
 
The WCD requested that, at the end of any dam project, the host state should 
consider: 
 
Gender relationships and power structures are all too often detrimental to 
women. Extensive research has documented gender inequalities in access to, 
and control of, economic and natural resources. In Asia and Africa for 
example, women may have use rights over land and forests, but are rarely 
allowed to own and/or inherit the land they use. (Ibid: 114)   
 
However, the displacement in the south-east as a result of the GAP project has deeply 
disrupted and affected the lives of local people, mainly women and children, because 
women and adult children who reside on family land were not entitled to 
compensation as individuals (Morvaridi 2004). As regards unequal rights for women, the EU 
gender equality acquis has been written into Turkish legislation.  The EU stated in its 2004 report: 
“Intensified efforts will be needed for full alignment with EU standards in these fields, in 
particular as regards the full respect of women’s rights and improving the role of 
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women in political, economic and social life” (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004: 22).145  
Turkey has become aware that it cannot ignore the region’s cultural and 
political rights, including those related to the environment, historical sites, cultural 
heritage and inhabitants. In other words, GAP has faced the challenges from the EU 
and international non-governmental organizations, which required that Turkey should 
set up a sustainable water policy that would be in the interests of the region.146  
These international non-governmental organizations have had a powerful 
impact on Turkish water policy in the south-east, having already implemented 
effective high profile “campaigns includ[ing those concerning] the Three Gorges 
dams in China, the Pak Mun in Thailand, Ilisu in Turkey, Ralco in Chile, Epupa in 
Namibia, the Lesotho Highlands” (WCD 2000: 19). For example, when national and 
international companies such as Balfour Beatty (UK and USA), Impregilo (Italy), 
Skanska (Sweden), ABB Power Generation, Sulzer Hydro (Switzerland and Austria) 
and the Turkish companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen considered becoming involved 
in the Ilisu Dam as part of the GAP project (Morvaridi 2004: 723), these contractors 
were guaranteed credit of about $850 million from the Turkish agency the State 
Hydraulic Works (DSI) to carry out the construction of the dam (Bosshard 1998). 
However, “[e]ach contractor approached their government’s Export Credit Agency 
(ECA) to underwrite support for their involvement in the project against the risk of 
non-payment (Morvaridi 2004: 723). One of the reasons that the contractors were 
concerned related to attacks by environmentalists and international news agencies, 
which stressed that the Ilisu dam project was a threat to the environment and the 
‘cradle of civilization’ (Boutros-Ghali 1991: 41). 
Moreover, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as 
Corner House, Berne Declaration, ECA-Watch, Forests and European Union 
Resource Network (FERN), Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), and World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 See Commission of the European Communities, 
ec.europa.eu/information_society/.../COM_2004_0356_F_EN_ACTE.pd...EN. EN. Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels, 30.4. 2004. COM (2004) 356 final (accessed 2 April 2015). 
146 See World Wildlife Fund (2005), To dam or not to dam? Five years on from the World, 
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/about_freshwater/freshwater_resources/to_dam_or_not_to_dam/
; Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report, 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key.../2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf; Dams and Development: A New 
Framework for Decision; www.internationalrivers.org/.../world_commission_on_dams_final_report 
(accessed 2 April 2015). 
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Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED), as well as local activists have continued 
the campaign against the Ilisu dam via the initiative to Save Hasankeyf (ISH). These 
groups highlighted the fact that the project did not “meet international standards 
relating to environmental protection, resettlement, archaeological preservation, and 
negotiation which affected communities and other nations” (21 August KHRP 2007).  
Through the challenges of the NGOs to Turkish water policy in the south-east, 
the region’s inhabitants have begun to seek a role in the GAP project. Based on my 
empirical research, it is evident that they (in particular local Kurds) have begun to 
refuse the ‘top-down’ model of GAP and want to ensure that the project is carried out 
in the interests of their region, including their cultural heritage and identity rights, at 
least operating within the framework of EU democratic requirements. In this regard, 
one should bear in mind that the Kurds particularly favour joining the EU. Turkey in 
the EU would mean the end of authoritarian laws restricting Kurdish rights and 
freedoms. The Kurds believe that if Turkey were part of the new EU model of 
cosmopolitan democracy, they would have not only more opportunity to express their 
cultural and social identity freely, but would also play a major role in socio-economic 
decisions which affect them, primarily GAP. In this respect, Tocci makes the point 
that within Turkey, “the greatest support [for accession to the EU] has come 
consistently from the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern provinces” (2007: 135).  
The new global political order with its emphasis on the role of international 
non-governmental organizations such as the EU has been pushing Turkey to move 
away from its autocratic regime and accept the cosmopolitan democracy model, 
which would ensure “fundamental human rights exist[ing] alongside political, 
economic and social-cultural rights” (Winn 2002: 40). Thus, GAP, as a ‘social 
development’ project could not now be considered, as Turkish policy-makers had 
previously thought, only for economic, security and energy purposes. GAP has 
become internationalized in order to place the south-east in a larger framework. In 
other words, GAP as a state-led development project has been increasingly challenged 
since the end of the Cold War by many democratic civic developments such as 
cosmopolitan democracy, as the proposition that the Turkish state is not the only actor 
and is not the only authority connected with the GAP project has come to the fore. In 
particular, in the context of the EU’s 2004 report on Turkey-EU accession 
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negotiations, Turkey faced major challenges on regional policy by the European 
Council.147 The report stated that: 
 
The Union reaffirms its commitment that if the European Council decides in 
December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the 
Commission, that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will 
open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. (Council of the 
European Communities 2004: 3) 
 
The EU report requested that “Turkey should set up a regional development policy 
that would enable it to participate in EU programmes for strengthening economic and 
social cohesion” (Ibid: 41). The regional policy was of course not limited to the 
general economic and social cohesion implications. The GAP project was essential 
regional policy that the EU wanted Turkey to implement in line with its criteria.   
The EU required all candidates for membership to “meet institutional 
requirements of the EU regional policies during the accession negotiations” and, 
overall, in those states which were accepted as members, this imperative “brought 
about a major reform of their local and regional governance structures” (Beleli 2005: 
2).148 New candidates for membership have faced up to the institutional reforms 
required, in the form of “regional decentralization and the establishment of 
democratized regional governance structures” (Ibid).  
Broadly speaking, Turkey was told that it must prepare to implement the 
acquis by the time of EU accession, including “social progress, aiming at high levels 
of employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality 
of life and economic and social cohesion, [as this] is a key factor of economic 
performance as well as social justice” (Commission of the European Communities 
2004: 41). Moreover, the Kurdish question, in particular, was to be addressed 
comprehensively.  
Other organizations, such as the WCD, requested that when planning a dam 
project the host state should take into account:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 See Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report, 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key.../2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (accessed 5 June 2015). 
148 See more in Beleli, Ö, Regional policy and EU accession: learning from the GAP experience, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly 2005, esiweb.org. 
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international and national laws progressively aimed at empowering indigenous 
peoples to play a decisive role in development planning and implementation. 
Constitutions in some countries recognise the vulnerability of indigenous 
people in mainstream development processes arising from their distinct culture 
and history and have designed safeguards to protect their rights. The scope of 
international law has widened and currently includes a body of conventional 
and customary norms concerning indigenous peoples, grounded on self-
determination. In a context of increasing recognition of the self-determination 
of indigenous peoples, the principle of free, prior, and informed consent to 
development projects and plans affecting these groups has emerged as the 
standard to be applied in protecting and promoting their rights in the 
development process. (WCD 2000: 112) 
 
The WCD states that local consent must govern development decisions, according to 
the framework of the cosmopolitan democracy model.  As Archibugi indicated above, 
in the framework of cosmopolitan democracy, “citizens … should be empowered in 
order to exercise their rights and duties, not just in their nations, but also in the 
political communities which affect their lives” (2012: 11).  
However, such assumptions have been upsetting for Turkey. In particular, the 
requirements of the EU regarding the south-east, including economic and social 
cohesion and local rights related to GAP, were not welcomed by Turkey. Therefore, I 
argue that one of the reasons Turkey has not wanted to focus on completing the GAP 
‘social development’ project was and is because the GAP notion of social 
development went beyond economic growth, in the context of the development of 
global institutions requiring cosmopolitan democracy, which would influence the 
cultural, political and collective rights of Kurds. Because of this, the Turkish state has 
become sceptical, not only about EU accession, but also about the completion of GAP 
in terms of delivering its so-called ‘social development’ aims. 
In short, when the Turkish state realized that a cosmopolitan democratic 
regime within the EU might diminish its role as the primary driver of both economic 
and political affairs in the south-east, the state began to shift its focus from the social 
development of GAP, and mainly focused on hydroelectric power production and 
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security issues, such as building dams to prevent the passage of Kurdish guerrillas, 
and using hydroelectrics as a form of regional security in the Middle Eastern context. 
However, the question arises as to whether Turkey as an associate member of 
the EU will ever fully respect Kurdish rights and complete GAP’s social development 
programmes for improving their region, something which would have the potential to 
create long-term socio-economic, if not political, stabilization, or whether Turkey will 
continue its traditional approach towards the south-east by maintaining an 
authoritarian system in that region.  This depends on how far the Turkish state, 
politicians, the ruling elite and, in particular, the traditionalists who are predominant 
within the civilian–military elite are willing to grasp the notion of the cosmopolitan 
democracy model.  
 
7.6. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has revealed that the concept of the GAP ‘social development’ project 
has been obstructed by various interrelated internal political developments and 
external global political developments. Internally, there have been three major 
political developments in the south-east which have obstructed GAP from reaching its 
key ‘social development’ goals. These are  
1. The rise of the Kurdish national movement, which weakened the ambitions of 
the Turkish state to complete GAP’s social programmes because of the 
unpredictable escalation of political issues concerning the Kurds;  
2. The rise of the pro-Kurdish political party in the south-east, which has shifted 
the political power balance and shrunk the mainstream Turkish political 
parties’ support for GAP;  
3. Turkey’s failure to create a concrete policy for resolving the Kurdish question, 
including the missed opportunity of ‘peace processes’ or ‘peace talks’ with the 
PKK, which has resulted in a focus on conflict rather than on the completion 
of the social programmes.  
Externally, the notion of cosmopolitan democracy, led by international institutions 
and global geo-governance actors such as the EU, has played a role in generating a 
sceptical attitude within the Turkish state towards the completion of the GAP ‘social 
programmes’. In particular, when Turkey became squeezed by the pressure of 
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cosmopolitan democracy, as part of the global political development of the post-Cold 
War ‘new world order’, forcing it to review its traditional politics and veer away from 
its predominantly statist policy in the south-east and consider the project not only in 
the context of economic development and security but also in relation to the 
environmental, cultural and political dimensions of the region, the Turkish state began 
to neglect GAP’s social programmes.  
To conclude, I would argue that, on the one hand, as the result of the above 
three interrelated ‘internal’ political developments, and on the other hand, as the result 
of the emergence of post-Cold War global geo-governance, transnational or 
cosmopolitan regimes of democratization have had a vital, essentially negative impact 
on Turkish regional politics regarding the south-east in relation to the GAP project, 
including Kurdish demands for their cultural recognition, if not self-determination. In 
particular, the pressure of the requirements of cosmopolitan democracy for the 
interests of the region’s inhabitants (mainly Kurds) to be taken into account and for 
them to have a role in the project. Therefore, Turkey has effectively abandoned any 
attempt to complete the ‘social development’ aspirations of GAP, despite the fact that 
the official GAP website indicates the intention to complete the project by 2018. This 
date, along with all the other dates originally posited, has a distinctly theoretical ring 
about it.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fact that the GAP ‘social development’ project was originally conceived as a 
means of overcoming the longstanding chronic poverty created by the socio-economic 
situation of the south-east region is undeniable. This study has demonstrated that 
when Turkey was in the process of restructuring its growing economy in the 1980s 
and 1990s, adopting the neo-liberal model in order to do so, with the aim of obtaining 
an influential place in an increasingly global economic and political structure, the 
backwardness of the south-east could no longer be ignored. Thus, overcoming the 
socio-economic problems of the region required specific attention, and GAP was the 
consequence. However, the ‘social development’ aspect of GAP became less of a 
priority for the Turkish state, and GAP’s social programmes failed to come to fruition.  
The purpose of this thesis has not only been to examine the creation of the 
GAP ‘social development’ project and its mission, but to explore which factors have 
resulted in the project failing to reach its ‘social development’ goals. To make these 
issues more comprehensible, I began by focusing on the longstanding political tension 
between the south-east region and centralized Turkish authority, and the unequal 
socio-economic development of the south-east relative to the rest of Turkey. 
I have shown how the Turkish economy has been undergoing a lengthy 
process of development, modernization and expansion ever since the creation of the 
republic. Although when the Ottoman state dissolved in the 1920s it left the economy 
in a poor condition, the new Turkish republic, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, devoted itself to breaking out of the traditional mould of Turkish society, 
creating secularity, rationality and a modern industrial economy. Turkey modernized 
rapidly in all areas, including security, economy, culture and politics (Aydın 2005; 
Henze 1993; Keyman 2007).  
This commitment to modernization and development was the crucial driver in 
establishing the policies of the newly created Turkish state, and its policy-makers and 
the intellectual–bureaucratic elites were committed to the introduction of westernizing 
reforms in government and society, in accord with the will of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Atatürk believed that in order to move on from traditional social norms, which he saw 
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as synonymous with backwardness, Turkey had to turn its face toward the West and 
its culture, and away from the East.  
So the creation of a modern Turkish republic “in the wake of the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire [was] an anomaly somewhat out of place in the Middle East” 
(Knudsen 2003: 199). Turkey has distanced itself from its Middle Eastern neighbours 
and sought to orientate its position toward the West. This was perceived not only as 
disappointing but also as an act of betrayal by the Muslim Middle Eastern states, and 
since Turkey allied itself with the West, and the United States in particular, its 
relations with Middle Eastern countries have been strained. 
However, in order to create a new society, secure the new Turkish state and 
modernize, Atatürk wanted a European–type parliamentary system of government, 
and for Turkey, as a member of Western civilization, to be run as a republican regime. 
This involved the establishment of six principles: nationalism, populism, 
republicanism, secularism, etatism and revolutionism (Kili 1980; Akural 1984; 
Rumford 2003; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).  
Atatürk’s secular nation-state has been strongly influenced by the military, 
which has, on several occasions, openly dictated the country’s politics. The military 
has seen itself as the unique protector of the Turkish Republic, and in 1960, 1971 and 
1980, military juntas seized power, consolidating the army’s political power by 
reinforcing its position to the point where no civilian political organization could 
oppose it, and the military has restructured the constitution in a way which has 
allowed it to legitimize its intervention in everyday Turkish civilian politics. Although 
the political influence of the Turkish military has been reduced in recent years, it is 
still a significant force within the country.  
The overall Turkish economy has successfully expanded since the creation of 
the republic, particularly since the 1980s, when the world political economy was 
reformatted on the basis of the neo-liberal development model, which led to robust, 
positive socio-economic development in Turkey. Turkey continued to undertake 
reforms; “capital markets such as the reopening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the 
beginning of Treasury auctions for marketing new government debt, the formation of 
an inter-bank money market, and other changes” (Filiztekin 2006: 20).  The sharp 
development in the Turkish economy under the neo-liberal development model 
enabled Turkey to become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
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which was the first step towards becoming a member of  the ‘European family’ (Aral 
2001). 
However, there was a major obstacle in the way of Turkey securing its place 
in a globalized world system, and ultimately obstructing it from becoming a full 
member of the EU, and this was the underdevelopment of the south-east region, 
which Turkey had ignored since the creation of the republic. Turkish policy-makers 
began to realize that ignoring the backwardness of the south-east was going to hinder 
Turkey’s progress. The socio-economic and politically volatile issues in the south-
east, and the historically tense relationships between the Turkish state and the Kurds 
in the region (Kılıç 1998; Özcan 2006; Kendal 1993), were now making the situation 
harder for these policy-makers. 
However, none of these problems were going to be easily overcome. First of 
all, the Kurds were sceptical towards the Turkish state, since they felt betrayed by the 
creators of the republic. For instance, they had been promised autonomy for the 
region, and told that they would choose their own rulers (Kılıç 1998: 26). But the state 
denied the existence of the Kurds. The Turkish state simply denied the fact that there 
is a separate Kurdish ethnic identity, instead calling them ‘mountain Turks’ (Short 
and McDermott 1975: 8), a policy which led to three major Kurdish uprisings before 
the 1980s, the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925, the ‘Ararat Uprising’ in the 1930s and, in 
1937, the third major uprising, led by Sayyid Riza, in Dersim (Tunceli). 
Although there was no serious Kurdish resistance during the period between 
1938 and 1970, a fact which gave Turkey a vital opportunity to focus on dealing with 
the social and economic backwardness of the south-east, it failed to do so, instead 
pushing the region further into the hands of the ‘tribal’ leaders and religious men such 
as the ‘sheikhs’, resulting in even further isolation of the south-east from the rest of 
the country in both social and economic terms. Atatürk had crushed and outlawed all 
the religious orders and ordered that Turkey must leave its traditional way of life 
behind, adopt Western civilization, and become a modern country. However, since the 
‘tribal’ leaders and ‘sheikhs’ (who were against the idea of westernization and were 
markedly traditional, or ‘backward’, as Atatürk and his followers saw it) were 
working in the interests of the Turkish political leaders in the region in such ways as 
collecting votes for the government and keeping the local people under control, 
Turkey let them continue to control the region, with the sole proviso that they stayed 
loyal to Turkey. As long as everyone obeyed the official ideology and accepted 
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Atatürk’s direction, “Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk” (Rugman and 
Hutchings 1996: 26), they were left in peace. So in the period between 1938 and 
1970, since the Kurds were silent and the region was being run in the interest of the 
Turkish state under these feudal sheikhs and aghas, Turkey abandoned the south-east, 
thereby socially, economically, and arguably politically, pushing it into further 
hardship. 
Although in the 1970s some Kurdish intellectuals and students who lived or 
studied in big Turkish cities and protested against Turkish policy in their region under 
the banner of the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKD), Turkey, instead 
of reconsidering its policy towards the region and grasping the political danger of not 
dealing with the issues, after a short period outlawed their activities and imprisoned 
them (Entessar 1992). 
Furthermore, when a few years later Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, the Kurdish 
Workers’ Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Öcalan, who created a Kurdish National 
Liberation Movement with the aim of putting an end to the Turkish policy towards the 
Kurds and their region, succeeded in reawakening Kurds and put the Kurdish question 
on the world agenda, Turkey continued to stick to its traditional policy regarding the 
region’s socio-economic and political problems.  
However, by the late 1980s, the issue of the south-east posed two problems for 
the Turkish state. Firstly, Turkey could no longer ignore the region, because its 
backwardness was creating problems for the country with regard to taking its desired 
position in the globalized world system, most importantly becoming a full EU 
member.  
Secondly, since the end of Cold War, ‘new thinking’ about strategy, 
international security and politics has led to the traditional statist and militarized view 
on international politics being dramatically altered. A new kind of world system has 
been created. The Hobbesian notion of the world has become less meaningful, and the 
traditionalists’ conceptual framework of the state has been overturned during this 
period. Sovereign states or nation-states, which were once universal, have begun to 
lose their classical position in the global system as the importance of “military – 
political security declined after the post-Cold War” (Buzan et al 1998: viii).  
The concept of the state being in control of everything was challenged, as 
Strange (1996: 4) described it: 
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Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, 
on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And 
the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority 
to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies, and in a 
growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and 
weaker ones without it. 
 
In order to continue to exist, the states have begun to look at other growing concerns 
with regard to development, such as security (political, economic, environmental and 
societal) (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Anderson and Fenech 1994). In 
particular, issues such as increasing population, with growing demand for fresh water, 
food and energy, have become crucial for nation-states. 
In the context of this post-Cold War era, I argue that the south-east has come 
to hold a new strategic position for the Turkish state. Thus, the materialization of the 
GAP project should be understood in a wider national, if not international, 
framework. In particular, the GAP project has brought new opportunities and 
strategies, such as hydroelectric energy production, and since Turkey is upstream on 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, has positioned the country as a hegemonic state in the 
Middle East. In this regard, the GAP ‘social development’ project, I argue, was 
originally a political project predominantly motivated by the strategic interest of the 
Turkish government in strengthening its position of power through addressing 
political matters in the south-east region and thereby employing its hegemonic 
strategy in the context of the Middle East.  
Although this thesis has not studied Turkish policy regarding GAP in relation 
to its external security in any detail, we should also bear in mind that the project puts 
downstream states such as Syria and Iraq in a “strategically and materially 
disadvantageous position, and therefore threatens their national security” (Rohr 1999: 
3). Thus the project has the extra benefit for Turkey of enhancing internal as well as 
external security, and “contributing to the long-term military-political goal of macro-
regional hegemony” (Warner 2004: 19). 
In short, the GAP project involves Turkey holding on to the waters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers through the creation of dams, potentially enabling the 
country to gain a strategic position over Syria and Iraq through hydro-hegemony. 
Therefore, I argue that GAP serves Turkey’s long-term goal of regional hegemony, 
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with the utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris waters not only being for Turkish 
energy needs but also to enhance its political position in the Middle East, which in 
turn would enable it to become a powerful regional actor in the globalized world 
political economy, eventually widening the EU door to the country.  
To recap, GAP as a social development project was thought to have the 
potential to diminish the social, economic and ethnographic problems of the south-
east and turn the region into a profitable, modernized area, narrowing the socio-
economic gap between the region and the west of Turkey particularly through the 
production of hydro-electricity, while at the same time strengthening its geo-regional 
hegemonic position within the Middle East. Turkish state planners adopted the 
concept from the global development model, believing that the process of socio-
economic development, assisted by the GAP social programmes, would overcome the 
backwardness of the region and enable the modernization of its traditional society, in 
the process providing social stability alongside socio-economic integration between 
the underdeveloped south-east/Kurds and the industrialised west/Turks.  
In order to make the subject more comprehensible, I also assessed the overall 
literature on the GAP ‘social development’ project. The Turkish government presents 
GAP as a ‘social development’ scheme that will create economic, social and spatial 
changes, and which is intended to end the chronic poverty of the south-east/Kurdish 
region by raising local people’s income levels and living standards, providing social 
stability and economic growth through the enhancement of the employment capacity 
of the regional sector and creating socio-economic integration between the region and 
the west of Turkey. Most public discourse reflects this position. 
Broadly speaking, there has been a considerable amount of work on GAP 
regarding it as an alternative socio-economic formula for dealing with the 
backwardness of the south-east through the ‘social development’ programmes. I 
analyzed the the literature in relation to the ‘social development’ project and its 
politicization, showing how it has been used by the Turkish state to attempt to deal 
with the Kurdish question. 
  However, since the aims of the ‘social development’ programmes have not 
been achieved, I have studied the most relevant works concerning the obstacles that 
have blocked the progress of the GAP project. I have examined the overall project 
through empirical and theoretical work, and studied the most relevant literature in this 
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context, enabling me to grasp aspects of the issue that have not been recognized in the 
literature, and I have discussed this. 
Since the GAP ‘social development’ project is involved with regional politics, 
I examined the background of the GAP project more broadly, particularly in chapters 
two to four. In chapter two I examined the physicality and construction of the GAP 
project. In chapter three, I clarified why there was a perceived need for the GAP 
‘social development’ project in the south-east, a region that had been socially and 
economically neglected by the Turkish state. I then assessed the unequal social 
development of the south-east relative to the rest of the country. Chapter four was 
mainly devoted to the literature review.  
  Whilst I indicated that GAP has made significant progress towards achieving 
sustainable development, I also stated that GAP has failed to reach its original target. 
In terms of the positive progress, social services such as Multi-Purpose Community 
Centres (Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM)),149 which provide services for 
girls over the age of 14 and local women, including “literacy courses, health 
education, nutritional and housekeeping courses, maternal education, knitting and 
weaving courses, as well as poly-clinical services” (Carkoglu and Eder 2005: 178-9), 
and GAP Youth House Centres (GAP Gençlik Evleri’)150, which have been providing 
social activities for young people and offering lessons on information technology, 
writing, reading, English, music, theatre, folk dance and photography, including 
Children’s Development Centres, which provide social activities for younger children 
aged from 4 to 6 and 7 to 14, including lessons for pre-school education, Turkish 
language and mathematics, reading and writing, technology and arts. Children’s 
Development Centres provide a great opportunity for socially and economically 
disadvantaged parents. In these respects, GAP has made important progress. In terms 
of hydro-electric power plant 74% of the project has been completed. However, GAP 
has not succeeded in irrigating around 18 million hectares as planned. Only around 
20% of land in the south-east has so far been brought under irrigation. This land that 
has achieved good productivity in the form of pulses, vegetables and fruit, cereals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-icerik/gap_nedir.aspx; 
GAP ÇATOM, www.gapcatom.org (accessed 2 June 2013). 
150 See GAP-Genclik evleri in TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı GAP İdaresi Başkanlığı, www.gap.gov.tr/site-
icerik/gap_nedir.aspx (accessed 2 June 2013). 
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cotton (www.gap.gov.tr, accessed 5 June 2011). The industrial sectors have also 
experienced some positive developments.  
However, my empirical work, including primary evidence, government 
documents and independent reports, indicates that the GAP ‘social development’ 
project is far behind the target in the GAP-Master Plan; the project has not reached its 
main social development target and has not overcome the longstanding socio-
economic backwardness of the south-east.  
The south-east is still the least developed area in Turkey, both economically 
and socially. The claim that GAP would provide jobs for local people and that it 
would end poverty in the south-east, as Altan Tan, local MP, member of the pro-
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP)) (personal 
interview, June 2011), argued, was merely the project’s mask. It is a political device 
as opposed to something which policy-makers are sincerely committed to. 
My research also shows that GAP has failed to improve the region’s literacy 
levels. The level of education, especially for girls, is low. For instance, as Müsvet 
Çakar (personal interview, June, 2011, Mardin), president of the Environmental 
Ecology and Support Ecology Association (Çevre Ekoloji ve Yasatma Destekleme 
Dernegini), stated: “Mardin is the fourth from the bottom in Turkey in regard to 
literacy.” The research also reveals that a specific group of people who have been 
employed by the state in the region benefit economically from the project, not the 
inhabitants, who are mainly peasants. Therefore I argue that the project has been 
inequitable, resulting in an imbalance between the income of local people and those 
brought in to the region as a result of the project.  
My work also indicates that the rather small proportion of the land that has 
been irrigated is not distributed fairly. For instance, GAP policy-makers’ first priority 
in this respect has been those areas which are politically loyal to the Turkish state. For 
instance, the province of Sanliurfa, which is mainly inhabited by Arabs (who are 
supporters of the Turkish state), is the area which has benefited most from the project, 
whereas Diyarbakir, inhabited mainly by Kurds, has only received 5% of the water 
transfer. Similarly the area around the pro-Kurdish town of Suruç in Sanliurfa 
province is one of the most fertile areas in the region, much more so than the Harran 
Plain, which adjoins a pro-Turkish town, in the same province. While Harran has 
been receiving water from the Atatürk Dam, no water has yet been transferred from 
the dam to Suruç. One of the participants from Suruç (name not given, personal 
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interview, June 2011)151 said: “We are being punished by the Turkish state for being 
Kurds.” From this perspective, I would argue that the GAP project has been merely a 
political ploy.  
The negative outcomes of the project have been more significant than the 
positive ones for the local people. The majority of my interviewees stated their 
complained that GAP had destroyed their lives and forced many to leave their homes 
with very little compensation. That which they did receive did not come with any plan 
or advice on how to use it. Many of my interviewees observed that because they had 
no previous experience of dealing with large sums of cash, they either put it in a bank, 
in which case it eventually lost its value, or bought practical things such as a car. 
However, none of this resulted in ongoing financial stability, so many people faced 
further poverty, and many of these moved to big cities. Those people who had lost 
their lands and livelihood now had to struggle to live in a city. Many locals have been 
obliged to look for jobs in other parts of the country, and they believe that GAP is 
intended simply to provide energy for Turkish needs. It is true that Turkey gets almost 
50% of its electricity from the GAP project. 
However, there is a contradiction in the fact that the Turkish state continues to 
claim that the project will bring prosperity to the south-east despite the fact that there 
has been very little sign that it will create sustainable development there. This claim 
reminds one of the work of Eduardo Galeano. The concept of development, 
introduced by industrialized Western countries in Third World countries, carries the 
proviso that, “[t]he Third World will become like the First World,  – rich, cultivated 
and happy if it behaves and does what it is told, without saying anything or 
complaining” (Galeano 1997: 214). These countries listened and made a conscious 
effort to hear good news for years, but it has never arrived. The difference is that the 
local people in south-east Turkey do not wait or listen, because the idea that GAP will 
modernize the region and bring higher living standards has failed to convince them. 
After much verbal posturing and too many promises from the representatives of the 
state, my empirical work reveals that local people have become less willing to trust 
the claims by the state that it will develop the region via GAP. Sebaha Tuncel, 
independent MP in Istanbul (personal interview, June 2011), indicated that the project 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Suruç town is very pro-Kurdish, and many Kurdish guerillas originated there, so many of my 
participants were concerned that they should remain anonymous. 
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had destroyed many people’s hopes, after they had been waiting for years for GAP to 
bring prosperity to their region.  
Since the project has been a ‘top-down’ creation, not involving any 
consultation with local people, the latter, particularly Kurds, have begun to believe 
that the project has nothing to do with social development but rather that it is the 
state’s hidden political tool in the region, a means of assimilating Kurds. Making 
Kurdish villages disappear and forcing the Kurds to live in big cities, the Turkish state 
believe eventually that the Kurds will be assimilated through “their forced inclusion 
into mainstream Turkish society and culture” (Ronayne 2005: 36).  
My research also shows the ways in which the GAP Project has been 
destructive to local civilization in the south-east. The construction of GAP dams has 
already buried many archaeological sites such as Zeugma or Belkis (modern name) 
and Nevali Çori, and the project will soon lead to the destruction of the ancient city of 
Hasankeyf.  The dams have had a serious negative impact on the environment, 
ecology, archaeological sites, historical towns, settlements and cultures in the region.  
I also discussed the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, which, like GAP, has had a 
negative impact on human life, the environment, cultural heritage and archaeological 
sites. For instance the Aswan project has deeply affected thousands of Nubian lives in 
ways similar to how GAP has affected local communities in the south-east of Turkey. 
However, my research reveals that the Aswan project has been extremely positive in 
terms of the region’s socio-economy, and played a major role in the overall 
development of the entire country, whereas GAP has been intertwined with regional 
political issues and has been constructed to serve Turkish state policies in the region, 
despite the fact that it is officially supposed to be, like the Aswan High Dam, a 
sustainable regional and socio-economic development project. 
Many mainstream Turkish political party leaders and the Turkish state itself, 
particularly at the beginning of the GAP project, genuinely wanted it to be completed. 
However, it has failed to revolutionize the south-east region’s socio-economic 
situation through profitable farming and employment opportunities. Hence the 
question arises, what have been the obstacles to the realization of the project?  
In order to reveal the main obstacles, I looked at four developments, three 
internal and one external, which I believe have obstructed the project.   
The first internal factor is the rise of the Kurdish national movement in the 
south-east, allied with the development of Kurdish de facto authority in Turkey’s 
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neighbouring countries. The Kurdish National Liberation Movement has been led by 
the PKK, which “developed [a] broad organizational structure and displayed an 
enormous capacity to mobilize Kurds both within and without Turkey, especially in 
Europe” (Hirschler 2001: 146). “The PKK, at one point, was estimated to have some 
10,000 well-armed insurgents and could command the loyalty of 50,000 militia and, 
according to government estimates, 375,000 sympathizers” (Barkey and Fuller 1997: 
60). The battle between Turkish troops and the PKK guerrillas turned the region into a 
war zone, and this has impacted on Turkish thinking in relation to GAP ‘social 
development’ programmes. 
Meanwhile, the development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey’s neighbouring 
countries, especially since the Kurds in Iraq achieved autonomy at the end of the 
second Gulf War (Stansfield 2003), has also influenced the Turkish state with regard 
to its internal Kurdish question, and the geopolitical and geostrategic issues in the 
region. 
I argue that the rise of the Kurdish national movement in the region has 
weakened the ambition of the Turkish state to complete GAP’s social programmes. 
This is, firstly, because of the unpredictable escalation of political developments with 
regard to the Kurds and, secondly, when the original ‘social development’ project did 
not work out for the Turkish state in the ways in which it was planned, it began 
neglecting the social programme. The policy-makers have had to concentrate on 
security issues in the south-east, and have come to ignore the importance of GAP’s 
social programmes in the region.  
Secondly, the rise of the pro-Kurdish political party and the losses experienced 
by mainstream Turkish political parties has shifted the balance of political power in 
the south-east, and this has shrunk the mainstream parties’ support for GAP, again 
leading to the project being neglected. Turkish mainstream political parties used to get 
substantial numbers of votes from the region, but with the rise of the pro-Kurdish 
party, this ceased to be the case. The emergence of the pro-Kurdish political party, 
which was established in the 1990s and has had successful results ever since, 
diminished support for all the mainstream Turkish political parties, and the latter 
gradually removed their support from GAP. According to one of my participants in 
Hasankeyf (June 2011): “All this is politics and the Turkish government and 
politicians are punishing the Kurds for not being faithful.” 
My research shows that, despite the fact that Turkey has tried to block the 
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development of the pro-Kurdish party, closing it down several times and imprisoning 
many elected Kurdish politicians, the pro-Kurdish political movement received an 
increasing percentage of votes and finally, in the 2015 general election, the People’s 
Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) broke the 10% national vote 
threshold to become the fourth elected party in Turkey. The loss of the Turkish 
mainstream parties’ dominant position to pro-Kurdish parties in the GAP region has 
resulted in negligence towards the ‘social development’ project, contributing to the 
project failing to reach its target. 
Finally, the failures of Turkish politics and the strategies of the Turkish state 
regarding the Kurdish question, particularly the ‘peace talks’ between the PKK and 
the Turkish state, had a negative impact on the GAP project. Despite the fact that 
Turkey made several attempts to make peace with the PKK and end the turmoil, it has 
always been sceptical towards the Kurds. For instance, the Oslo talks were carried out 
in a positive atmosphere but failed in 2012, and later when the Turkish Prime Minister 
and the PKK leader, Öcalan, publically revealed that new peace talks were taking 
place between the Turkish state and the PKK, it was widely perceived as good news 
and a new opportunity to end the longstanding Kurdish issue. 
However, this hope ended when the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya 
Demokra (PYD)) movement arose in Syria, a counterpart to the PKK. Turkey feared 
that another autonomous Kurdish state, led by PKK ideology, together with Iraqi 
Kurdistan, would be a death threat to unified Turkey. In this respect, I argue that 
Turkey continued its traditional policies, refusing to resolve the Kurdish question, 
despite the fact that the last ‘peace talks’ provided  a great opportunity for the region’s 
stabilization, which in turn would assist GAP in pursuing its objectives in terms of the 
region’s socio-economic development. If Turkey had succeeded in creating long-term 
peace with the Kurds in the region, the GAP project would have been in a position to 
rebalance the economy between the west of Turkey and the south-east. 
However, having pointed to the three major internal obstacles, interrelated 
political issues that have prevented the ‘social development’ project from becoming 
reality, I argue that there is also an external factor that has impacted on GAP. I have 
analyzed GAP in the context of the global political framework that has arisen in the 
post-Cold War period. This has manifested itself as a new system, which has required 
individual nation-states to reshuffle their obligations within the concept of the 
cosmopolitan regime of democracy. From this global political development, the idea 
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of cosmopolitan democracy has been developed in order to overcome the 
complexities of the period. 
The development of cosmopolitan democracy has begun to challenge the 
concept behind the Westphalia Treaty, the Realist philosophy that sovereign states are 
the only actor occupying centre stage in world politics. Cosmopolitan regimes of 
democratization, as one element of globalization in the post-Cold War period, have 
been developed by liberal thinkers such as Archibugi, Held, Beck and others, “with 
the aim of providing intellectual arguments in favour of an expansion of democracy, 
both within states and at the global level” (Archibugi 2004: 437), creating the 
theoretical possibility of perpetual peace in the world, and reducing the power of 
nation-states via global democratic governance in the form of organizations such as 
the EU. 
The core concept of the cosmopolitan regime of democracy has been to focus 
“on the role of citizens who should be empowered in order to exercise their rights and 
duties, not just in their nations, but also in the political communities which affect their 
lives” (Archibugi 2012: 11). Cosmopolitan democracy has become enforcement, led 
by the EU, resulting in Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, having had to 
address its internal politics and regional policies such as GAP as a matter of urgency. 
I pointed out that Turkey has been fighting for a long time to join the EU, 
having perceived it in terms of its economic and security benefits. However, with the 
end of the Cold War, the expansion of EU criteria and the potential impact of the 
EU’s adherence to a cosmopolitan regime of democracy became an issue in Turkish 
regional domestic politics, and this included the GAP Project. The Turkish state and 
its political elites have consequently become sceptical as to whether they should join 
the EU.  
The Turkish state and its predominantly statist elite have been keen to 
continue to be the only principal actor in both economic and political affairs. So a 
development such as the cosmopolitanization of democracy was considered to be a 
threat to national sovereignty, traditional values and the traditional system of internal 
security. However, EU criteria involve a membership mandate; not only the stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection 
of minority rights, but also a guarantee of regional socio-economic development. In 
other words, the GAP project should be nurtured within the cosmopolitan regime of 
democracy. The regime of cosmopolitan democracy takes into account “certain ethnic 
	   219	  
or cultural groups that, although willing to continue to be part of their state of origin, 
want to obtain specific collective rights” (Archibugi 2008: 227). This approach has 
been deeply disconcerting for the Turkish state, politicians and ruling elite, who have 
linked it to the ‘Sèvres syndrome’.   
Turkey wanted to develop the GAP project in the framework of economic 
growth and security, not in terms of the cultural and political dimensions of the south-
east; and it never wanted to be pressurized by external political developments such as 
the regime of cosmopolitan democracy, or by EU requirements concerning cultural 
and political rights including those related to the environment, historical sites, cultural 
heritage and the regional policy of the Turkish state. Broadly speaking, as Archibugi 
indicated, in the framework of cosmopolitan democracy, “citizens … should be 
empowered in order to exercise their rights and duties, not just in their nations, but 
also in the political communities which affect their lives” (Archibugi 2012: 11).  
However, such assertions have been upsetting for Turkey. Therefore, I argue 
that this external factor is one of the reasons that Turkey has become sceptical, not 
only about EU accession, but also about the completion of the GAP ‘social 
development’ project, shifting its focus from social development to concentrate on 
hydroelectric power production and security, building dams which prevent the free 
movement of Kurdish guerrillas, and using hydroelectricity as a form of regional 
security in the context of the Middle East. Broadly speaking, Turkey has effectively 
abandoned any attempt to complete the GAP ‘social development’ target, despite the 
fact that the official GAP website continues to refer to the intention to complete the 
project, the target date now having moved again, to 2018. 
Therefore I argue that despite the fact that I have described four problems,  
three internal and one external, that have impacted on the GAP ‘social development’ 
project, the obstacles to it are also related to the historical ambiguity and paradoxical 
nature of Turkish policy in the region. GAP could have been successfully 
implemented if these policies and the mind-set of the state towards the Kurds had 
changed. It appears that the GAP ‘social development’ project will not be able to play 
its role either in dealing with the longstanding socio-economic issues of the south-east 
or in enabling integration between the west of Turkey and the region, unless Turkey 
radically reconsiders its traditional state policies towards the region, accepts Kurdish 
cultural empowerment, and enable the region’s inhabitants to actively co-operate with 
the project. Ultimately whether the concept of ‘development/modernization’ can be 
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employed to enable the GAP ‘social development’ project to succeed depends on 
where developments in terms of Kurdish nationalism are heading and how far the 
Turkish state and politicians, the ruling elite, are willing to understand and accept the 
cosmopolitan democracy model.  
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Appendix I: Interview Questions 
 
Questions for GAP Directors and Staff  
 
1. What are Turkey’s key aims and future plans for GAP? 
2. How will the region benefit from the GAP project? 
3. How many jobs is GAP likely to provide in the region? Has it provided any 
yet? 
4. Has the project led to opportunities for entrepreneurs? 
5. To what extent has the ÇATOM project created opportunities for women and 
young girls to become aware of their problems? 
6. The people most affected by GAP appear to be young people. ‘Youth to Youth 
Social Project’ was supposed to address this issue. What is the situation with 
these young people now? Did the project provide jobs and education for them? 
7. What is the impact of GAP on traditional local agriculture? 
8. What is the contribution of the GAP project to the country and the region so 
far? 
9. How will GAP fulfil the economic gap between the west and east of Turkey? 
10. Only about 3.4 % of Turkish enterprises in manufacturing industry are 
available in the region compared with the west of the country. To what extent 
will the project lessen this gap? 
11. What do you mean by saying that GAP is a transformational and an 
integrational regional development project? 
12. Many historical sites have already been flooded. Was there any attempt to 
salvage anything? 
13. Is there any environmental effect on local people as a result of flooding? 
14. Is there any negative affect on the ecosystem and environmental damage in the 
region as a result of the flood? 
 
Questions for NGOs, Academics and MPs  
 
1. How do you characterize the aims of GAP? 
2. Does the region benefit from the GAP project? 
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3. Has GAP increased the local economy? 
4. To what extent has GAP affected welfare locally? 
5. Do you think that GAP is a great opportunity for the region? 
6. Is there an environmental effect on local people as a result of the flooding? 
7. What are the long-term environmental prospects in the region? 
8. Do you think that GAP will affect the region’s ecological and environmental 
aspects? 
9. Do you think that GAP will change the ecosystem and affect natural life in the 
region? 
10. To what extent has GAP caused displacement? 
11. What are the psychological effects on people who have been dispossessed by 
the project? 
12. What is GAP’s justification for flooding historical sites? 
13. Does Turkey intend to create an interdependent relationship between the 
Kurdish community and the rest of Turkey via GAP? 
14. Do you think GAP is a social-development project designed to help the locals 
in the region or is it a source of security? 
15. What are Turkey’s key aims and future plans for GAP? 
 
Questions for Displaced/Resettled People 
 
1. What is the GAP project? 
2. Did you have land before the Dam was flooded? If yes, do you have any now? 
3. How is your new life in the new resettlement? (Socially and economically) 
4. What are the differences between your new house and your old house? 
5. Did you get paid compensation payments? If yes, did you receive 
compensation on time? 
6. Are you happy with the money you did get? 
7. Would you prefer being compensated financially or being able to stay in your 
old house? 
8. Did you have any misrepresentation of the value of your house? If so, how did 
this affect your life? 
9. To what extent has the GAP project affected your life in general? 
10. Did or do you suffer any social problems? 
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11. Are you happy here with your new life? 
12. Do you have a job? 
13. Do you think GAP is a social-development project designed to help the locals 
in the region or is it a source of security?  
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Appendix II: List of Interviewees 
 
Names Title and Position Date and Place 
of Interview 
Abdurrahman 
Karaman 
 
Local resident, Samsat July 2011,  
Samsat 
Adalet H. 
Akbas 
 
Coordinator of the GAP – ÇATOMs June 2011, 
Sanliurfa 
 
Ahmet Gökçek Local resident, Halfeti July 2011, 
Halfeti 
 
Ahmet Özer Professor in the University of Süleyman 
Demirel. Isparta 
June 2011, 
Istanbul 
 
Altan Tan Local MP and member of the pro-Kurdish 
Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve 
Demokrasi Partisi (BDP)) 
June, 2011, 
Diyarbakir 
Ali Çarkoglu Professor in University of Koç, Istanbul June 2011, 
Istanbul 
Erdal Balsak A member of staff at the Derik Town Hall June 2011, 
Istanbul 
Erkin Board member of the Association for Social 
Change (Sosyal Değişim Derneğinde yönetim 
kurulu üyesi) 
June 2011, 
Diyarbakir   
 
Gaye Yilmaz University of Bogazici June 2011, 
Istanbul 
Fırat Argun Local resident, Hasankeyf June 2011, 
Hasankeyf 
 
Kurt GAP-Youth House staff member, Mardin June 2011, 
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Mardin 
Leyla Gün GAP-ÇATOM staff member, Mardin June 2011, 
Mardin 
 
Mehmet 
Açikgöz 
GAP regional director July 2011, 
Sanliurfa 
 
Mehmet Çelik Local textile businessman  from Samsat town July 2011, 
Samsat 
 
Müsvet Çakar President of an NGO, the Environmental 
Ecology and Support Ecology Association 
(Çevre Ekoloji ve Yasatma Destekleme 
Dernegini), in Mardin 
June 2011, 
Mardin 
Ömer Faruk 
Paköz 
Chairman of Keep Hasankeyf and Tigris Dicle 
River Alive Association (Hasankeyf ve Dicle 
Nehri Yaşatma Derneği başkanı) 
June 2011, 
Hasankeyf 
Sadrettin 
Karahocagil 
President of GAP July 2011, 
Ankara 
 
Sabahat Tuncel MP and member of the pro-Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi 
(BDP))  
 
June 2011, 
Istanbul 
 
 
Serhat Öz NGO staff member from the Keep Hasankeyf 
Alive Initiative Activists (Hasankeyfi yaşatma 
girişiminde activist) 
June 2011, 
Hasankeyf 
Mahsun Kepti Local resident, Suceken village, Batman 
province 
June 2011, 
Hasankeyf 
 
Mustafa Seven Local resident, Yenicagla village, Batman June 2011, 
Batman 
Mesut Local resident, Hasankeyf June 2011, 
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Hasankeyf 
Nail Ayberk Locally elected head of the village, Halfeti July 2011, 
HalfetiJuly 2011, 
Halfeti 
Nedim Tüzün Chairman of the electrical engineering 
committee, Diyarbakir  
July 2011, 
Diyarbakir 
Gülbahar 
Ölmek 
Assistant to the mayor of Surici/Diyarbakir July 2011, 
Diyarbakir 
Anonymous x 4 Local residents, Suruç 
 
June 2011, Suruç 
Anonymous x 5 Local residents, Halfeti 
 
July 2011, 
Halfeti 
Anonymous x 2 Local residents, Hasankeyf June 2011, 
Hasankeyf 
Anonymous x 2 Local residents, Samsat, 
 
July 2011, 
Samsat 
Anonymous x 2 Local residents, Harran July 2011, 
Harran 
Anonymous x 2 Local residents, Diyarbakir July 2011, 
Diyarbakir 
Anonymous x 2 Local residents, Yenicagla village, Batman June 2011, 
Yenicagla 
village, Batman 
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